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ABSTRACT 
Essays on Cross-Sectional Returns and 
Asset Pricing 
 
 
The dissertation aims at the further understanding of several critical issues in 
the stock markets. It contains four chapters. 
 Cross-sectional stock returns and asset pricing has been one of the most 
important areas in financial economics. With the empirical failure of the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), an increasing number of studies have been 
conducted in the US stock market, and consequently many alternative asset 
pricing models and factors, have been proposed. Chapter One investigates the role 
of liquidity risk in cross-sectional asset pricing in both the USA and the UK. This 
study finds that a liquidity-augmented CAPM explains asset returns. Liquidity 
explains a sizeable spectrum of cross-sectional stock returns; and its effect is 
robust in the presence of other well-known empirical factors and a range of 
macroeconomic factors. Given the influential work of Fama and French (1992 and 
1993), the performance of size and value premiums, (i.e., the excess return of 
small-capitalization stocks over large-capitalization stocks and the excess return 
of high book-to-market over low book-to-market stocks) are also compared. It is 
found that value premium is robust while the size premium disappears in the data 
for both countries.  
 Chapter Two investigates the relationship between liquidity and beta, as this 
relationship has been given little attention in the literature. Using the illiquidity 
measure of Amihud (2002), Acharya and Pedersen (2005) show that liquidity is 
priced in the framework of CAPM, and illiquid stocks have higher betas. This 
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study, however, provides empirical evidence that Amihud’s measure is highly 
correlated with firm’s size, and the results of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) could 
be spurious because of inappropriate choice of liquidity proxy. Using the size-free 
liquidity measure proposed in this study, it is demonstrated that liquid stocks have 
higher betas. This is consistent with the model of Holden and Subrahmanyam 
(1996), in which risk-averse investors resist holding risky (high beta) stocks. As a 
consequence, they trade risky stocks more often than low beta stocks, thus 
increasing the liquidity of high beta stocks. The evidence that illiquid stocks have 
low betas while still commanding higher returns implies that liquidity is priced in 
a multifactor, rather than CAPM, framework, which is consistent with the work of 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). 
 In Chapter Three, many different factors proposed in the cross-sectional asset 
pricing literature are reviewed; and it is argued that the number of factors in the 
literature seems to be too large, as suggested by the Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
(APT). It is hypothesized that all the existing factors cannot be mutually exclusive 
and/or equally important, thus there must be redundant factors. More importantly, 
many of the successful factors are not well economically or theoretically 
motivated. For example, there is still no consensus on the underlying risk of the 
well-known Fama and French factors. Last but not least, many of these successful 
empirical factors suffer in terms of the data-mining critique of Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990). In this study, a total of 18 factors are assembled and categorized into three 
groups: five risk-related, eight firm characteristics and five APT motivated 
principal component factors. Individual stocks rather than portfolio returns are 
used in testing factor models to avoid the data-snooping problem. The results 
suggest a risk-related four-factor model can serve as a replacement for the 
controversial Fama-French and momentum factors. More importantly, the four 
factors, i.e., excess market return, co-skewness, downside risk, and liquidity, are 
economically and theoretically better motivated than the firm-characteristics 
based factors. It is also found that many of these firm-characteristics sorted 
factors are not pervasive in explaining individual stock returns. It is, therefore, 
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concluded that most of the factors are redundant and may be the outcome of 
data-mining. 
 Chapter Four examines the cross-sectional effect of the nominal share price. 
This chapter endeavours to understand two interesting puzzles associated with 
share price. First, the nominal share prices of the US stocks have remained 
remarkably constant since the Great Depression despite inflation. Second, there is 
no consensus about the motivations for firms to split their stocks, since financial 
theory suggests share price is independent of its value. The findings indicate that 
share price per se matters in cross-sectional asset pricing: stock return is inversely 
related to its nominal price. It is shown that a strategy of buying these penny 
stocks can generate a significant alpha even after considering the transaction costs. 
The abnormal returns of these penny stocks are robust in the presence of other 
firm characteristics such as size, book-to-market equity, earning/price ratio, 
liquidity and past returns; and are also not explained by the existing factors. These 
results also cast some light on the stock-split phenomenon. Intuitively, if firm 
managers know that low price would generate higher future returns, they are more 
likely to split their stocks on behalf of shareholders. 
 This thesis makes several major contributions in the area of cross-sectional 
asset pricing. First, it highlights the importance of liquidity risk in the financial 
markets. For example, Chapter One and Three suggest the robust significance of 
liquidity risk in both the UK and US stock markets. Second, this study 
investigates the interaction between liquidity and other well-known factors in 
asset pricing. For instance, the well-documented value premium can be explained 
by liquidity risk (Chapter One), by the close link between liquidity and beta 
(Chapter Two); and by the close association between liquidity and size, share 
price and other factors (Chapters One to Four). Third, this study addresses the 
issue arising in the asset-pricing literature regarding the number of factors used in 
explaining asset returns. Chapter Three concludes that many of the existing 
empirical factors are not pervasive and may be the outcome of data-snooping as a 
result of grouping. Consequently, this chapter indicates that a theoretically better 
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justified four-factor model, comprising excess market return, co-skewness, 
downside risk and liquidity, is competent to explain stock returns. Last but not 
least, this thesis also challenges the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Chapter Four 
demonstrates that investors buying low price stocks (penny stocks) and selling 
high price stocks can generate significant profits, and rational asset-pricing 
models cannot explain this abnormal return. Nevertheless the inverse relationship 
between share price and return does shed some light on stock split motivations.  
 The results of this thesis, suggest a number of future research projects. For 
example, most of the academic work on cross-sectional returns and asset pricing 
are accomplished for the major developed markets such as the UK and US. With 
the maturation and growing importance of emerging markets, it is feasible to test 
asset pricing hypotheses in these markets. The extent to which these hypotheses 
are validated in the emerging markets would significantly impact both academia 
and practitioners. 
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1. Cross-Sectional Stock Returns in the UK 
Market: the Role of Liquidity Risk 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Liquidity in the financial markets has been one of the critical issues in both 
practice and academia. Since the 1980s, a number of episodes of financial market 
distress have underscored the importance of the smooth functioning of the 
markets for the stability of the financial system. At the heart of these episodes was 
a sudden and drastic reduction in market liquidity, characterized by disorderly 
adjustments in asset prices, a sharp increase in the costs of executing transactions, 
and so forth. The well-known 1998 episode involving Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) is a representative example and has prompted investors to 
pay more attention to their liquidity risk when making portfolio decisions.  
In this study, the role of liquidity risk in explaining the cross-sectional stock 
returns is investigated. In particular, the link between liquidity and the 
well-documented value premium is examined. Fama and French (1992) point out 
that liquidity, though important, does not need to be specifically measured and 
accounted for, as it is subsumed by the combination of size and book-to-market 
factors. It is generally accepted that illiquid stocks tend to be small and that 
people would not be surprised to see the high correlation between size and 
liquidity. However, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) show that there is a 
statistically significant positive relationship between expected stock returns and 
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illiquidity, even after taking Fama–French risk factors into account. Additionally, 
Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001) demonstrate that liquidity does 
need to be accounted for individually, even after controlling for size, 
book-to-market and momentum.  
Liquidity is a broad and elusive concept, which is not directly observed. 
Many liquidity proxies have been proposed, such as bid–ask spread, trading 
volume, or a combination of return and volume.1 Among these liquidity measures, 
a few studies use trading volume as the proxy for the aggregate demand of 
liquidity traders (Campbell, Grossman and Wang, 1993), which suggests there 
could be some link between liquidity and other factors. Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) demonstrate that low (high) volume stocks display many characteristics 
commonly associated with value (growth) stocks. Therefore, the return spread 
between value and growth could contain the difference of liquidity risk inherited 
by them.  
Since Fama and French (1992, 1993), many researchers have documented the 
existence of the value premium, i.e., the excess return of value stocks (high 
book-to-market) over growth stocks (low book-to-market). Fama and French 
(1998) even find international evidence of this value anomaly. There are an 
increasing number of studies that attempt to explain this value anomaly using 
different theories.2 None of these, however, can successfully account for this 
value spread. Although Lee and Swaminathan (2000) document the empirical 
connection between trading volume and value/growth, they do not investigate the 
interaction between value/growth and liquidity. The relationship between value 
anomaly and liquidity risk is formally tested in this study. 
                                                
1 See section 1.2 for detailed descriptions. 
2 Zhang (2005) uses rational expectation theory in a neoclassical framework to explain this value anomaly. He 
finds that value is riskier than growth in poor market conditions when the price of risk is high and high 
book-to-market signals persistent low profitability. Petkova and Zhang (2005) find time-varying risk goes in 
the right direction in explaining value premium; however, the beta-premium covariance in their study is still too 
small to explain the observed magnitude of the value anomaly. Other studies state that value spread is a 
premium for distress using a behavioural theory. These argue that this value anomaly is real but irrational, 
which is the result of the investor’s overreaction that leads to the under-pricing of value (distress) stocks and 
over-pricing of growth stocks. 
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The contribution of this study is twofold: first, it is demonstrated that in the 
UK market there is a significant liquidity premium which can not be explained by 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Fama and French three-factor model, 
or Fama and French with a momentum factor model;3 and second, evidence is 
provided that variations in liquidity explain variations in the value premium. The 
value anomaly can be explained by a liquidity-augmented CAPM, which offers 
important implications for the link between value/growth and liquidity. 
Furthermore, the evidence of liquidity in explaining the value premium is not 
subsumed by the distress factor proposed by Agarwal and Taffler (2005) and a 
number of macroeconomic variables. These results are not consistent with those 
of Fama and French (1995, 1996) and Saretto (2004), who suggest the excess 
return of value over growth stocks is due to the distress risk inherited by them.  
This study proceeds as follows: the next section describes the development of 
the hypotheses and research designs. Section 3 shows the empirical results. The 
last section offers concluding remarks and future research directions. 
1.2. Hypotheses and Calculating Factors 
The first part of this section explains the methods by which liquidity is employed 
to explain cross-sectional stock returns. The construction of the liquidity measure 
and factor are then presented in the next subsection. The method used to construct 
the size and value/growth factors in the UK market is explained, as it is not 
necessarily the same as the method used in the US market. 
                                                
3 Overall, a considerable amount of literature has been written about liquidity and asset pricing, but most 
research has been performed on the US market, with only a few investigations having been performed on the 
UK market. As pointed out by Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2003), “It would be dangerous for investors to 
extrapolate into the future from the US experience. We need to also look outside of the United States.” Thus, 
the UK data is adopted in this research to address the crucial question in asset pricing of “whether the results 
obtained for the US stock markets can be generalized to markets in other countries”. 
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1.2.1. Liquidity Effects and Cross-Sectional Stock Returns 
Since Fama and French (1992, 1993), many empirical papers have documented 
that average stock returns are related to firm characteristics, such as size and 
book-to-market. These return patterns are apparently not explained by the CAPM 
and are thus called anomalies. Among these, the value premium, i.e., the excess 
return of value stocks (high book-to-market) over growth stocks (low 
book-to-market) has been extensively researched. With Fama and French (1998, 
2006) providing additional international evidence for the robustness of the value 
premium, there are an increasing number of studies that attempt to explain this 
value anomaly using different theories. Ang and Chen (2005) show that the value 
premium can be explained by a conditional CAPM. Fama and French (2006), 
however, argue that Ang and Chen’s (2005) evidence is specific to the period of 
1926–1963. Other studies, such as Zhang (2005) and Petkova and Zhang (2005), 
use different theories and methods to explain the value premium; however, their 
results show that the observed value premium is still too large to be wholly 
explained. Overall, none of the research has successfully accounted for this value 
anomaly.  
In this paper, the robustness of the size and value premium in the UK stock 
market is investigated. To examine the cross-sectional stock return differences 
related to size and book-to-market, decile, quintile and 30
th
/70
th
 
percentile-breakpoint portfolios with regard to the stocks’ characteristics, such as 
size and book-to-market, are formed. Taking 10 decile portfolios ( tPi, ) for 
example, at the end of June in year t, 10 size decile portfolios are formed on the 
stocks’ ranked market value. Similarly, at the end of December year t based on 
the stocks’ book-to-market value, 10 value decile portfolios are formed. In 
regression analysis, similar to Ang and Chen (2005), the dependent variable is a 
hedge portfolio that takes a long position in a small (high book-to-market) 
portfolio and a short position in a big (low book-to-market) portfolio ( tStL RR ,, − ), 
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where tLR ,  stands for the long position of this portfolio, which is either small or 
high book-to-market stock groups; and tSR ,  refers to the short position of this 
portfolio, i.e., either big or low book-to-market portfolios. We test the CAPM 
upon ( tStL RR ,, − ) via the significance of alphas. If the intercept (alpha) is 
significant, it suggests that the single market factor CAPM cannot explain the 
cross-sectional returns.  
Size is commonly referred to as one type of liquidity proxy, as investors 
would not expect the same level of liquidity between large and small stocks; thus, 
the return difference between small and big could be the result of the variations in 
liquidity risks associated with each of them. Campbell, Grossman and Wang 
(1993) argue that trading volume is a proxy for the aggregate demand of liquidity 
traders. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Fama and French (2006) demonstrate 
that low (high) volume stocks display many characteristics commonly associated 
with value (growth) stocks. Therefore, the return spread between value and 
growth could reflect the differences in the liquidity risk inherited by them. In 
order to test these two hypotheses, we test the liquidity effects over the hedge 
portfolio, i.e., the following liquidity-augmented CAPM is estimated: 
titiftiitStL LIQRRmRR ,2,1,,, )( εββα ++−+=−          (1) 
The factor sensitivity for liquidity factor ( 2,iβ ) should be significant in the above 
cross-sectional regression if liquidity is related to size or book-to-market.  
If liquidity is one of the missing factors for the explanation of size or value 
premium, it should be able to explain return differences to some extent. Following 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Ang and Chen (2005), the intercepts (alphas) of 
different portfolio strategies (such as small minus big, high minus low 
book-to-market) should not be significantly different from zero if liquidity is 
included. 
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1.2.2. Calculating Factors in the UK Market 
1.2.2.1. Liquidity Measures and Liquidity Factor 
1.2.2.1.A Concept of Liquidity 
Like volatility, liquidity is not directly observed and many different liquidity 
measures have been proposed for different purposes. Liquidity has many 
dimensions. When market-wide liquidity is low, the probability of a seller 
completing a large transaction in a timely manner without making a significant 
price concession is low relative to the times of high market liquidity. Therefore, 
the key elements in a liquidity risk measure include volume, time, and transaction 
costs. Kyle (1985) suggests that three aspects of the transaction process need to be 
considered while measuring market liquidity: tightness, the cost of liquidating a 
position over a short period; depth, the ability to sell or buy a large number of 
shares with little price impact; and resiliency, the extent to which prices recover 
from random shocks with no structural information. 
Previous research, such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2000) and Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), has focused on the 
bid–ask spread as a measure of illiquidity. This type of measure focuses on the 
aspect of tightness since the cost is the main concern of this measure. However, as 
highlighted by Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), bid–ask spread is a noisy 
measure of illiquidity because many large trades appear outside the spread and 
many small trades occur within the spread. When liquidity is measured in terms of 
depth, there are a number of proxies in the literature. For instance, Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996) assign stock illiquidity as a proxy for price impact, which 
is measured as the price response to signed order flow (order size). Amihud (2002) 
measures a stock’s illiquidity as the ratio of its absolute return to dollar volume. 
Finally, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) estimate a resiliency-based liquidity risk 
measure based on the idea that price changes accompanying large volumes tend to 
be reversed when market-wide liquidity is low. 
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1.2.2.1.B Liquidity Measure and Liquidity Factor 
Among these liquidity proxies, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure is widely 
used in empirical studies because of its superior advantage of simple calculation. 
In addition, this proxy only needs return and volume data so that liquidity for a 
relatively long time span can be estimated. Amihud’s measure is also consistent 
with Kyle’s (1985) concept of illiquidity, the response of price to the order flow 
and Silber’s (1975) measure of thinness, which is defined as the ratio of the 
absolute price change to the absolute excess demand for trading. Hasbrouck (2006) 
reviews different liquidity measures, and find that Amihud’s measure is most 
strongly correlated with other price impact and cost-related liquidity proxies. 
Amihud’s liquidity measure for stock i is defined as: 
∑
=
−=
miD
t dmi
dmi
mi
mi
v
r
D
,
1 ,,
,,
,
,
1
γ
  (2)4 
where: miD ,  is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in 
month m, 
is the return on stock i on day d  of month m, and 
dmiv ,,  is the dollar trading volume for stock i  on day d  of month m. 
However, this measure has two disadvantages. The first is that Amihud (2002) 
takes dollar trading volume as the denominator, which may result in a high 
correlation between the liquidity measure and size since large volume stocks are 
usually more frequently traded than small volume stocks. That is, it is not 
expected that the dollar amount of trading for a firm whose market capitalization 
is 10 million dollars will be the same as that for a firm whose market 
capitalization is 10 billion dollars. In addition, as share prices increase over time, 
liquidity appears to increase when it is measured by Amihud’s method even if 
there are no changes in liquidity.  
                                                
4 There is no negative sign in the original paper of Amihud (2002). The negative sign is included here, so that 
large negative values signify low liquidity. 
dmir ,,
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In order to construct a liquidity measure that is robust with respect to size, we 
scale the denominator by the market capitalization of the stock; in other words, 
dollar trading volume is replaced by turnover in the denominator. Furthermore, as 
argued by Lo and Wang (2000), turnover is a canonical measure of trading 
activity. Therefore, while replacing the dollar trading volume by turnover does 
not alter the principle of this price reversal nature, it would enable us to construct 
a relative liquidity proxy that is free from the size effect. 
The second disadvantage is that the liquidity measure may have extreme 
outliers when trading activity is extremely low (i.e., trading volume could be very 
close to zero); therefore, we use the natural logarithm of these values to minimize 
the effect of the outliers. The modified relative liquidity measure ( mi ,ψ ) for stock 
i is defined as: 
∑
=
−=
miD
t dmi
dmi
mi
mi
Turnover
r
D
,
1 ,,
,,
,
, ln
1
ψ
  (3) 
where: miD ,  is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in 
month m, 
is the return on stock i on day d  of month m, and 
dmiTurnover ,,  is the turnover for stock  i  on day d  of month m. 
The liquidity measures in equations (2) and (3) are calculated for all the 
stocks in the market every month, from which the monthly liquidity measures for 
each stock are obtained. Then, using the liquidity measures, market-wide liquidity 
factors as in Fama and French (1993) are created. At the end of each year, two 
portfolios are formed on liquidity using the median liquidity as the breakpoint. 
The performance of the hedge portfolio that consists of a long position in a liquid 
portfolio and a short position in an illiquid portfolio in the following 12 months is 
defined as the liquidity factor ( tLIQ ). The portfolios are rebalanced at the end of 
each year. We calculate each stock’s liquidity and market-wide liquidity factor for 
dmir ,,
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Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure ( mi ,γ ) and size-adjusted liquidity measure 
( mi ,ψ ). With this mimicking liquidity factor, the role of liquidity in explaining the 
cross-sectional return differences is further explored. 
1.2.2.2. Size and Value/Growth Factors 
UK SMB (Small minus Big) and HML (high minus low book-to-market) factor 
returns are calculated in a similar way to those in Fama and French (1993) except 
for the breakpoints. Fama and French (1993) use the 50th percentile (for size) and 
30th and 70th percentiles (for book-to-market) NYSE-based breakpoints. 
Following Dimson, Nagel and Quigley (2003) [DNQ hereafter], this study uses 
the 70th percentile of ranked size and 40th and 60th percentiles of book-to-market 
in the UK market. In the UK, large capitalization stocks are concentrated in the 
low book-to-market segment, and small capitalization stocks, in contrast, are 
concentrated in the high book-to-market class. 5  Choosing less extreme 
book-to-market breakpoints and a wider range for the small-capitalization group 
ensures acceptable levels of diversification in these corner portfolios throughout 
the sample period. In addition, the 70% breakpoint for the size results in a 
distribution of aggregate market value across portfolios that is relatively similar to 
the distribution in Fama and French (1993), where most NASDAQ stocks, most 
of which are smaller than the NYSE-based 50% breakpoint, are sorted into the 
small-capitalization group.  
1.3. Empirical Results 
1.3.1. Data 
In this study, the sample covers all the stocks traded on the London Stock 
Exchange from January 1987 to December 2004 because the trading volume data 
                                                
5 Similar results are found in this study. They are displayed in the empirical section. 
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which is used for calculating liquidity is available from 1987. All the data on 
stock returns, market capitalizations, book-to-market ratios and trading volumes is 
from DataStream. To construct data set, the identities of all UK listed companies 
are extracted from the ‘live’ constituents of the FTSE All Share Index held on 
DataStream, and also, in order to mitigate survivorship bias, from formerly listed 
companies in the DataStream ‘DEADUK’ file. This DataStream ‘DEADUK’ file 
comprises companies which have been, but no longer, listed in the UK. 
Book-to-Market ratio is the inverse of price to book value in DataStream. The 
DataStream data type code for market capitalization, price to book value, and 
volume are MV, PTBV and VO. In calculating liquidity measures, the daily 
frequency returns and dollar trading volume data are needed. The book-to-market 
ratio is the end of the calendar year value, and any negative book-to-market stocks 
are deleted from the sample following Fama and French (1992); in addition, all 
the delisted equities are included in the sample so that survivorship bias is 
controlled for in this study. Initially, the number of stocks in this study is 945 in 
1987 and this gradually increases to 2306 in 2004. While calculating the liquidity 
measures, due to the lack of availability of data regarding trading volume, the 
sample size is much smaller than the total number of available stocks; for 
example, less than 200 stocks from 1987 to 1990, 576 stocks in 1991 and 1459 
stocks in 2004.6 For the time-series regression analysis in this study, a sample 
period from January 1991 to December 2004 was chosen in order to minimize any 
bias that may arise from the small number of stocks in the early sample period.  
1.3.2. Market Liquidity 
In a manner that is consistent with Amihud (2002) and Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003), market liquidity is defined as the average of an individual stock’s liquidity. 
The first two rows of Table 1.1 display the value and equally weighted Amihud’s 
liquidity measure. The value-weighted Amihud’s liquidity measure suggests that 
                                                
6 The number of stocks used to calculate liquidity measures and factors are displayed in the last row of Table 
1.1. 
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the most illiquid year is 2001, which corresponds with September 11th; while 
1998 is the second lowest liquidity period, which corresponds with the Russian 
Crisis.7 The equally weighted Amihud’s illiquidity also shows similar patterns; 
however, it has more weight in small stocks, and thus is more volatile. It is not 
surprising that the level of liquidity of small stocks changes more than that of 
large stocks. Figure 1.1 clearly shows that the liquidity measures are associated 
with market crashes; for instance, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 
Russian default, September 11th in 2001 etc.  
The third row of Table 1.1 is the relative liquidity measure (adjusted by 
stocks’ market values), described in section 1.2. Figure 1.2 plots the relative 
liquidity measure. While the correlation between this relative measure and the 
value (equally)-weighted Amihud’s measure is significant, i.e., 0.29 (0.25), it is 
interesting to note that there is a significant difference between Amihud’s 
absolute liquidity measure and the new relative measure. The new relative 
measure is much smoother and less volatile than Amihud’s measure. Extreme 
outliers in Figure 1.1 are now apparently reduced according to this new liquidity 
measure. With the new measure, it is clear that the most illiquid year is 1998, 
when market liquidity is widely perceived to have dried up because of the LTCM 
collapse and Russian default.
8
 The next illiquid period is the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997 and September 11th in 2001. By contrast, the most liquid period is 
during the recent bull market. Amihud (2002) shows that liquidity displays 
persistence; and, indeed, the new measure has first- and second-order 
autocorrelations of 0.83 and 0.72, which are both significant at the 1% level.  
                                                
7 By contrast, the most liquid year is 1989; however, the high liquidity in the early sample period is likely due 
to a result of the sample selection bias in the early sample period. 
8 Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), who use the US data and their proposed price-reversal liquidity measure, 
identify that the US stock market experienced the third largest liquidity drop in 1998. Within the same time 
span, however, this study shows results consistent with theirs.  
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1.3.3. Different Portfolio Strategies in the UK 
Previous work shows that average stock returns are related to firm characteristics 
like size and book-to-market equity. In this section, the cross-sectional stock 
returns related to size, book-to-market equity and liquidity in the UK are 
examined. The results are compared to the US as in Fama and French (1993), and 
the previous work on the UK market in DNQ (2003).  
1.3.3.1. Size-Sorted Portfolios 
As described in the previous section, the 10 decile portfolios are formed based on 
size (market equity). Panel A of Table 1.2 shows the statistical properties of the 
10 decile portfolios. Contrary to the findings of Banz (1981) and Fama and 
French (1993), where evidence is found that small firms outperform big firms, it 
is interesting to see that big firms perform better than small firms in the UK 
equity market. (There is a 5.7% annual difference in the portfolio returns between 
the largest and smallest decile portfolios, i.e. S-B_d.)  
The largest 10% of stocks represent, on average, 81% of the total market 
capitalization (the largest 20% of stocks account for over 90% of the total market 
capitalization). During the same period in the US market, the largest 20% of 
stocks account for about 80% of the total market capitalization.9 This suggests a 
more skewed distribution of large stocks in the UK stock market. 
Next, the mimicking size factor (SMB) for the UK stock market was 
calculated. The statistical properties of the SMB are reported in the last column of 
Table 1.2, Panel A. Over this period, the SMB has a negative average monthly 
return of 0.35% (which is equal to an annual negative average return of 4.08%) 
with a standard deviation of 2.7%. The results for the UK market are consistent 
with the findings of DNQ (2003) where, although the data in their research is only 
up to 2001, the correlation of their monthly SMB and this study’s is nearly 92%. 
                                                
9 The US data over this period is from Professor Kenneth French’s website. 
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By contrast, the SMB is positive with an average monthly return of 0.2% in 
the US over this period. Nevertheless, the trends for the SMB in the UK and the 
US are very similar, as shown by Figure 1.3. Indeed, the annual (monthly) SMB 
between the UK and the US has a correlation of 0.70 (0.33). Panel B of Table 1.2 
compares the statistical properties of monthly SMB in the UK and the US. The 
t-tests with regard to a zero mean for the SMB suggest that both the UK and the 
US SMBs are not different from zero. Ang and Chen (2005) and Dimson and 
Marsh (1999) also document the disappearance of the size effect in the US and the 
UK, respectively. 
1.3.3.2. Book-to-Market Sorted Portfolios 
Panel A of Table 1.3 reports the summary statistics for the 10 decile 
book-to-market portfolios. The annual return difference between the high and low 
book-to-market portfolios (H-L_D) is over 10%.
10
 Consistent with Fama and 
French (1998) and DNQ (2003), there is strong evidence of the existence of the 
book-to-market premium. The first row of the table also shows that small stocks 
are usually distributed in the high book-to-market category. For example, half of 
the highest book-to-market stocks only account for 20% of the total market 
capitalization. These results are consistent with the finding of Fama and French 
(1993) and DNQ (2003).  
The mimicking value/growth factor (HML) is reported in the last column of 
Table 1.3, Panel A. With a standard deviation of 2.5%, the monthly HML has a 
return of 0.32% (which equals an annual rate of 3.9%). In the US, these numbers 
are larger. (The annual HML is 4.9%, with a standard deviation of 3.4%.) There is 
again a similar trend in the HML during the same period in the US and the UK, 
which can be seen from Figure 1.4. Panel B of Table 1.3 reports the statistical 
comparison of the monthly HML in the UK and the US. The zero-mean tests 
suggest that both of them are significantly different from zero.  
                                                
10 Fama and French (1998) find that there is a value premium of 4.62%. This is because they use a very small 
sample for the UK market: on average, only 185 stocks are examined. 
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1.3.3.3. Liquidity-Sorted Portfolios 
Based on the liquidity measure of Amihud (2002), 10 decile liquidity portfolios 
are formed and summarized in Panel A of Table 1.4. The risk–return relationship 
suggests that illiquid stocks should earn higher expected returns than liquid stocks, 
because investors should be compensated for bearing the illiquidity risk. However, 
Table 1.4 indicates that this is not the case in the UK equity market. On average, 
the highly illiquid 30% of the stocks display a negative annual return from 1988 
to 2004. The most illiquid-decile equity group in the UK even experience a 
-13.7% annual loss. In contrast, the most liquid-decile stocks show an annual 
return of nearly 9%, which results in an annual return spread of over 22% 
between the liquid and illiquid stocks (ILLIQ-LIQ_D).  
The three most illiquid portfolios include many small stocks, where the total 
market value of these portfolios is only 2.59% relative to the whole market. As 
liquidity increases, so does the size of the firms, where the most liquid 10% of the 
stocks account for over 72% of the total market capitalization. As expected, 
Amihud’s liquidity measure is affected by the size of firms, where large firms’ 
stocks are more liquid than those of small firms. From Panel A of Table 1.2, it can 
be seen that that big stocks have an average annual return of 7.05%, which is very 
similar to the return for the liquid stocks. By contrast, because the illiquid stocks 
(usually small) show negative returns, it can be inferred that small stocks with low 
liquidities perform poorly.  
While Amihud’s liquidity measure is apparently highly correlated with size,11 
the relative liquidity measure from the present research should not be so 
correlated. Summary statistics of the ten portfolios made upon the relative 
liquidity measure are presented in Panel B of Table 1.4. The first row reports the 
percentage of each liquidity-deciles’ market capitalization to the total market 
capitalization. Although this time the most liquid stock group shows a smaller 
                                                
11 In Panel A of Table 5, it can be seen that the correlation between the liquidity mimicking factor based on 
Amihud’s measure and the SMB is 75%.  
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weight than other groups, the remaining nine deciles are much more evenly 
distributed in terms of size. Therefore, small stocks are illiquid in absolute 
measure: they could be as liquid as, or more liquid than, larger stocks according to 
our relative measure.  
However, the return spread (ILLIQ-LIQ_D) based on this relative liquidity 
measure is still large (almost 18% annually), although it is smaller than that based 
on Amihud’s measure. The standard deviation of the most liquid portfolio of the 
relative liquidity measure is larger than that of Amihud’s measure. This could 
arise because liquid stocks based on Amihud’s measure are usually large, and 
their returns less volatile. 
The correlation matrix of monthly observations between the RM (market 
return), SMB, HML and the two liquidity mimicking factors is displayed in Panel 
A of Table 1.5. The mimicking liquidity factor based on the relative liquidity 
measure of the present research barely shows any relationship with that based on 
Amihud’s measure, and also a very low correlation with SMB and RM. Amihud’s 
measure is, however, highly correlated with size. There is almost no relationship 
between the SMB and the HML in the UK, a result similar to the US (Fama and 
French, 1993). Panel B describes the statistical properties of these factors. 
Because liquid and big stocks display excess returns over illiquid and small stocks 
in the UK, this causes the mimicking liquidity factor (LIQ) and size factor (SMB) 
to display negative values. The last row of Panel B reports the Sharpe Ratios of 
various factors. LIQ and LIQ_AMIHUD produce the largest absolute Sharpe 
Ratios, which implies that investors may be significantly rewarded for perusing 
liquidity strategies; specifically, buying liquid and selling illiquid stocks. Trading 
long big and short small also tends to be a good investment strategy in the UK 
stock market, as it has the third largest Sharpe Ratio. 
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1.3.4. Liquidity Effects in Explaining Cross-Sectional Returns 
From the previous section, it can be seen that average returns are closely related 
to stock characteristics such as size, book-to-market and liquidity. In this section, 
the cross-sectional effect of liquidity on stock returns is examined. 
The statistical properties of different hedge portfolios are reported in Panel A 
of Table 1.6. It is evident that the strategy of small minus big displays negative 
average returns regardless of breakpoints. However, the t-tests suggest that these 
negative values are not statistically significant. The book-to-market strategy, by 
contrast, shows a significantly positive average return whatever breakpoint is 
employed. Liquid stocks have significant excess returns over illiquid stocks as 
highlighted by the right panel of the table. 
Panel B of Table 1.6 reports the results of the CAPM on different hedge 
portfolios related to size, book-to-market and liquidity. Although the size 
premium is not different from zero as shown in Panel A, the CAPM can still 
further reduce the magnitude. For example, the average return for the S-B_D (the 
return difference between the smallest and biggest decile portfolios) is reduced 
from -0.3% to -0.1% after being adjusted by the excess market return. By contrast, 
the significance of value and liquidity premiums remains in the presence of a 
market portfolio. 
Table 1.7 describes the effect of liquidity on the size and book-to-market 
strategies. Although the CAPM is efficient in explaining the return regularities 
associated with size, as shown in Table 1.6, it is still of interest to note that factor 
loadings on liquidity are all significant at the 95% confidence level in the left 
panel of Table 1.7. This evidence implies that the liquidity risk partly explains the 
excess return of big over small stocks; and the connection between size and 
liquidity is robust in the presence of a market factor. The right panel of Table 1.7 
shows that all the factor loadings on liquidity are statistically significant at the 
99% confidence level, which suggests that liquidity plays a significant role in 
describing the observed value anomaly. In this liquidity-augmented CAPM, all 
                                                    Essays on Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing 
 - 27 - 
three book-to-market strategies show insignificant intercepts. Compared with the 
results in Panel B of Table 1.6, the magnitude of intercepts is dramatically 
reduced in this liquidity-augmented model, which illustrates the success of the 
liquidity factor in explaining value anomalies.  
Fama and French (1995) argue that the HML is a suitable proxy for relative 
financial distress risk. Saretto (2004) provides empirical evidence that HML can 
be interpreted as a distress factor. Chen and Zhang (1998) also demonstrate that 
the high returns from value stocks compensate for the high risks induced by 
characteristics such as financial distress, earnings uncertainty or financial 
leverage.  
A seminal work by Agarwal and Taffler (2005) uses a z-score as a proxy for 
distress risk, and shows that momentum is largely subsumed by their distress risk 
factor. This study investigates whether the role of liquidity in explaining the value 
premium is not subsumed by their distress factor. The distress risk factor is 
calculated using the same method described by Agarwal and Taffler (2005).12 
The correlation in the present research between the liquidity factor ( tLIQ ) and the 
distress factor is -0.09. The financial distress factor cannot explain the value 
premium in the UK market. Panel A of Table 1.8 describes a 
distress-factor-augmented CAPM, where it is clear that the CAPM intercepts 
remain significant and the factor loadings on the distress factor are all 
insignificantly different from zero. In Panel B, when the distress factor is included 
in the liquidity-augmented CAPM, the relation between liquidity and value 
premium continues to be significant. 
The possible explanation for the close relationship between liquidity and 
value premium can be found in Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993), where 
they present a model in which trading volume is a suitable proxy for the aggregate 
demand of liquidity trading. In addition, the empirical work of Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000) demonstrates that low (high) volume stocks display many 
                                                
12 The generous provision of the UK financial distress factor by Vineet Agarwal is gratefully acknowledged. 
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characteristics commonly associated with value (growth) stocks. Therefore, the 
return spread between value and growth could contain the difference in the 
liquidity risk inherited by them. Thus, liquidity could help to explain this value 
premium.  
1.3.5. Robustness of Liquidity Effects 
In this section, it is first demonstrated that variations in liquidity provide an 
explanation for variations in the value premium in the UK, and are robust with 
respect to a variety of macroeconomic variables. Second, it is argued that the 
liquidity factor in the present research is robust in the sense that the 
cross-sectional return difference related to liquidity is unable to be explained by 
other well-known factors, such as SMB, HML and momentum.  
Zhang (2005) proposes that the value premium is linked to macroeconomic 
conditions. He explains that value firms are burdened with more unproductive 
capital when the economy is bad, and find it more difficult to reduce their capital 
stock than growth firms do. The dividends and returns of value stocks will hence 
covary more with economic downturns. We demonstrate that the ability of 
liquidity in explaining the value premium is robust in the presence of specific 
macroeconomic variables,13 such as industrial production, CPI, money supply, 
term spread (i.e., yield difference between ten-year government bond and 
one-month T-bill) and corporate spread (i.e., the yield difference between BBB 
and AAA bonds). Such results are displayed in Table 1.9.  
Table 1.10 suggests that the liquidity premium remains pronounced in 
different models, such as the CAPM, the Fama and French model, the Fama and 
French model augmented with a distress factor and the Fama and French model 
augmented with a momentum factor (winners minus losers).14  
                                                
13 The data for these macroeconomic variables are from the OECD. Refer to Table 1.9 for details. 
14 The case of decile breakpoints are reported only to simplify the presentation. However, the results are similar 
regardless of different strategies such as ILLIQ-LIQ_q or ILLIQ-LIQ_p. 
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In short, the finding that the value premium is related to liquidity is robust in 
the presence of a number of macroeconomic variables. The premium of liquid 
over illiquid stocks is robust even after being adjusted by SMB, HML distress and 
momentum factors. 
1.4. Conclusions 
In this study, it is found that the UK small stocks, on average, display a poor 
performance compared with big stocks in the last two decades. The US data, 
however, shows a slight positive SMB over the same period, but the t-test 
conducted illustrates that SMB is statistically indifferent from zero. Similar results 
can also be found in Dimson and Marsh (1999) and Ang and Chen (2005). 
Consistent with the majority of the literature on the value premium, there is a 
statistically significant value premium in the UK stock market. The return spread 
between high and low book-to-market decile portfolios (HML_d) is over 10% 
annually. This HML is also pronounced and comparable with the US results. 
Amihud’s absolute liquidity measure is compared with the relative liquidity 
measure in this study. According to Amihud’s measure, small stocks are illiquid 
where illiquid stocks, on average, show negative returns over time, and liquid 
stocks have high positive expected returns. The return difference between liquid 
and illiquid is over 22% annually; however, as expected, Amihud’s measure is 
highly correlated with stock size. The relative liquidity measure in the present 
research produces little correlation with stock size and any other pervasive risk 
factors. Nevertheless, the return spread between liquid and illiquid decile 
portfolios is still striking: 18% annually.  
Cross-sectional analysis shows that there is no size anomaly in the UK from 
1991 to 2004. There is, however, a pronounced value anomaly within this period. 
The CAPM fails to explain this return difference. A liquidity-augmented CAPM 
can successfully explain the observed value anomaly. 
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Finally, the ability of liquidity to explain the value premium is robust with 
respect to the financial distress factor and a number of macroeconomic variables. 
The liquidity premium of liquid over illiquid stocks is statistically significant even 
after being adjusted by the SMB, HML, distress and momentum factors. Some 
natural questions arise: what are the underlying risk factors that are responsible 
for this pronounced liquidity premium? Is liquidity a more important common 
risk factor? Is there any connection between liquidity and beta? An unreported 
result shows that the betas of the most liquid and illiquid decile portfolios are 1.36 
and 0.90, respectively, and the Wald test rejects the equality of these two betas. 
The interaction between liquidity and other stock characteristics remains an 
unexplored area in empirical finance. In modern finance, some of the observed 
return irregularities cannot be explained by the rational asset pricing model, for 
example, the short-term momentum, the cross-sectional difference related to 
volatility, etc. This could be the result of the flaws in the models themselves. The 
success of variations in liquidity in explaining the value anomaly in this study 
gives much momentum to pursue further research in this area.  
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2. Do Illiquid Stocks Really Have Higher 
Betas? 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Liquidity in the financial markets has been one of the critical issues in both 
practice and academia. It is well-documented in the literature that liquidity 
impacts expected returns. There have been an increasing number of studies on 
cross-sectional return and liquidity, such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1989), 
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993), Amihud (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) 
and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) among others. Although it is generally accepted 
that illiquid stocks tend to be small and it would not be surprising to see the high 
correlation of size and liquidity, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) show that 
there is a statistically significant positive relationship between expected stock 
returns and illiquidity, even after taking Fama-French risk factors into account. 
Additionally, Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001) argue that liquidity 
does need to be accounted for individually, after controlling for size, 
book-to-market and momentum.  
In the traditional CAPM framework, these empirical findings imply that betas 
increase as illiquidity increases. Betas increase as liquidity decreases and thus 
illiquidity stocks have higher expected returns than liquid stocks. However the 
link between liquidity and return is not straightforward. Suppose, for example, 
that there are two stocks in the market which are identical except for their 
liquidity: one is liquid and another is illiquid. When market moves at the arrival 
of new information, the price of the liquid stock would change correspondingly to 
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its beta. For the illiquid stock, however, the price may not move as predicted by 
its beta due to its illiquidity. The return of this illiquid stock may move more or 
less than its beta implies, and thus betas estimated using ex post returns are noisy.  
In this study, the impact of liquidity on beta is examined. Despite the 
existence of many studies on the relationship between asset return and liquidity, 
little research on the interaction between betas and liquidity has been conducted. 
A closely related study has been undertaken by Acharya and Pedersen (2005). 
They explicitly present an equilibrium asset pricing model with liquidity risk. By 
applying the CAPM for returns net of illiquidity costs, they decompose beta into 
four components: standard market beta and three betas representing different 
forms of liquidity risk. However, their empirical evidence is not strong in showing 
that liquidity risk is important in addition to the market risk.  
The present study makes several contributions. Evidence is provided that the 
illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) is problematic given its high correlation 
with size. Considering the strong relationship between size and betas (see, for 
example, Fama and French, 1992), the effects of liquidity on returns in the 
literature could be affected by size. In order to overcome the high correlation 
between size and liquidity, the relative illiquidity measure documented in Chapter 
One, a modified version of Amihud’s illiquidity measure, is used. It is found that 
liquid stocks have higher betas than illiquid stocks. To test the robustness of these 
results, a two-dimensional size/liquidity sorting procedure is conducted using both 
Amihud’s measure and the present study’s relative liquidity measure, obtaining 
the same results.  
Although illiquidity is expected to affect betas, it is the sign between betas 
and liquidity that is surprising. Following Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996), it is 
suggested that investors’ trading behaviours are responsible for this phenomenon. 
Risk-averse investors would trade the high beta stocks more frequently than the 
low beta stocks, which results in the more liquidity of the risky (high beta) assets. 
It is this mechanism that produces a positive link between beta and liquidity. 
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Despite the existence of the negative association between illiquidity and beta, 
the positive relationship between illiquidity and returns still holds. Contrary to the 
results of Acharya and Pedersen (2005), who claim that liquidity is priced within 
the CAPM framework, the results of the present study suggest that illiquidity 
plays an important role in cross-sectional asset pricing. The effect of liquidity on 
return is, however, not through beta as in the CAPM; instead, it should be treated 
as an additional factor, as in Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) and others. 
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section the relationship 
between beta and liquidity in the CAPM framework is discussed. In section 2.3 
the inter-relationship among beta, size and liquidity is investigated, and the 
implications of the results discussed. The last section concludes. 
2.2. Liquidity and Beta in the CAPM Framework 
2.2.1. The Relationship between Liquidity and Beta in the CAPM 
Framework 
When the market is not liquid in the conventional CAPM, assets are not 
appropriately priced by their betas. Following Acharya and Pedersen (2005), this 
study also assumes a CAPM in net returns in the economy where market is 
frictionless. Excess return of asset i  is generated by:  
)()( *,
**
, tmiti rErE β= ,         (1) 
where *,tmr  is the excess market return, 
*
iβ is the true beta, and E(.) denotes 
time-series expectation (and hereafter). The asterisk denotes that all the variables 
are in the imagined frictionless (or perfectly liquid) economy. The CAPM in the 
presence of illiquidity can be express as:  
)()( ,, tmiti rErE β= ,         (2) 
where  
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tititi rr ,
*
,, δ+= ,         (3) 
and ti,δ  represents noise due to the different liquidity levels of asset i .  
It is important to understand the properties of ti,δ . The expected value of the 
noise is zero; 0)( , =tiE δ  or the long run average value of the noise is zero. If not, 
the price difference between the liquid and illiquid assets increases over time, 
which is then expected to be arbitraged away once the price difference becomes 
large enough to compensate for illiquidity risks. Second, an important difference 
between the proposed model and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) is that market 
illiquidity is not modelled. This is not because the market is always liquid, but in 
this study it is assumed that the illiquidity noise ti,δ  is measured relatively to the 
market. One such example in empirical studies is that a stock market index is used 
as the market portfolio, and individual stocks or stock portfolios are investigated 
with respect to the market portfolio. When illiquidity premium (risk) is measured, 
it is the individual stocks’ illiquidity relative to the market that matters, not the 
illiquidity of the entire stock market. Thus it is assumed that 0)( , =ticE δ at time t, 
where (.)cE  represents cross-sectional expectation.  
With the assumptions it can be easily shown that  
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=∆ . Note that when the cross-sectional probability measure 
is proportional to the market capitalization, the cross-sectional expectation of 
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betas are one, i.e., 1)()( * == icic EE ββ . This would further imply that 
0)( =∆ icE  which is consistent with an assumption of 0)( , =ticE δ . 
Now suppose that there are two assets in the market that are identical except 
for their liquidity: one is liquid and another is illiquid. For the liquid asset, its 
observed beta would be unbiased because 0, =tiδ . The illiquid asset, on the other 
hand, would have a biased beta. Since 0)( =∆ icE  as long as the cross-sectional 
probability measure matches its weight within the market portfolio, the impact of 
illiquidity would appear differently for different assets; some may be downward 
biased, others may be upward biased, but the cross-sectional expectation of the 
biases should be zero. It is interesting to see that an upward bias in beta happens 
when the illiquidity noise is positively related with the market return while beta is 
downward biased when the illiquidity noise is negatively related with the market 
return. When market goes up (or down), individual assets move higher (or lower) 
than their betas suggest because of illiquidity, and higher betas are observed for 
these assets. On the other hand when market goes up (or down), individual assets 
move lower (or higher) than their betas suggest because of illiquidity, and biased 
(lower) betas are observed for these assets. 
This simple analysis suggests that the link between liquidity and returns, i.e., 
illiquidity increases beta which in turn increases expected return, may not 
necessarily hold. Therefore, our hypothesis is that observed beta, iβ , could be 
negatively or positively related to the illiquidity, and thus there is no clear 
relationship between illiquidity and beta. The present empirical investigation 
would reveal whether illiquidity is priced through beta, or whether illiquidity is 
priced as an additional factor.  
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2.2.2. Illiquidity Measures 
To investigate the relationship between beta and liquidity, a suitable liquidity 
measure needs to be chosen. Following up the discussion in Chapter One, 
Amihud’s illiquidity measure and the relative illiquidity measure proposed in the 
first chapter are chosen. Amihud’s illiquidity measure for stock i  is defined as: 
∑
=
=
yiD
d dyi
dyi
yi
yi
v
r
D
,
1 ,,
,,
,
,
1
γ
        (5) 
where: yiD ,  is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in 
year y, dyir ,,  is the return on stock i on day d  of year y, and dyiv ,,  is the 
dollar trading volume for stock  i  on day d  of year y. 
And the relative illiquidity measure ( yi,ψ ) for stock i is defined as: 
 
∑
=
=
yiD
d dyi
dyi
yi
yi
Turnover
r
D
,
1 ,,
,,
,
, ln
1
ψ
      (6) 
where dyiTurnover ,,  is the turnover rate for stock  i  on day d  of year y.
15  
2.3. Empirical Results 
2.3.1. Data and Calculation of Liquidity Measures 
The two illiquidity measures are calculated on December of each year. 
Twenty portfolios are then formed in December of year t using the illiquidity 
measures that are calculated with daily data of year t. Stocks are used that are 
traded on at least 200 days and at values of greater than 5 dollars in a year, as in 
                                                
15 The negative sign is not included in the liquidity proxies as in Chapter One because the main focus of this 
chapter is to examine the relation between illiquidity and beta. 
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Amihud (2002).16 As in Fama and French (1992), all non-financial firms in the 
NYSE and AMEX which have return files in CRSP are used;17 and NASDAQ 
stocks are not included because the volume data includes inter-dealer trades 
(Atkins and Dyl, 1997, Acharya and Pedersen, 2005 and others). The number of 
stocks each year ranges from 1069 (in 1962) to 2430 (in 2005) over this sample 
period.  
For each of these portfolios equally weighted annual returns are calculated for 
year t+1 (henceforth ‘post-formation’ returns). Using equal-weighted portfolio 
returns is consistent with Amihud (2002) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005), 
because it is a way of compensating for the over-representation of large liquid 
stocks that exist in the sample. The process is repeated from December 1962 to 
December 2004 and 43 post-formation annual returns from 1963 to 2005 are 
obtained for each portfolio. Betas are re-estimated by regressing the 
post-formation returns on CRSP value weighted portfolio returns. Following 
Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995), annual returns are used rather than monthly 
returns since betas estimated with higher frequency returns are likely to be biased 
due to trading frictions and non-synchronous trading, or other phenomena 
including systematic cross-temporal covariances in short-interval returns.  
2.3.2. Returns, Beta and Liquidity 
Table 2.1 records the properties of the portfolios ranked on the two illiquidity 
measures. Panel A displays the results of Amihud’s illiquidity measure18. The 
most illiquid portfolio (portfolio 20) has an annual return of over 18 percent in 
excess of the most liquid portfolio (portfolio 1). The panel also shows that 
Amihud’s illiquidity measure is closely associated with other characteristics; 
                                                
16 Amihud (2002) argues that these selection criteria make the liquidity estimation more reliable. 
17 Both Amihud (2002) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) have the same sample selection as the current study. 
All firms including financials have also been used, but the results are not different from what is reported in this 
study.  
18 We take the natural logarithm of Amihud’s measure because the measure shows a strong nonlinear 
relationship with other firm characteristics reported in this study. The nonlinearity could cause complicated 
econometric problems since most asset pricing models are linear. Nevertheless, the results from using 
ln(Amihud) and Amihud are not different. In this study, we report the results in logarithms (Amihud). 
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liquid stocks have high absolute dollar trading volume and price level, but have 
low turnovers. In particular, as expected, illiquid stocks are much smaller than 
liquid stocks. 
The relative illiquidity measure, described in Panel B, in contrast, does not 
necessarily have similar properties. First of all, while the relationships between 
liquidity and dollar trading volume and price still hold, they are much weaker than 
those in panel A. For example, the average price level for the most liquid (illiquid) 
stocks is 34.10 (23.93) dollars as opposed to 59.45 (10.99) dollars of Amihud’s 
illiquidity measure. Secondly, as argued in Chapter One, although one of the 
advantages of the relative illiquidity measure proposed in this study is to measure 
liquidity free from size, there is still some evidence that illiquid stocks tend to be 
small. Nevertheless, the relationship between the relative measure and size 
becomes less pronounced than that in panel A. For instance, the difference in the 
average logarithm of market capitalization between the most and least liquid 
stocks is 1.76 from the relative measure, while it is 6.57 from Amihud’s measure. 
Thirdly, the relative measure shows that the most liquid stocks have the highest 
trading activities as reflected in their turnover. 
The most interesting observation is that the relationships between betas and 
liquidity are not the same between these two illiquidity measures. The relative 
measure shows a strong negative relationship between betas and liquidity, while 
Amihud’s measure does not. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) modify Amihud’s 
measure and provide empirical evidence that their ‘net’ market beta is increasing 
with illiquidity. This study, however, has different results: after the size effect is 
taken out, there is a significant negative association between beta and illiquidity. 
This is somewhat surprising, because it suggests that illiquid stocks have lower 
systematic risk (betas) and therefore, investors holding the illiquid securities 
would not be compensated with higher expected returns under the CAPM 
framework. 
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2.3.2. Does Illiquidity Increase Betas?  
The difference between the two illiquidity measures lies in how size is treated. 
The problem with Amihud’s measure is that the measure is highly related to size, 
which in turn is related to betas (Fama and French, 1992). Therefore, the size 
effect needs to be separated from illiquidity measures. In this section, the 
inter-relationship among different stock characteristics is further investigated by 
forming two-dimensional size/liquidity portfolios. Cross-sectional regression 
analysis is also used to examine the link between beta and liquidity. 
2.3.2.1. Two-dimension Size/Liquidity Portfolios 
An alternative method to reduce the effects of size on liquidity is to form 
two-dimensional portfolios using size and liquidity. At the end of each year, all 
available non-financial stocks are first ranked into 10 size-decile portfolios, each 
of which are further divided into 10 decile portfolios using the two illiquidity 
measures. Portfolios are equally-weighted, and annually rebalanced. One of the 
benefits of using this two-way sorting method is that it enables the investigation 
of the inter-relations between liquidity, return and beta free from size effect. Table 
2.2 presents the portfolios’ post-formation betas and holding periods’ time-series 
averages of annual returns, logarithms of market capitalization and turnover. 
Panels A and B report the results based on Amihud’s measure and relative 
measure, respectively.  
Fama and French (1992, 1993) show that the post-formation returns of small 
stocks are higher than those of big stocks. Similar results are portrayed in Table 
2.2, where the return difference between small and big (Small-Big) is reported in 
the second to the last column. Moreover, Small-Big increases with illiquidity: 
from 7% to 26% in terms of Amihud’s measure, and from 10% to 19% in terms of 
our relative liquidity measure. 
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The illiquidity premium, i.e., the return difference between the most illiquid 
and liquid portfolio, ILLIQ-LIQ, monotonically decreases with size. For instance, 
in terms of Amihud’s measure, ILLIQ-LIQ remains significant from 15% for the 
smallest portfolio and declines to 6% the middle-size portfolio, and then becomes 
insignificantly different from zero for large portfolios (Panel A of Table 2.2). The 
relative liquidity measure also has similar patterns. However, both panels A and B 
suggest that the illiquidity premium only exists within the small stocks.  
The magnitude of ILLIQ-LIQ for the smallest portfolio is 15% in terms of 
Amihud’s measure, which is nearly twice as much as that in terms of the relative 
illiquidity measure. This could be the result of the strong correlation between 
Amihud’s measure and size. For example, panel A of Table 2.2 shows that in the 
smallest size-decile the logarithmic values of the market capitalization decreases 
from 10.44 to 9.61 as portfolios become more illiquid. Similar relationships 
between size and Amihud’s measure can be found in other size deciles. Therefore, 
the relationship between Amihud’s liquidity measure and size is too strong to be 
removed even after the two dimensional portfolio sorting procedure. Although 
there is no clear association between beta and the illiquidity measure of Amihud 
in Panel A of Table 2.1, it becomes clearer that liquidity is positively linked to 
beta in this two-dimensional sorting procedure. As reflected in the upper Panel A 
of Table 2.2, when the size effect is controlled, it is observed that liquid stocks 
have higher betas than illiquid stocks in 9 out of 10 size-deciles. More importantly, 
beta increases almost monotonically with liquidity.  
The relative illiquidity measure, presented in Panel B of Table 2.2, displays a 
similar result to that of Amihud’s measure in this two-path sorting procedure. 
Furthermore, the advantage of this relative liquidity proxy is reflected in the lower 
part of Panel B, where liquidity is not related to size within in each size-decile. 
Thus the size effect on liquidity disappears by using the relative illiquidity 
measure and the two dimensional portfolios; on the other hand, we note that betas 
increase with liquidity.  
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In short, after size is controlled, a consistent relation is observed between beta 
and liquidity in terms of both the illiquidity proxies: liquid stocks have 
significantly higher betas than illiquid stocks. 
2.3.2.2. Cross-sectional Regression Analysis 
The results with the two-dimensional portfolios formed on size and liquidity 
suggest that liquidity, size and beta are highly correlated. Further investigation is 
undertaken to ascertain if beta is explained by liquidity in the presence of size in 
the following cross-sectional regression. 
tppttptttp SizeILLIQ ,13121 )ln( εβ +Φ+Φ+Φ= −−  (7) 
where pβ is the post-formation beta for portfolio p. 1−ptILLIQ  and 
1)ln( −ptSize are the illiquidity level and natural logarithm of the market 
capitalization for portfolio p at the end of year t-1. The test assets are 20 and 100 
liquidity portfolios, and 25 and 100 two-dimensional portfolios formed on size 
and liquidity. If liquidity is not related to systematic risk, then t2Φ  should not be 
statistically significant. Table 2.3 presents the results from using Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression.  
In Panel A where Amihud’s measure is used, the estimates for different 
portfolios are inconsistent. The signs from one-dimensional portfolios are not the 
same as those with two dimensional portfolios, and the signs of 
t2Φ with 20 
liquidity ranked portfolios are opposite to those with 100 liquidity ranked 
portfolios. The relative measure in Panel B, on the other hand, produces 
consistent estimations for different portfolios: in particular the coefficients on the 
illiquidity measure are always significant and negative. Recall that the larger 
value of 1−ptILLIQ  implies the more illiquid this portfolio, and therefore the 
negative sign suggests that the liquid stock has higher betas than the illiquid 
stocks. 
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To sum up, the regression results confirm the findings in the previous section: 
liquidity is positively linked to beta when the size effect is considered. 
2.3.3. Does Illiquidity Increase Returns? 
In this section we re-investigate the cross-sectional relationship between 
illiquidity and return in the presence of the size effect. In the previous section we 
show that illiquidity (liquidity) has a negative (positive) relationship with betas. 
This negative association implies that illiquid stocks should display lower returns 
than liquid stocks in the CAPM framework.  
In order to investigate if illiquid stocks do have lower returns, we use the 
Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression;  
tppttpttptttpt SizeILLIQr ,141321 )ln( εβ +Φ+Φ+Φ+Φ= −−  (8) 
The results in Table 2.4 confirm those of the previous studies, such as 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Amihud (2002). 
t3Φ  is always 
significantly positive, which implies that illiquid stocks show higher returns. The 
results, however, are not expected in the CAPM framework. The inter-link among 
illiquidity, beta, and returns is not supported.  
The result is interpreted as follows. The CAPM, where only beta explains 
returns, does not explain why illiquid stocks whose betas are lower than liquid 
stocks have higher returns. Therefore the attempt to explain illiquidity in the 
CAPM framework (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005) is not supported by the evidence 
of this study. That illiquid stocks have lower betas but still show higher returns, 
implies that liquidity might be an additional risk factor as in Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003). It is argued that the results of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
are affected by the size effect when Amihud’s measure is used. 
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2.4. Discussions and Conclusions 
In this study, the focus is on the relation between beta and liquidity. One of 
the main purposes of this study is to reveal the impact of illiquidity on beta. 
Although Acharya and Pedersen (2005) show that illiquid stocks have high betas, 
this study however find opposite results. It is shown that the illiquidity measure of 
Amihud (2002) is not ideal given its high association with size. By either using a 
size/liquidity two-dimensional sorting procedure or using this study’s relative 
liquidity proxy, it is shown that illiquidity is negatively related to beta.  
The implications of the study’s findings are summarised as follows. First, 
Amihud’s measure appears to be popular in empirical studies, but caution should 
be exercised when this liquidity proxy is chosen given its high correlation with 
size, especially in investigating the cross-correlation between liquidity and other 
assets’ characteristics. Second, after size is controlled, both Amihud’s illiquidity 
measure and this study’s size-free relative liquidity measure yield consistent 
results, e.g., illiquid stocks have lower systematic risk. This, together with the 
evidence that excess returns of illiquid stocks exist only within the small-stock 
family, naturally raises a couple of important questions: how is illiquidity priced? 
Or is liquidity at least pervasive? Even among small stocks this negative link 
between illiquidity and beta contradicts with the risk-return theory. This certainly 
suggests that illiquidity is not priced through betas.  
Liquid stocks have higher betas than illiquid stocks, which seem odd at first 
glance given that people generally perceive illiquid stocks should have higher risk 
therefore higher beta. The results, nonetheless, are consistent with Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) who argue that investors require higher expected returns on 
assets whose returns have higher sensitivities to market-wide liquidity, i.e., high 
liquidity beta. They demonstrate that illiquid stocks tend to have high liquidity 
beta and low market beta. Secondly, our empirical results could be explained in 
terms of risk-averse investors’ trading behaviour. The model of Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1996) suggests that investors would focus exclusively on the 
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short term if they are sufficiently risk averse. In their model, different information 
signals get reflected in price at different points in time, and the increase of 
liquidity, in equilibrium, causes a greater proportion of investors to focus on the 
short-term signal, which decreases the information-ness of prices about the long 
run. Therefore, risk-averse investors might disfavour holding risky (high beta) 
stocks so that they trade the risky stocks much more often than the low beta 
stocks. This is confirmed in Panel B of Table 2.1 where liquid stocks have high 
turnovers. 
Last but not least, this empirical study shows that liquidity does affect returns, 
but not within the CAPM framework as suggested by Acharya and Pedersen (2005). 
Nevertheless the existence of cross-sectional return difference related to liquidity 
does imply that liquidity might be priced within a multifactor model as in Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).  
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3. Too Many Factors! Do We Need Them All? 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Earlier tests on the CAPM show that alphas are positive and betas are not priced 
(see Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 1972; Blume and Friend, 1973; and Fama and 
MacBeth, 1973; among many others). Some researchers try to find answers to the 
failure of CAPM from different risk measures in the rational framework, for 
example, coskewness (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976; and Harvey and Siddique, 
2000) or downside beta (Harlow and Rao, 1989). Others show that firm 
characteristics such as size, book-to-market, and momentum explain 
cross-sectional asset returns (Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1992, 1993 and 
1996a; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
The success of these firm characteristics has accelerated the efforts of academics 
and practitioners in search of new firm characteristics that produce a large 
cross-sectional return difference that is robust to well known existing factors, such 
as, the famous Fama-French three factors and momentum. These efforts have 
produced more than a dozen factors in both the finance and the accounting spectra, 
most of which can be replicated with data readily available. 
When factors are constructed by taking long and short positions on firm 
characteristics or risk measures as in Fama and French (1993 and 1996a), they 
could capture the variation in cross-sectional asset returns. These factors (or 
subsets of these factors) are assumed to be proxies for the underlying risk factors 
or state variables that capture the stochastic opportunity set (Merton, 1973 and 
Ross, 1976). Fama and French (1996a) claim that their two firm characteristics 
based factors (i.e., size and book-to-market) are indeed the ones that ‘mimic’ 
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combinations of underlying risk factors or state variables (page 57). However, the 
debate as to whether the two factors outlined by Fama and French (1996a) are risk 
factors continues. For example, Daniel and Titman (1997) suggest it is firm 
characteristics, i.e., size or book-to-market ratios, that appears to explain the 
cross-sectional variation in stocks returns rather than the characteristics being 
proxies for non-diversifiable risk.  
The question addressed in this study is that the number of firm characteristics 
or risk measures that are claimed to be useful in cross-sectional asset pricing 
seems to be too large. Although the theory of multifactor models does not specify 
how many factors are needed to explain asset returns, the number certainly should 
not be large. Early empirical studies on multifactor models, such as Roll and Ross 
(1980), Lehmann and Modest (1988), Connor and Korajczyk (1988, 1993), 
among others, suggest three to six factors. Compared with these figures, the 
number of factors that have been introduced in the empirical studies is well above 
a dozen. This difference suggests that either many empirically identified firm 
characteristics are the result of data-snooping bias due to portfolio grouping and 
are thus redundant, or that the number of factors is truly larger than those 
suggested by the early studies on multifactor models in the 1980s. 
In this study, among the many different factors that have been proposed in the 
literature, specific factors are identified to explain asset returns. These factors 
should be included in linear asset pricing models. The study, however, does not 
answer whether or not these factors are associated with risk. For example, the 
well-documented value premium could reflect investors’ incorrect extrapolation 
of the past earnings growth of firms (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), the 
distress of firms (Fama and French, 1993 and 1995), or risk related to costly 
reversibility of value firms (Zhang, 2005). The focus in this study is to 
empirically identify the pervasive factors out of the many proposed factors, which 
could best explain asset returns. 
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For this purpose, a total number of eighteen factors that have been proposed 
in the literature, are tested:19 eight are formed on non-risk firm characteristics, 
five on risk-related variables, and five are principal factors used in Connor and 
Korajczyk (1988, CK factors hereafter). The classification of the three groups is 
in line with MacKinlay (1995), and Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998). 
For instance, MacKinlay (1995) claims that risk-based factors are developed 
under the assumptions of investor rationality and perfect capital markets; while 
the non-risk based factors are stimulated by the biases in the empirical 
methodology. Analogously, Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) 
empirically investigate the relation between stock returns and non-risk stock 
characteristics, such as book-to-market, size, and risk measures20. 
In order to avoid data-snooping bias in empirically testing asset pricing 
models, thousands of individual stocks were used without grouping. The 
conventional F test developed by Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) is not 
possible when the number of assets tested is larger than the number of time series 
observations; and hence, in this study we use the average F test proposed by 
Hwang and Satchell (2007). Hwang and Satchell (2007) show that the new test 
has more power than the conventional F test in a variety of situations, and that it 
is also robust with respect to leptokurtic data. 
In time-series regression analysis, the performance of different sets of factors 
are investigated using 7 non-overlapping 5-year intervals starting from January 
1972 to December 2006 to allow the time variation in linear factor models. 
Ultimately it is believed that the set of pervasive factors should explain asset 
returns equally well in different sample periods. 
We find that a four-factor model (comprised of the market portfolio, 
coskewness, downside risk and liquidity) performs equally well to the famous 
Fama-French three factor model with momentum, which is widely used as a 
                                                
19 The factors considered (i.e., firm characteristics or risk measures) have been shown in major financial 
journals to have explanatory power with respect to cross-sectional asset returns. The study results show that the 
factors not tested in the study are not likely to change the conclusions.  
20 They classify the risk measures as betas or factor loadings, where benchmark factors are those in either Fama 
and French (1993) or Connor and Korajczyk (1988). 
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benchmark model in much empirical research. More importantly, the three factors, 
coskewness, downside risk, and liquidity are economically better motivated than 
the non-risk firm characteristics related factors such as the famous Fama-French 
factors (SMB, HML), momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and 
others. 
The results of the study have several implications for the asset pricing 
literature. First, many additional factors other than market return have been 
proposed due to the desire for a CAPM replacement, e.g., Fama-French factors 
and others. Since these factors are claimed to be successful in explaining 
cross-sectional returns, the return differences related to these factors are expected 
to disappear or at least decrease to some extent given the existence of institutional 
investors, hedge funds in particular. Among the factors examined in this study, 
many of them are found to be highly correlated with each other, and evidence is 
also provided that many of these factors are not pervasive when data sample are 
more updated than that are used in the original studies. 
More importantly, some light is cast upon the controversy over empirical 
asset pricing models, where the debate centres on whether firm-specific attributes 
should be used to predict returns. For instance, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) and Daniel and Titman (1997) argue that these variables may be used to 
find securities that are systematically mis-priced by the market. Others argue that 
these measures are proxies for underlying economic risk factors (Fama and 
French, 1993, 1995, and 1996a). There is also a third view that suggests the 
observed return-characteristics relations suffer from data-snooping biases 
(MacKinlay, 1995; and Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1995). By controlling 
the data-snooping biases, the results demonstrate that risk-related factors that are 
better motivated than the firm-specific attributes perform as well as 
firm-characteristics based factors in explaining individual stock returns. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe 
the factors considered in this study. Section 3.2 discusses the potential drawbacks 
of the conventional asset pricing test and describes the study’s test method, i.e., 
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the average F test. In section 3.4, the data and empirical results are presented. The 
last section concludes. 
3.2. Factor Specifications 
Among the many firm-specific characteristics and risk measures (hereafter 
‘factors’) that have been proposed in the literature, those that are widely cited in 
the literature have been selected. Other factors could be included, but as 
demonstrated in the tests, the factors other than those considered in the study do 
not seem to change the study conclusion. In this section the factors used in the 
study are divided into three groups and described. 
 
3.2.1. Risk Related Factors 
Five factors are identified that are economically better motivated than the other 
factors. First, market return is probably the most widely used factor in the 
literature. Despite little empirical evidence that supports the CAPM (see Black, 
Jensen, and Scholes, 1972; Blume and Friend, 1973; and Fama and MacBeth, 
1973; among others), in particular, in the presence of size (Fama and French, 
1992 and 1996b), the excess market return is still considered to be one of the most 
important factors in testing asset pricing theory. Fama and French (1996a) argue 
that the excess market return is required for the positive equity premium although 
it does not explain cross-sectional average returns. 
Second, it is difficult to rationally object that liquidity matters in asset pricing 
(see Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) show 
that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between expected 
returns and illiquidity, even after taking the Fama-French three factors into 
account. Additionally, Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001) argue that 
liquidity does need to be accounted for individually, after controlling for size, 
book-to-market and momentum. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) further 
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demonstrate that half of the profits from a momentum strategy are attributable to 
the liquidity risk. 
Three more factors are then included that are closely related to the 
distribution of asset returns. When asset returns are not normal and investors’ 
utility functions are not quadratic, asymmetry or fat-tails are priced. In particular, 
when investors have a decreasing marginal utility of wealth and decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, as in Arrow (1971), then we expect investors to dislike 
fat-tails and downside risk but prefer positive skewness. Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1976) show that higher moment such as coskewness is priced. Harvey and 
Siddique (2000) claim that conditional skewness helps explain cross-sectional 
variation of expected returns across assets; and its significance does not disappear 
even when factors based on size and book-to-market are included. They also 
provide evidence that the momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is 
related to systematic skewness. Furthermore, we also use cokurtosis as Hwang 
and Satchell (1999) report that cokurtosis could also explain the dynamics of 
equity returns when asset returns have fat-tails. Finally, motivated by the studies 
of Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) and Harlow and Rao (1989), Ang, Chen and 
Xing (2006) investigate whether or not equities that are sensitive to downside 
market movements require a premium. They show that this downside risk 
premium exists and that it is not explained by various characteristics, such as size, 
book-to-market, momentum, volume, coskewness and liquidity effects. 
3.2.2. Factors Formed on Firm Characteristics 
Eight factors are identified based on firm-specific characteristics in this section. 
Although many of these factors explain asset returns well with significant 
cross-sectional return differences, debates on why these factors explain 
cross-sectional asset returns still continue and there is little conclusive evidence 
that these are risk factors. In particular, debates on value/growth, momentum, and 
idiosyncratic volatility, have attracted extensive interest in the recent literature. 
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Banz (1981) and Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985), as well as a series of 
studies by Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996a and 1996b), show that size and 
book-to-market equity are able to explain a significant amount of the common 
variation in stock returns. Fama and French (1993) create the well-known SMB 
(small size portfolio returns minus big size portfolio returns) and HML (high 
book-to-market portfolio returns minus low book-to-market portfolio returns).  
A recent study of Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2006) suggests that a stock’s 
annual asset growth rate is more important than other accounting variables in 
predicting cross-sectional returns. They further demonstrate that the forecasting 
ability of asset growth is above other well known characteristics, such as 
book-to-market, size, and lagged returns. Parallel studies in the accounting 
literature show that accruals21 also can be used in explaining asset returns. Sloan 
(1996) documents that firms with high accruals earn abnormally lower returns on 
average than firms with low accruals. Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005) 
develop a comprehensive balance sheet categorization of accruals and show that 
less reliable accruals lead to lower earnings persistence and abnormally lower 
average returns. 
A series of studies show that returns are predictable because of investors’ 
over- and under- reaction to information. Earlier studies, such as De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985), Fama and French (1988a) and Poterba and Summers (1988), report 
negative autocorrelations in the long-run and positive autocorrelations in the short 
run. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document that past winners consistently 
outperform past losers over a 3 to 12-month holding period. They argue that this 
strategy of buying winners and selling losers is profitable, and is not due to 
systematic risk or delayed stock price reactions to common factors. In addition, 
Fama and French (1996a) suggest that most of the stock characteristics-related 
anomalies are largely dissipated in their three factor model except for this 
short-term momentum profit. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) show that the short 
                                                
21 Accruals are commonly defined as the change in non-cash working capital less depreciation expense. 
Detailed calculations can be found in Appendix.  
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term momentum continues but past winners consistently underperform past losers 
over a 13 to 60-month holding period, suggesting the phenomenon of long-term 
reversal. 
Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001) find that stocks with unusually high 
trading volume over a day or a week tend to appreciate over the following month. 
They argue that their results are consistent with a “visibility” story: shocks in the 
trading activity of a stock affect its visibility, and in turn the subsequent demand 
and price for that stock. They conclude that the volume premium cannot be 
accounted for by return autocorrelations, firm announcements, market risks, and 
liquidity. 
Finally, Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006) show that idiosyncratic 
volatility is priced. They find that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility from 
the Fama-French three factor model have low average returns, and that this 
phenomenon cannot be explained by size, book-to-market, momentum, volume 
and liquidity effects. 
 
3.2.3. Principal Component Factors 
Despite the empirical success of the above factors, most of them are not well 
motivated from an economic point of view (see Daniel and Titman, 1997; and 
Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin, 1999). The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) implies 
that the risk factors should be those which capture the variations in large 
well-diversified portfolios. Following Connor and Korajczyk (1988), we use 
principal components techniques to estimate the pervasive factors for asset returns. 
They provide evidence that their five-factor version of APT explains returns 
better than the CAPM. Therefore, the first five principal component factors (PCA 
factors, hereafter) are also used in this study, and grouped in the third category. 
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3.2.4. The Factors Tested in This Study 
In summary, we have eighteen factors altogether. These are the excess market 
return (ERM), coskewness (COSK), cokurtosis (COKT), downside risk (DNSD), 
liquidity (LIQ), HML, SMB, asset growth (ASG), accrual (ACRU), long-term 
reversal (LTRV), momentum (MOM), idiosyncratic volatility (IDSN), trading 
volume (VO), and five CK factors (PCA1 to PCA5).
22
 Among the eighteen 
factors, ERM, COSK, COKT, DNSD and LIQ as well as the PCA factors are 
theoretically motivated. On the other hand, it is still controversial whether the 
firm-characteristics based factors (such as SMB, HML, ASG, LTRV, MOM, IDSN 
and VO) are priced factors. 
 
3.3. Testing Method 
Two popular methods for testing asset pricing models are the two-step 
cross-sectional regression (Black, Jensen and Scholes, 1972; and Fama and 
Macbeth, 1973) and the multivariate F tests in the time-series approach (Gibbons, 
Ross, and Shanken, 1989). For both methods, it is a common practice to group 
stocks into portfolios using some criteria (e.g., firm characteristics) to reduce the 
cross-sectional dimension of the joint distribution of returns and the measurement 
errors in the betas. However this grouping leads to loss of information (Roll, 1977; 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979) and can cause a data-snooping bias (Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1990). When portfolios are formed on empirically motivated 
characteristics, the conventional test will reject the model too often in the presence 
of grouping (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990; and Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken, 2006).  
A direct and more effective method to avoid this problem is to use individual 
stocks rather than portfolios. For example, Kim (1995) proposes a method for 
                                                
22 Short-term reversal (from Professor Kenneth French’ data library) and upside risk (Ang, Chen and Xing, 
2006), were also used in this study, both of which do not play any meaningful role in asset pricing in the 
presence of the other factors considered in this study. 
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testing asset pricing models using individual stocks in the two-step cross-sectional 
regression. However, the approach seems to be too complicated to be used in 
empirical finance. A simple but appealing approach is the average F test proposed 
by Hwang and Satchell (2008). They show that the assumption does not decrease 
the power of the test and the size and power of the average F test is generally 
better than the conventional F test. The advantages of the average F test are that it 
can be used even when the number of stocks (N) is larger than the number of 
observations in time horizon (T), and that it is robust to elliptical distributions of 
returns. Therefore, the test makes it possible to assess thousands of individual 
stocks and thus avoid the problems that arise from grouping. 
Assume that the linear factor model is 
ttt FR εβα ++=  
where 
tR  is a (N by 1) vector of excess returns for N assets, tF  is a (K by 1) 
vector of factor portfolio returns, ( )′≡ Nαααα ,......,, 21  is a vector of intercepts, 
( )′≡ Nββββ ,......,, 21  is an (N by K) matrix of factor sensitivities, and 
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and 
∧
α  and 
∧
β  are the maximum likelihood estimators of α  and β . The 
analytic function of the average F statistic is not known and thus in this study the 
statistics are obtained via Monte Carlo simulations with 10,000 replications. 
Throughout this study, we choose 5% of the simulated test statistics as 
benchmarks to test the linear factor models. For robustness, we compared the 
results with those of the conventional F test using bootstrapping. 
3.4. Empirical Results 
3.4.1. Data and Calculating Factor Returns 
The Fama-French three factors, momentum (MOM), and long-term reversal 
(LTRV) are from Professor Kenneth French’s data library. Other firm 
characteristic factors are calculated as follows. Following the method used by 
Fama and French (1992), a factor related to a specific characteristic is computed 
as the out-of-sample (post-formation) return difference between the lowest 30% 
and the highest 30% portfolios formed on the characteristic. When forming 
portfolios, stocks with share price below $5 are removed to minimise the impact 
of extremely large returns associated with market microstructure biases and thin 
trading.
23
 The portfolio returns are calculated with value weights.
24
 All 
nonfinancial firms listed in the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ markets were used 
                                                
23 Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Amihud (2002), and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) have similar requirements. 
24 Factor returns with equal weights are also calculated, and it is found that the results with equal weights are 
not different from those with value weights. Thus in the study results are reported with factors that are 
calculated with value weights. 
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from the CRSP monthly return files and the Compustat annual industrial files 
from 1963 to 2006. The detailed calculation methods for the factors are explained 
in the Appendix. 
3.4.2. Preliminary Analysis 
3.4.2.1. Properties of Factor Returns 
Table 3.1 displays the properties of eighteen factors. The first two rows of Panel 
A describe the average monthly returns and their standard errors. Some of the 
average returns are not significant; this could be because the study’s sample 
period is not the same as those used by previous studies, or the study’s factor 
construction method (the return difference between the lowest 30% and highest 
30% in our study) is not necessarily the same as those used by the studies which 
introduce these factors. For example, high volume stocks have higher returns than 
low volume stocks, as in Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001), but the factor 
VO formed on volume shows an insignificant average return of 0.04%. The 
insignificance could be explained by the fact that Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin 
(2001) use NYSE stocks while this study uses all CRSP nonfinancial firms. 
Another difference can be found in the performance of downside risk premium 
(DNSN). Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) suggest that stocks whose downside betas 
are high have higher returns than those whose downside betas are low. However, 
this study did not find a significant difference in returns between high and low 
downside betas. The reason for the difference in results would be that 
post-formation returns are used in our study, whereas Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) 
use pre-formation returns. The factors formed on size, coskewness and 
idiosyncratic errors, also do not show significance. As is well documented, the 
effects of size become weaker after the early 1980s. The empirical evidence of 
coskewness in cross-sectional asset returns is mixed and depends on the sample 
periods (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976; and Friend and Westerfield, 1980). 
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Idiosyncratic errors are not significant, which could be the result of the study’s 
calculation using nonfinancial firms, whereas Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang 
(2006) use all the available stocks.25 
Among these factors, momentum (MOM) shows the most significant monthly 
average return, i.e., 0.81%. Liquidity (LIQ) has the second largest average 
monthly return, which is -0.51% per month.
26
 Clearly illiquid stocks show higher 
returns than liquid stocks, which is consistent with most previous studies, such as 
Amihud (2002), among others. This study reports a 0.41% monthly average return 
for asset growth (ASG), which is smaller than the 7.9% per annum reported by 
Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2006). The difference can be explained by the portfolio 
construction method; a higher return difference can be obtained by calculating 
ASG returns using the lowest and highest asset growth decile portfolios as in 
Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2006).27 
The difference in the performance between the factors that were obtained 
using the top and bottom 30% with all CRSP nonfinancial firms and those 
proposed in the previous literature indicates that the performance of many factors 
include in the study is sensitive to the portfolio construction methods and thus 
may not be robust. Different sets of factors are likely to be selected for different 
sample periods or for different exchanges. Consistent with many previous studies 
that tested the Fama-French three factors and momentum in various ways (Fama 
and French, 1996a, and many others), the study also found that these factors are 
significant except for SMB. On the other hand, only the liquidity factor is 
significant among risk-related factors, and none of the PCA factors are. The poor 
                                                
25 Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006) report a negative return (-0.02%) for portfolio 5 (containing the 
highest volatility stocks), where this portfolio accounts for just 1.9% of the whole market capitalization (Panel 
B of Table VI, Page 285). In an unreported table, the study’s calculations are repeated using their sample 
period, from 1963 to 2000. Similar results are found for low idiosyncratic risk portfolios 1 (containing the 
lowest volatility stocks) to 4. Portfolio 5 in the study’s calculation, however, has a positive average return 
(1.09%) and represents 3.3% of the whole market capitalization. This difference is mainly the result of 
excluding financial firms. The reason for this difference is beyond the scope of the study. Nonetheless, it is 
certainly an interesting issue to explore in future. 
26 The Appendix shows the formulas for calculating the liquidity proxies. By construction, lower values of the 
liquidity proxies imply more liquidity. Therefore, the negative sign suggests that liquid stocks have a lower 
return than illiquid stocks. 
27 Indeed, the average monthly return difference between the lowest and highest asset growth decile portfolios 
in the study is 0.7%, which is close to the annual average of 7.9% reported in Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2006). 
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performance of these factors is one of the major reasons why they are not used in 
the empirical studies, despite their strong theoretical support.  
Panel B of Table 3.1 displays the correlation coefficients among these factors. 
These factors are grouped into three sub-groups as indicated by the lines. Not 
surprisingly, downside risk is highly correlated with excess market return since 
downside risk is constructed conditional upon market performance. Liquidity is 
highly correlated with size factor, which is due to the close association between 
firm size and liquidity (Hwang and Lu, 2007). As expected, accounting variables 
related factors are highly correlated. For example, ASG and HML, both of which 
could be interpreted as value/growth factors, are highly correlated (0.68); and the 
correlation coefficient between ACRU and ASG (HML and ACRU) is 0.63 (0.57). 
Interestingly long-term reversal and momentum show low correlations with other 
factors. While behaviourists argue that these factors are driven by investors’ 
irrational behaviours, many researches argue that these factors are likely to be 
connected to the business cycle. 28  Notably, the idiosyncratic factor is 
significantly correlated with many other factors, for instance ERM, DNSD, SMB, 
HML and ASG. The high correlations of the idiosyncratic factor with other factors 
indicate that the idiosyncratic factor could be a proxy for many other firm specific 
characteristics. This result is also consistent with that of Brennan, Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (1998).29  
The first PCA factor displays high association with other factors, for example, 
-0.66 with idiosyncratic factor, and 0.57 with SMB. Market return has correlation 
coefficients of 0.43 and 0.41 with PCA1 and PCA3. However, there is no 
significant association between the remaining three PCA factors and other 
risk-related and firm characteristics based factors.  
                                                
28 See Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Hong and 
Stein (1999), and Zhang (2006), who explain momentum from investors’ irrational behaviour,. Others that 
attempt to explain momentum with changes in fundamentals include Conrad and Kaul (1998), Berk, Green and 
Naik (1999), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), Johnson (2002), and Liu, Warner and Zhang (2005). 
29 They find that returns after adjusted by Fama-French factors are still significantly with other 
firm-characteristics. 
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3.4.4.2. Do We Need All of These Factors? 
The correlation matrix in Table 3.1 suggests that the factors in the literature are 
not mutually exclusive or equally important in asset pricing. Given that early 
studies on multi-factor models suggest up to six factors, we hypothesize that 
many of these factors are redundant in asset pricing. In this section we perform 
some preliminary tests to evaluate this hypothesis. 
Following many previous studies, we first regress factor returns on the 
Fama-French (FF) three factors and momentum, as these factors are known to 
explain cross-sectional returns. If these FF factors and momentum (four factors) 
explain the other factors considered in the study, then these other factors can be 
constructed by combining the four factors. Panel A of Table 3.2 shows that the 
majority of the factor loadings on Fama-French factors and momentum are 
significant. For example, HML is significant for 8 out of 9 factors except for 
COSK. The alphas of the factors where average returns are significant (Table 3.1), 
i.e., ASG, LTRV and LIQ, become insignificant in the presence of Fama-French 
factors and momentum. For example, despite the argument by Cooper, Gulen and 
Schill (2006), the study found that ASG is explained by both the Fama-French 
three factors with momentum because the pricing error (intercept) of asset growth 
becomes statistically insignificant. 
In parallel, we also use PCA factors to explain the same factor returns. The 
first PCA factor is statistically significant in explaining all 9 factors, and the 
remaining 4 PCA factors also have significant factor loadings in some regression 
specifications. For example, when the first 3 PCA factors together are to explain 
COKT, the pricing error becomes insignificant. However, the four factors, i.e., 
LIQ, ASG, LTRV, and IDSN, are not explained by the PCA factors, while only one 
factor, i.e., IDSN, is not explained by the FF three factors and momentum. The 
results indicate that the FF three factors and momentum performs better in 
explaining asset returns than the PCA factors. The outperformance of the FF 
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factors with momentum relative to the PCA factors is in fact consistent with the 
results of Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998). 
In Panel B, SMB, HML and MOM are regressed on other factors. The study 
found that the intercept for SMB and HML becomes insignificant. Although the 
alpha for MOM still remains significant, its magnitude has been significantly 
reduced from 0.81% to 0.7%. The evidence in Panels A and B implies that there 
are many correspondences among these factors, and thus some of them might be 
redundant if they are used together to explain stock returns. 
Panel B of Table 3.2 displays the results of the Principal Component Analysis 
of the 5 risk-based and 8 firm-attributes related factors. The first four components 
explain approximately 80% of the total variance, and the first nine components 
explain about 95% of the variation in the thirteen factor returns. 
The simple exercises in this section suggest that the number of factors needed, 
among the 13 risk and firm-specific related factors, could be smaller than those 
proposed in the literature. In the following subsection we investigate these factors 
in a more rigorous way. 
3.4.3. Which Factors We Need? 
Although the previous section indicates that all of these factors may not be needed, 
and the Fama-French three factors and momentum explain most of the other 
factors proposed in the literature, it does not clearly identify which factors are 
empirically ‘most’ relevant for the explanation of asset returns. There are two 
important motivations for this study, namely identifying factors, or sets of factors, 
that best explain asset returns of individual stocks; and investigating the 
possibility that a set of economically better motivated factors can replace the 
empirical factors based on firm characteristics, such as the Fama-French three 
factors (FF factors, hereafter) and momentum. 
One of the studies that is closely related to the present research is Brennan, 
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), who investigated the relation between 
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individual stock returns, measure of risk and non-risk characteristics, where 
Fama-French factors or CK factors are employed as proxies of risk measures. 
Under the assumption that expected returns are determined by risk factors, which 
are proxies either by CK factors or Fama-French factors, they find that non-risk 
characteristics are significantly related to returns even after risk-adjusted by CK 
factors and FF factors, for example, return momentum effect still persists.  
However, this study has a different focus and uses different methods. First, 
the study does not explicitly assume a set of factors that should be used to explain 
asset returns; instead the factors are grouped into three categories: risk-based, 
firm-characteristics related and CK factors. By examining the performance of 
different combinations of factors within each group, we can directly answer the 
following question, which factors, firm-characteristics or risk based factors, have 
more marginal explanatory power?  
Second, a series of papers by Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996a, and 
1996b) shows that FF factors can explain most of asset return anomalies except 
for momentum. One of the study’s null hypotheses is that the pervasive factor 
returns (characteristics sorted portfolios, e.g., Fama-French factors, SMB, HML) 
should explain asset returns in time-series regressions if they are really the proxies 
for underlying risk factors. Using Average F-Test method can enable the 
examination of the performance of the factors using individual stocks to avoid the 
loss of information due to grouping; and it is also applicable when the number of 
stocks (N) is larger than the number of observations (T). The number of stocks 
(second column of Table 3.3), which is indeed large, ranges from 1741 in the 
early 1970s to 4300 in the late 1990s, and is significantly larger than the number 
of months, i.e. the 420 months from January 1972 to December 2006. 
Finally, it is also interesting to examine the validity of different asset pricing 
models in different sample periods. For example, if Fama-French’s SMB and 
HML and momentum are really pervasive and proxies for the underlying risk 
factors, it is not likely that these factors lose their explanatory power in asset 
pricing within different sample periods unless the risks related to these factors 
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disappear during the periods. For this reason, we use seven non-overlapping 
5-year sub-periods to allow the time variation in linear factor models. Moreover 
using sub-periods reduces survivorship bias; for example, the number of stocks 
that have survived for the last 35 years is very small, i.e., only 381 in our sample. 
It is also possible to investigate which factors matter during which sub-periods. 
The study’s sample covers all the nonfinancial stocks in the NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ return files from the CRSP. Average F-test is applied to all these 
stocks in the 7 non-overlapping 5-year intervals from January 1972 to December 
2006, because the CRSP only started to record NASDAQ stocks from December 
1972. At the start of each interval, a stock must have share price equal to or above 
$5; and during each 5-year interval it must have at least 24 observations.30 Using 
a shorter sub-period (5-year) would minimise the effects of time-varying factor 
loadings (Ferson and Harvey; 1999). The empirical tests in this study start with 
single factor models. Table 3.3 reports the results of seven sub-sample periods 
using the average F test. The third column represents the simulated Average F test 
statistics at the 5% significance level; and any number larger than these statistics 
would imply the rejection of the model (i.e. the null hypothesis that alphas are 
zero is rejected). The last row of Table 3.3 (Titled “NOR”) counts the number of 
sub-periods, in which one factor model is rejected. Although the number of 
sub-periods in which the model is rejected is a crude measure, it summarizes the 
performance of these models in a straightforward way. 
As expected, single-factor models do not explain asset returns well. For 
instance, similar to the results of Fama and French (1992 and 1996b), the excess 
market return (ERM) is rejected in five out of seven sub-periods. Interestingly, 
most of the factors that were tested performed equally well or better than ERM. 
For example, two factors, COSK and PCA1, are rejected only three out of seven 
sub-periods. Over the entire 35 years, three 5-year sub-periods (1982 to 1986, 
                                                
30 The study also applies the Average F-test in the period from January 1967 to December 1971; and it was 
found that most of the factor models examined in this study do not explain individual stock returns over this 
period. This might be the effect of the smaller number of stocks in the sample because NASDAQ stocks are not 
included. Nonetheless, the conclusions in this study do not change if this period is included.  
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1992 to 1996, and 2002 to 2006) remain the most challenging periods for single 
factor models, because none of the single factors considered in this study can 
explain asset returns. 
Table 3.3 clearly suggests that the one factor models have some difficult 
periods in explaining stock returns. Since the market return is required for the 
positive equity premium although it does not explain cross-sectional average 
returns (Fama and French, 1996a), the study next investigates the marginal 
explanatory power of an additional factor in addition to the ERM. Besides, the 
study also evaluates the performance of any combinations of two CK factors in 
parallel. Panel A of Table 3.4 suggests that two CK factors do not increase the 
explanatory power of a single PCA factor. For instance, PCA1 and PCA2 have 3 
and 4 rejected sub-periods on standalone basis respectively (Table 3.3); but 
combining these two still displays 3 rejected sub-periods (Model 1 of Table 3.4); 
and any other mixtures of two PCA factors do not seem to outperform Model 1. 
The results of adding either one risk related or characteristics related factor 
are reported in Panel B and C. Among the total 12 factors, liquidity (Model 4 of 
Panel B), long-term reversal, and momentum (Models 5 and 6 of Panel C) can 
improve the performance of CAPM by two periods. The best two-factor model is 
the one that includes ERM with HML (Model 2 of Panel C), which is rejected in 
only two sub-periods. Similar to the one factor models, the two factor models 
show significant pricing errors during the 10-year period from 1977 to 1986 and 
the last 5-year interval. 
The study repeated the same exercise to include the 3rd and 4th factors and 
report the results in Table 3.5 and 3.6. Panel A of both Table 3.5 and 3.6 shows 
that the explanatory power of CK factors does not increase with the number of 
factors included. For example, the first 3 PCA factors have 3 rejected periods 
(Model 1, Panel A of Table 3.5); whereas the first 4 PCA factors together also 
have 3 rejected periods (Model 1, Panel A of Table 3.6), which performs no better 
than just the first two PCA factors (Model 1, Panel A of Table 3.4). 
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However, by adding more factors, the risk related factor models improve 
significantly. When number of factors is 3, there are 3 models which only have 2 
rejected sub-periods: ERM, COSK and LIQ; ERM, COKT and LIQ; and ERM, 
DNSD and LIQ (Models 3, 5 and 6 in Panel B of Table 3.5). This implies that 
coskewness, cokurtosis and downside risk can improve the two factor model of 
ERM and LIQ which has 3 rejected periods (Model 4 in Panel B of Table 3.4). 
Indeed, the number of rejected sub-periods reduces to 1 with the four risk related 
factor model, e.g., ERM, LIQ, COSK and DNSD (Model 4 in Panel B of Table 
3.6); and no other combinations can outperform these four factors. 
Panel C of Table 3.5 displays the performance of three factor models whose 
factors are firm-characteristics based. None of the combinations outperform the 
risk-based three-factor combinations, i.e., have less than 2 rejected periods, but 
there are 4 models, i.e., Models 1, 8, 10, and 11, which have 2 rejected 
sub-periods. Among these four models, it is interesting to observe that the two 
rejected sub-periods of the Fama-French three factor model (Model 1) are all 
within the first 20 years of the sample period. Fama and French (1993) argue that 
their factors can explain stock returns. The study results, obtained by using 
individual stocks instead of portfolio returns, imply that their seemingly 
successful results might be the outcome of information loss (Roll, 1977; 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979) or data-snooping biases (Lo and MacKinlay, 
1990; and Berk, 2000) due to portfolio grouping. When the number of factors is 4, 
there are 56 different factor specifications (Panel C of Table 3.6). As in Fama and 
French (1996a), we find that Fama-French factors together with momentum 
explain stock returns better than the FF three factor model. However, only one 
sub-period requires momentum and the contribution of momentum for the other 
sub-periods is limited. 
To sum up the results so far, the study has been unable to find a set of factors 
that can explain individual stock returns over the 35-year period. Nonetheless, one 
may still draw the following conclusions. First, CK-type PCA factors 
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underperform risk-related and firm-characteristics related factors31, as the least 
number of rejected periods is 3. Second, the set of economically better motivated 
risk-related factors which shows the least number of rejections are, market 
portfolio, coskewness, downside risk and liquidity. Third, among the firm-specific 
information related factors, Fama-French and momentum outperform all the other 
alternatives. While the firm characteristics related factors, such as Fama-French 
and momentum, remain controversial in asset pricing, coskewness, downside risk 
and liquidity are well and economically better motivated. The study found these 
three factors together with market return explaining individual stock returns no 
worse than firm-characteristics sorted factors, e.g., size, book-to-market, and past 
return. 
During the five-year period from January 1982 to December 1986, almost all 
the models investigated in this study fail to explain individual stock returns. This 
might be related to macroeconomic conditions, because the US economy was in 
contraction over this period and the interest rate was at a historical peak. Figure 
3.1 and Figure 3.2 plot the one-month T-bill and NBER business cycles from 
December 1966 to December 2006. It is evident that the average yield is higher in 
the first half than the second half of the sample period, especially during the early 
80s with an average yield of over 8%. This implies a higher cost of capital for 
firms, which in turn requires high expected returns. In addition, there are four 
contraction periods in the first half of the sample period; in contrast, there are 
only two short-lived contractions in the remaining period. Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002) show that time-series patterns in returns are strongly linked to 
business cycle, and they find that the most intriguing momentum payoff can be 
explained by a set of lagged macroeconomic variables. They provide evidence 
that momentum returns are only positive during expansionary periods, whereas, 
they are negative during recessions. 
                                                
31 Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) also provide empirical evidence that Fama-French factors 
outperform CK factors. 
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3.4.4. Robustness Tests 
In this section, a number of robustness exercises are performed. First, the number 
of the factors is increased to 5; and the results do not seem to be improved. 
Second, the results reported above are obtained with non-penny stocks whose 
prices are at least $5. In order to examine the robustness of the findings when 
penny stocks or small stocks are included, the Average F-test is applied to the two 
four-factor models identified in the previous section using all the stocks. Panel A 
of Table 3.7 suggests that the result remains unchanged when penny stocks are 
included. 
A further question is whether or not the study results are significantly 
different from those obtained using the conventional F test. The conventional F 
test cannot be used when the number of stocks is much larger than the number of 
monthly observations. Thus the bootstrapping method is used to conduct the 
conventional F-test as follows. For each sub-period (T=60), 10 stocks (N=10) are 
randomly selected with replacement, and then tested to see if alphas are 
significant at the 5% level. By randomly selecting 10 stocks with replacement and 
repeating the procedure 10,000 times, any bias from grouping stocks may be 
minimised. Panel B of Table 3.7 compares the results from using the Average and 
Conventional F-test for the two most successful four-factor models identified in 
the previous section. Once again similar results were obtained. 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
Given the empirical failure of CAPM, one common response is to use returns of 
firm-characteristics sorted portfolios in a multi-beta model. Many factor returns 
have been proposed in the literature; they are all claimed to explain 
cross-sectional asset returns. However the number of factors seems to be too large. 
Hence, a total 18 widely cited factors were grouped into three categories and 
investigated. By examining the performance of these three types of factors in 
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explaining individual returns, we identify a set of risk-related factors, market 
return, coskewness, downside risk and liquidity, which work as well as the 
controversial Fama-French factors and momentum. However, it is not claimed 
that these firm-characteristics are not the proxies for the underlying risk factors. 
Nevertheless, the study results do imply that the economically better motivated 
factors could serve as a replacement for the controversial Fama-French and 
Momentum factors. 
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Appendix 
The data sets are from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
Compustat. The firm characteristics and other risk measures are defined and 
calculated as follows: 
1) Asset Growth (ASG): Asset growth rate is calculated as in Cooper, Gulen and 
Schill (2006). The annual firm asset growth rate is calculated using year-on-year 
percentage change in total assets (Compustat Data Item 6). The firm asset growth 
rate for year y is defined as the percentage change in total assets from fiscal year 
ending in calendar year y-2 to year ending in calendar y-1, that is, 
( ) ( ) ( )
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Using this asset growth rate, in June of year y, stocks are assigned into portfolios. 
Asset-growth factor (ASG) is the value-weighted hedge portfolio return (the return 
difference between lowest 30% minus highest 30% asset-growth portfolios) in the 
next 12 months. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of June every year. 
2) Accrual (ACRU): The comprehensive accrual definition of Richardson et al. 
(2005) is used, where accrual consists of the change in non-cash working capital, 
the change in non-current operating assets and the change in net financial assets32. 
3) Volume (VO): The volume factor (VO) is calculated following Gervais, Kaniel 
and Mingelgrin (2001), where the past 50 days trading interval is used to classify 
the high- (low-) volume stock. This 50-day interval is split into a reference period 
(first 49 days) and formation period (the last day of the interval). Using the daily 
number of shares traded during the first 49 days, a stock is classified as a high- 
(low-) volume stock if its formation period volume is among the top (bottom) 10 
percent for that trading interval. Then the one-month holding period returns are 
calculated for these 10 decile volume portfolios. Volume factor (VO) is the return 
                                                
32 Detailed calculations can be found in page 446 of Richard et al. (2005) 
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difference between the lowest and highest trading volume portfolio. Portfolios are 
rebalanced very month. 
4) Liquidity (LIQ): The illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) is calculated; 
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where yiD ,  is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in 
year y, dyir ,,  is the return on stock i on day d  of year y, and dyiv ,,  is the 
dollar trading volume for stock i  on day d  of year y. Analogous to Amihud 
(2002), a stock must have return and volume data for at least 200 days in order to 
calculate this illiquidity proxy. The liquidity factor (LIQ) is computed similar to 
that of ASG. The relative illiquidity measure of Hwang and Lu (2007) is also used, 
but the results are not better than those with Amihud (2002). 
5) Idiosyncratic risk (IDSN): the method followed is as in Ang, Hodrick, Xing and 
Zhang (2006). Specifically, idiosyncratic risk is defined as ( )itεvar  in the 
following Fama-French three factor model 
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At month t, idiosyncratic volatility is computed using 1 month daily data. Then all 
the available stocks are assigned to decile portfolios according to their ( )itεˆvar  
and held for the next month. The procedure is repeated every month. The factor 
construction of IDSN is analogous to VO. 
6) Coskewness, cokurtosis, and downside risk measure are defined as below 
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where ir ( mr ) is security i’s (the market’s) excess return, and mµ is the average 
market excess return. Coskewness and cokurtosis are calculated at end of every 
month following Harvey and Siddique (2000), and Ang, Chen, Xing (2006) where 
at least 24 out of the past 60 monthly returns are used. Then the following month 
return is recorded for the coskewness- (cokurtosis-) sorted portfolios. For the 
downside beta, Chen and Xing (2006) sort stocks into portfolios based on the 
realised −β at the beginning of the 12-month period t, and then they examine the 
relationship between downside beta and return from time t+1 to t+12. This study 
however forms portfolios with downside betas calculated with past daily returns 
and hold them for the next month. Specifically, at the end of every month we use 
past 1-year daily data to compute downside beta and then use post-formation 
return in the following month. The computations of factors, COSK, COKT, and 
DNSD are parallel to VO and IDSN.  
 Summarizing, firm characteristics: volume, idiosyncratic volatility, 
coskewness, cokurtosis and downside risk are calculated at the end of every 
month. Therefore, the corresponding factor returns: VO, IDSN, COSK, COKT, 
and DNSD are computed and rebalanced every month. As asset growth, accrual 
and liquidity level are calculated annually, factors ASG, ACRU and LIQ are 
rebalanced in June of every year. All the factor returns and portfolios are 
value-weighted. Our choice of value-weighting portfolios is consistent with other 
studies33 (see Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) for 
example). 
                                                
33 Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) suggest that the relationship between factors and returns should hold for both an 
average stock (equal-weighting) and an average dollar (value-weighting). Furthermore, as advised by Kothari, 
Shanken and Sloan (1995), The CAPM implies that the portfolio of stocks that has maximum correlation with 
the true market portfolio is efficient. Therefore, equally weighted returns can be dominated by the significant 
number of small stocks, resulting in an unrepresentative picture of the importance of the portfolio returns 
(Fama and French, 2006). 
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4. Is Share Price Relevant? 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Financial theory suggests that share prices do no affect the value of firms in 
frictionless markets. However, there is considerable empirical evidence that the 
share price of a firm is not entirely irrelevant. For instance, Bhardwaj and Brooks 
(1992) conclude that the well-documented January effect is primarily a low-share 
price effect. They also document that after-transaction-cost raw and excess 
January returns are lower on low-price stocks than on high-price stocks. Angel 
(1997) provides international evidence that share prices vary substantially across 
countries; and Dyl and Elliott (2006) report that there are substantial price 
variations in US stock markets due to firms selecting particular price ranges for 
their shares. They claim that firms manage share price levels to increase the value 
of the firm. 
A topic closely related to share price is stock splits. The work of Benartzi, 
Michaely, Thaler and Weld (2006) suggests that the average nominal share price 
in the US has remained remarkably constant at around $30 in spite of inflation 
since the Great Depression as a result of stock splits. A considerable number of 
hypotheses have been proposed to answer the question of why firms split their 
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stocks. There are at least three possible categories of explanations. One is 
signalling, in which firms keep their share prices low, despite the increased 
brokerage commissions, to signal that they are higher quality firms (Brennan and 
Copeland, 1988 and Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice, 1996). A second hypothesis is 
to increase the ownership base of the firm, and this is sometimes known as the 
optimal trading-range hypothesis. Although this is one of the most popular 
explanations (surveyed in Baker and Gallagher, 1980), the empirical evidence is 
mixed. For example, both Lamourex and Poon (1987) and Mukherji, Kim and 
Walker (1997) find the number of shareholders increases after a stock split; 
however, Mukherji, Kim and Walker (1997) find that the proportion of 
institutional ownership remains unchanged following a stock split. In addition, 
this hypothesis cannot explain why open-end mutual funds split since individuals 
can buy fractional shares. A third explanation is related to the liquidity issue. 
After firms lower their share prices via stock splits, more investors would be able 
to own it and liquidity should increase (Baker and Gallagher, 1980; Muscarella 
and Vetsuypens, 1996; Schultz, 2000 and among others). Benartzi, Michaely, 
Thaler and Weld (2006) examine these hypotheses and conclude that none of the 
existing theories is satisfactory in explaining the stock splits phenomena. The 
debate continues. 
In this study, evidence is first shown that share price per se is relevant in 
cross-sectional asset pricing. Share prices are inversely related to returns. Low 
share price stocks (penny stocks, less than or equal to $5) have higher average 
returns than high price stocks (more than $20). The strategy of buying low price 
stocks and selling high price stocks can generate significant positive returns: on 
average, 53 basis points a month over the period from 1963 to 2006. Secondly, 
our investigation confirms the result of Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) after 
replication. However, by using extra 20 years data, we, contrary to their early 
result, demonstrate that the profitability of this price strategy persists after 2 years 
even after considering a full round of transaction costs. Last but not least, the 
profitability of this strategy is robust in the presence of other effects such as size, 
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liquidity, book-to-market equity, earning/price ratio, and past performance. 
Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions suggest that the price effect is robust 
and not subsumed by other firm-specific characteristics.  
The excess return of penny stocks to high price stocks could be explained by 
so-called “Nominal Price Illusion”. This illusion arises when investors have 
valuation difficulties in noisy markets. Consider a situation with two identical 
stocks except for share prices, the same return for the two stocks implies that the 
absolute amount of share price increase would be higher for the high price stock 
than that of the low price stock. Naïve investors would interpret that the high 
price stocks simply become too expensive, therefore they would expect a higher 
return for the low price stock. Using this illusion, an explanation is proposed as to 
why firm managers split stocks: If firm managers know that lower prices may 
generate higher returns, they would keep share prices lower through stock splits to 
maximize shareholders’, and thus their own, utilities.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the 
background of penny stocks. In Section 4.3, evidence is provided for the notion 
that the strategy of buying low and selling high share price stocks is profitable. It 
is also demonstrated that the profitability of this strategy is robust in the presence 
of size, book-to-market equity, liquidity and other firm-specific characteristics. 
Section 4.4 shows that the return patterns associated with nominal share price are 
not explained by the existing factors such as Fama and French three factors and 
momentum; and it is also suggested that “Nominal Price Illusion” can be used to 
explain why firms split their stocks regardless of brokerage commissions. Finally, 
the last section concludes. 
4.2. Penny Stocks 
The term “penny stock” is defined differently depending on the context. In the US, 
a penny stock is a common stock that trades for less than $5 a share and is traded 
over the counter (OTC) through quotation services such as OTC Bulletin Board or 
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the Pink Sheets. However, the official SEC definition34 of a penny stock is 
low-priced, speculative security of a very small company, regardless of market 
capitalization or whether it trades on a securitized exchange (e.g. NYSE or 
NASDAQ) or an OTC listing service.  
The market for penny stocks has changed dramatically over the last few 
decades. Prior to the development of the NASDAQ market in 1971, penny stocks 
were typically traded over the counter or on regional exchanges, often with very 
limited disclosure requirements. In particular, before the Penny Stock Reform Act 
of 1990, the penny stock market was plagued by unscrupulous broker-dealers and 
underwriters. Previous researches on penny stocks were mainly within the 
spectrum of Initial Public Offering market, for example, Beatty and Kadiyala 
(2003); Bradley et al (2006), among others. 
In this study, penny stocks (whose prices are $5 or less) traded on the 
securitized exchanges, i.e., NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, are investigated in the 
perspective of cross-sectional asset pricing. Figure 4.1 plots the number of stocks 
traded in these three markets from December 1925 to December 2006, obtained 
from the CRSP data file. There are two significant adjustments over this period: 
the inclusion of AMEX and NASDAQ stocks into the CRSP database on July 2, 
1962 and December 14, 1972, respectively. Analogous to Bhardwaj and Brooks 
(1992), 5 price groups are created: less than or equal to $5, $5 to $10, $10 to $15, 
$15 to $20, and more than $20. It is evident that there were not many penny 
stocks publicly traded before 1962. However, after NASAQ stocks are included, 
penny stocks have represented on average 28% of the total stocks traded over the 
period from 1972 to 2006 with its peak of 48% at December 1974. It is also worth 
noting that the number of common stocks traded, peaks at the end of 1997 and 
decreases sharply during the following bear market. 
                                                
34 SEC (2006-02-02), Penny Stock Rules, US Securities and Exchange Commission.  
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4.3. Does Share Price Matter in the Cross-Sectional Asset 
Pricing? 
Financial theory suggests that share price should not affect a firm’s value, because 
a firm can change its share price by splitting or reverse splitting its shares. For 
example, a $10 million market value equity can be packaged as 1 million shares at 
$10 per share, or 2 million shares at $5 per share. In this section, evidence is 
provided that share price per se is relevant in cross-sectional returns. Low price 
stocks show higher returns than high price stocks. 
4.3.1. Data and Construction of Portfolios Based on Prices 
The sample used in this study covers all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ common 
stocks included in the CRSP monthly return files and the Compustat annual 
industrial files from July 1963 through December 2006. Stocks are grouped into 5 
price range portfolios at the end of June each year and are held for the next K 
years. In addition, following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), overlapping holding 
periods are used to increase the power of the tests. That is, in any given year t, the 
strategies hold a series of portfolios that are selected in the current year as well as 
in the previous K - 1 year.
35
 The portfolios are equally-weighted and rebalanced 
at the end of June each year.36 
Column six of Table 4.1 shows the number of stocks for portfolios in each 
price range. It is clear that the majority of the penny stocks are traded in 
NASDAQ; and these penny stocks have higher delisted probabilities than high 
price stocks as implied by the transition matrices in Table 4.1. Shumway (1997) 
documents a delisting bias in the stock return database maintained by CRSP. He 
suggests that delists for bankruptcy and other negative reasons are generally 
surprises and that correct delisting returns are not available for most of the stocks 
                                                
35 The empirical exercises are conducted without using the overlapping method, and the results are similar. 
These results are available from the authors upon request. 
36 Using value-weighted portfolios do not change the conclusions. 
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that have been delisted for negative reasons37 since 1962. This bias is more 
severe in the NASDAQ data than in the AMEX/NYSE files. To avoid any 
potential distortion this bias could cause, Shumway’s method is followed to avoid 
this delisting bias. Specifically, a delisting return of -30% is given to a stock if it 
has CRSP delisting codes of 500, 520, 551 to 573, 574, and 580 to 584.38 
4.3.2. Performance of the 5 Price Range Portfolios 
4.3.2.1 Share Price and Expected Return 
 
Table 4.1 documents the average monthly returns in the following 12-month 
holding period and characteristics of the 5 portfolios formed on price. Panel A 
reports the results that are obtained using NYSE and AMEX stocks only from 
July 1926 to December 2006; in Panels B and C, the entire sample period is 
divided into two: pre- and post- July 1963 periods; and finally Panel D examines 
NASDAQ separately given the fact that the number of stocks below $5 is 
significantly larger in this exchange.  
Panel A shows that penny stocks, clearly, have higher returns than nonpenny 
stocks in the following 12 months. The return difference between penny (P1) and 
more than $20 share price portfolio (P5) is 0.83% per month over the entire 81 
years. The return difference is 1.31% in the first 35 years (Panel B), although the 
number of penny stocks in this period is significantly less than that in the 
post-1963 period, with on average only 41 stocks being less than or equal to $5. 
Although penny stocks still outperform high priced stocks by almost 40 basis 
points in the post-1963 period, it is statistically insignificant. Therefore the 
outperformance of penny stocks is prominent during the pre-1963 period. 
                                                
37 Shumway (1997) suggests that the negative reasons include bankruptcy, insufficient capital, and other 
performance-related reasons. 
38 It is worth noting that assigning -30% return for these stocks can only enable the estimation more 
conservative. 
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The right hand side of Table 4.1 presents the migrations of these price range 
portfolios over one-year period. Each row shows the average transition vector for 
a particular portfolio. There are several interesting results that can be drawn from 
the table. First, as expected, penny stocks and more than $20 stocks that belong to 
the two extreme portfolios (P1 and P5) are more likely to stay in the same 
portfolio one year later than the middle price stocks. For instance, in Panel C, 
69% (83%) of penny (more than $20) stocks stay in same portfolio, while only 
35% of $15 to $20 stocks remain in the same rank after 12 months. The migration 
is the most frequent for middle price range stocks, in particular, P4 ($15 to $20). 
For instance 30% of stocks in NASDAQ P4 portfolios remain in the same rank; 
about 32% of them move to the more than $20 range; and 20% of them are shifted 
into the $10 to $20 range. Second, penny stocks are more prone to migrate into 
the higher price range than high price stocks migrate into the lower price range. 
For example, more than 16% of penny stocks move into the $5 to $10 range for 
NYSE and AMEX stocks during the post-1963 period (Panel C), while only 8.2% 
of the more than $20 stocks are relocated in the next price range. The last column 
of Table 4.1 shows the percentage of surviving firms in 12 months time. It is 
obvious that NASDAQ firms have a higher delisting probability than NYSE and 
AMEX; and the pre-1963 period has the lowest delisting stocks. This is the reason 
the delisting bias is controlled using the method of Shumway (1997). 
Since Panels C and D of Table 4.1 display similar return and characteristics 
pattern, and the number of penny stocks during the pre-1963 period is too small to 
get meaningful conclusions, we use all the stocks traded in the three exchanges 
from July 1963 to December 2006 as our sample hereafter.  
4.3.2.2. Share Price, Transaction Costs and January Effect 
Panel A of Table 4.2 reports the properties of price level sorted portfolios using 
the stocks in the three exchanges. Penny stocks, on average, outperform high 
price stocks by 53 basis points per month with the t-statistic of 1.94. Panel B of 
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Table 4.2 presents the average monthly buy-and-hold returns when holding period 
is 1 year and up to 5 years. It is evident that the price strategy of long penny 
stocks and short high price stocks (P1-P5) remains profitable up to 2 years. For 
example, when the holding horizon is two years, the average monthly return 
difference between penny (P1) and more than $20 (P5) is more than 58 basis 
points a month, which is equivalent to a 15% holding period return. It is worth 
noting that the performance of this strategy tends to be negative after two years. 
For instance, the average monthly return of P1-P5 becomes 50 basis points when 
the holding period is five years, relative to the 55 basis points when the holding 
period is three years.  
One of the natural concerns of this strategy is the transaction cost. Bhardwaj 
and Brooks (1992) randomly select 5 trading days from each year of the 1982 
through 1986 period, and then on each of these five days, they obtain the bid and 
ask prices and derive the commission rate from Francis Emory Fitch Inc’s Daily 
Market Publication. They report that the median bid-ask spread for penny stocks 
(and stocks with price more than $20) is 5.1% (and 0.8%); and the median 
commission rate is 7.4% (and 1.3%). Therefore, when a penny stock is acquired, 
its transaction cost would be (5.1%+7.4%)/2=6.3%. Likewise, when a stock with 
price higher than $20 is acquired, the transaction would be 1%. In Panel A of 
Table 4.2, the 1.6% monthly return of penny stocks can be translated into an 
annualized return of 21.2% before transaction costs. Therefore, penny stocks have, 
on average, 14.9% annual returns after transaction costs. Similarly, the after 
transaction costs returns for stocks with prices higher than $20 are 12.9%. Hence 
penny stocks outperform high price stocks by 2% after transaction costs in one 
year. However, after round-trip transaction costs, penny stocks underperform high 
price stocks by 3.3%, which is consistent with the result of Bhardwaj and Brooks 
(1992) who report 3.2% underperformance. They also claim that there is an 
underperformance of 1.8% when the holding period is two years. The results of 
the present study do not match those of Bhardwaj and Brooks. The two-year 
buy-and-hold returns before transaction costs for penny and high price stocks are 
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48.3% and 29.1% respectively, compared to their calculation of 38.6% and 40.4%. 
This is primarily due to the different sample selection in the present study. Their 
study uses NYSE and AMEX stocks from January 1967 to December 1986. The 
present study repeats this exercise using their sample and finds similar results. 
Therefore, by using a 20 year longer period, it is demonstrated that penny stocks 
outperform high price stocks by 8.6% within two years of the round trip 
transactions, although this is not the case when the investment horizon is one 
year.  
Although it seems that penny stocks need to be held for two years to 
outperform high stocks after the round trip transaction costs assumptions 
suggested by Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992), this is not necessarily the case with 
the transaction cost calculations of other researchers. For example, Hasbrouck 
(2006), using the Gibbs estimation method, suggests that the effective transaction 
costs for low price stock are never higher than 4% for US stocks over the period 
from 1926 to 2005 (Hasbrouck, 2006, Figure 3). Both Jones (2002) and 
Hasbrouck (2006) document the decline of the commission and effective 
transaction costs in the US, although the effective costs can rise during market 
turbulence. According to their calculation, the average effective transaction costs 
for penny and high price stocks over this study’s sample periods are 2% and 0.5% 
respectively. Based on these assumptions, penny stocks would outperform high 
price stocks by 4.3% (16.2%) in one- (two-) year period after the round trip 
transaction costs. 
In similar fashion to Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992), this study also separates 
January returns from the rest of the year and reports them in Panel B. In line with 
the January effect studies, January returns are considerably higher for all the 
stocks than the non-January returns. Consistent with the observation of Bhardwaj 
and Brooks (1992), it is also found that the excess returns of penny stocks over 
non-penny stocks are mainly attributable to the significant abnormal returns in 
January. When the holding period is one year, the monthly return difference 
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between penny and high price stock is on average 11% in January, compared to 
the insignificant -0.4% returns in other months of the year.  
4.3.3.3. Robustness of the Price Strategy 
The outperformance of penny stocks relative to high price stocks, however, could 
be explained by size, as Table 4.1 shows that size is positively related to price. 
Since Banz (1981) documents that small firms outperform large firms, the size 
effect has been subjected to extensive research (Fama and French, 1992, 1993 and 
among many others). The performance of small relative to large firms, 
particularly in January, has also been investigated by many other authors. Many 
researchers have proposed different explanations. For example, Kross (1985) 
concludes that the size effect is primarily a price effect. Jaffe, Keim and 
Westerfield (1989) find share prices significant in explaining abnormal January 
returns after control for size effect. However, Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) 
conclude that low share price, rather than size, is primarily responsible for the 
January effect. The empirical evidence in the previous section indicates that share 
price matters in the cross-section of average stock returns. In this subsection, we 
first investigate whether the outperformance of penny over high price stocks is 
due to size effect. 
Panel A of Table 4.3 displays the results of the two dimensional sorts for the 
period from July 1963 to December 2006. At the end of June each year, all the 
available stocks are firstly ranked into quintiles based upon firm’s size (Market 
Equity, which is defined as the product of share price and the number of shares 
outstanding), and then they are sub-grouped into 5 price range portfolios. These 
25 portfolios are rebalanced at the end of June each year.  
Panel A of Table 4.3 shows penny stocks outperform high price stocks only 
for small stocks. For example, the return difference between the smallest penny 
(S1P1) and smallest high price stocks (S1P5) is 0.9% per month. On the other 
hand, the difference between P1 and P5 within other size-quintile is negative 
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although not significant. It is interesting to note that the excess return of penny 
stocks over high price stocks is not related to size in January. For example, P1-P5 
is 6.6% even for the largest 20% of the stocks. In other months of the year, penny 
stocks significantly underperform high price stocks except for the small stocks.  
The same exercise is applied to construct 25 liquidity39 and price portfolios, 
since penny stocks are generally small and illiquid and hence the abnormal returns 
of penny stocks could be explained by liquidity. Panel C of Table 4.3 shows that 
there is no outperformance of penny stocks over high price stocks within each 
liquidity quintile. However, similar to the 25 size and price portfolios, significant 
abnormal returns are found for penny stocks in January irrespective of liquidity. 
The similarity between liquidity/price portfolios and size/price portfolios, 
however, is not completely unexpected since size and liquidity are highly 
associated with each other. The right hand side of Panel B shows the average 
number of stocks for the 25 Size-Price portfolios. More than 72% of small stocks 
have a share price not larger than $5 (portfolio S1P1, which has on average 739 
stocks over this period); while more than 78% of the big firms are priced over $20 
(portfolio S5P5, which has on average 869 stocks over this period). These two 
portfolios together represent 30% of the total available stocks in the market. The 
return difference between these two portfolios is highly significant, 1% (t-statistic 
of 3.20) per month, in which a significant 12% (t-statistic of 9.56) in January, and 
-0.03% (t-statistic of -0.11) in other months. The results in Panel D show that the 
share distribution of the 25 liquidity/price portfolios displays a similar picture to 
that of the size/price portfolios. For example, in the most liquid quintile, the 
majority of stocks have a share price higher than $20 (556 stocks in portfolio 
L1P5 out of the total 704 stocks in the most liquid quintile); conversely, more 
than half of the stocks in the most illiquid quintile are penny stocks. The return 
difference between these two portfolios (i.e., L5P1-L1P5) is 1% (t-statistic of 3.08) 
                                                
39 The illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) is employed, and detail explanation of this liquidity proxy can be 
found in chapter one. 
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per month, in which a highly significant 13.19% (t-statistic of 9.99) in January, 
and -0.09% (t-statistic of -0.31) in other months. 
We also perform the same two-dimensional sorts using other firm 
characteristics, such as past returns, BE/ME and E/P, as previous researches 
report that there are cross-sectional return regularities associated with these firm 
attributes (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Fama and French, 1993, 1996 and among 
others). Since the calculations of these firm attributes need share price as one of 
the inputs, which implies that share price is inevitably linked with these variables, 
one might suspect that the high abnormal returns of low price stocks could be the 
effect of these well-documented firm characteristics. For example, Miller and 
Scholes (1982) hypothesize that firms with low prices are often in financial 
distress, therefore the higher returns for the low price stocks might be the 
compensation for the distress risk. Fama and French (1995) on the other hand 
argue that high BE/ME signals poor earnings and HML (defined as the return 
difference between the high and low BE/ME stocks) proxies firms’ financial 
distress risk. Therefore, if distress risk is the underlying factor which drives the 
higher returns of low price stocks, we would not expect the presence of a price 
effect within each BE/ME quintile. Using the Compustat data file, we calculate 
BE/ME as in Davis, Fama and French (2000), in which Book equity (BE) is 
defined as a stock holders’ book equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit, minus book value of preferred stock. Market equity (ME) is 
the product of prices and the number of shares outstanding. All firms with 
negative book values are excluded. A firm’s average past 6 month return is used 
to form the past performance quintile. Earning per share (EPS) data is from 
Compustat, and E/P is defined as the ratio between EPS and price.  
Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 show the results of two-dimensional portfolio sorts 
using share price and past return, BE/ME and E/P. In contrast to the high 
correlations between share price, size and liquidity, the correlations between price, 
past return, BE/ME and E/P are less prominent because Panel B of each of these 
three tables shows that stocks are much more evenly distributed among different 
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portfolios. A similar pattern is observed for these additional three portfolio 
forming methods; i.e., the excess return of penny stocks over high price stocks is 
significantly positive, with exceptionally high abnormal performance in January 
and insignificantly different from zero in other months of the year. For example 
when portfolios are firstly sorted by BE/ME then by sub-grouped by price range 
(Table 4.5), within the middle BE/ME group (quintile 3) P1-P5 shows a 
statistically significant 0.67% return per month throughout the year with 11.81% 
in January and an insignificant -0.034% in other months.  
The results in this subsection can be summarized as follows: i) when the 
two-dimensional portfolios are constructed first by size or liquidity, penny stocks 
are mostly small and illiquid; ii) the two dimensional sorts suggest that the price 
strategy of long penny and short high price stocks is profitable even after 
controlling the effects of BE/ME, Momentum and E/P; and iii) this excess return 
is primarily driven by the exceptional abnormal January returns of penny stocks.  
Due to these high associations between share price, size and liquidity, the size 
and liquidity effects cannot be separated from the price effect in this portfolio 
formation method. Fama and French (2008) suggest that the main advantage of 
portfolio sorts is to present a simple picture of how average returns vary across 
the spectrum of an anomaly variable; the major disadvantage, however, is that 
sorts are difficult for drawing inferences about which anomaly variables have 
unique information about average return. Following their suggestion, the widely 
used Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions are employed to 
measure the marginal effects of share price relative to many other explanatory 
variables. 
4.3.3.4. How Strong is Share Price Compared to Other Important 
Determinants of the Cross-Section? 
As the empirical results above show that the return difference between penny and 
high price stocks varies with other characteristics, there is a need to examine 
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whether the price effect can be subsumed by the other multiple determinants of 
cross-section of returns. Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992, page 553) state 
“Transaction costs, degree of neglect, misassessment of risk, infrequent trading 
have been shown to partially explain the positive abnormal returns on small firm 
stocks. These characteristics are equally, if not more, applicable to low-price 
stocks.” If the price-return association is the by-product of other, or combinations 
of other characteristics, the coefficients on price should be statistically 
insignificant in the presence of other characteristics. 
The assets to be explained are monthly individual stock returns. To be 
included in the regression, firms must have non-missing observations for all the 
variables that are used in that model. There are 6 explanatory variables: previous 
month’s share price, size (market equity), average previous 6 months return, 
BE/ME, E/P and liquidity. Among which, liquidity is annually updated and the 
others are monthly updated. Seven models are estimated and their results are 
reported in Panel A of Table 4.7. In all the models estimated, share price is 
statistically significant in explaining cross-sectional return difference in the 
presence of other firm characteristics such as size, past return, BE/ME and others. 
Moreover, the R-square values with other additional characteristics variables do 
not increase significantly. Only the inclusion of firm size, past return and liquidity 
can improve the model marginally. For example, Model 2, which has size as an 
additional explanatory variable, only increases the R-squared to 3.8% from 3%. 
The inclusion of liquidity in the regression decreases the significance of share 
price effect, but share price still remains significant at the 10% level. 
Panels B and C repeat the same exercise but distinguish January from the 
other months of the year. It is found that the results in Panel C which exclude 
January are not different from the results of Panel A where all months are 
included. However, hardly any of the firm characteristics considered in this study 
are significant in explaining returns in January except for share price (significant 
at the 10% level when used alone, Model 1 in Panel B; and significant at the 5% 
level when used together with past return, Model 3 of Panel B). Nevertheless, the 
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estimated coefficients on share price are all negative in January as they are in 
other months of the year.40  
In short, the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression strongly suggests that 
share price is not irrelevant of cross-sectional returns. Low share price can predict 
high future returns. More importantly, the effect of share price is not subsumed by 
other firm characteristics such as size, BE/ME and liquidity.  
4.4. Explaining the Profitability of the Price Strategy  
4.4.1. Seasonality of the Price Strategy  
Thus far it is demonstrated that the share price is inversely related to the 
cross-sectional returns. The strategy of buying penny and selling high price stocks 
can generate a significant premium. However, the exceptionally high abnormal 
returns in January, as shown in the previous sections, suggest that this strategy 
might have a seasonal pattern. Figure 4.2 plots the average monthly returns for 
three price strategies: buying penny stocks and selling stocks with share price 
above $20 (P1-P5), buying small penny stocks and selling big high price stocks 
(S1P1-S5P5), and buying illiquid penny stocks and selling liquid high price stocks 
(L5P1-L1P5). There is clearly a seasonal pattern for all these price strategies: 
significant positive returns in the first quarter of the year and negative returns in 
the last quarter. In the following section, it is investigated whether this seasonality 
and the profitability of the price strategies are explainable by the widely used 
common factors such as Fama-French’s SMB, HML and Momentum factors. 
4.4.2. Time Series Regressions 
In this section the robustness of price effect is examined using, arguably, one of 
the most widely used factor models in empirical finance: Fama-French factors and 
                                                
40 The study’s sample includes 522 monthly observations from July 1963 to December 2006; therefore there 
are 43 observations in January and 479 observations in non-January months. The significance of estimated 
coefficients could also be due to estimation errors as suggested by Shanken (1992). 
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the momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The purpose of this 
time-series regression is to investigate whether the profitability and seasonality of 
the price strategy can be explained by this four-factor model. 
The assets to be explained are the 3 hedge portfolios defined in the previous 
section: (P1-P5), (S1P1-S5P5), and (L5P1-L1P5). In order to examine the 
seasonality, 12 dummy variables (JANDM, FEBDM, … , DECDM) are included 
which indicate the months of the year. For example JANDM is the dummy 
variable for January, which is unity in January and zero in other months. The last 
row of Table 4.8 reports the Wald F-statistics for the test of the coefficients on 
JANDM, FEBDM, … , DECDM are jointly zero.  
It is not surprising to observe that the factor loading on SMB is significantly 
positive, since low price stocks are small as in Panel B of Table 4.3. On the other 
hand, HML and MOM are significant only in 1 out 3 cases. The Wald test shows 
that the seasonal pattern of these price strategies remains even in the presence of 
these four factors. Figure 4.3 displays a similar seasonal pattern to the unadjusted 
price strategies payoff as in Figure 4.2, i.e., we continue to observe the positive 
returns in the first quarter and negative returns in the last quarter of the year. 
Although the magnitude of these price strategies is reduced in some months (for 
example, the January return of the hedge portfolio (P1-P5) is 11% and 9% before 
and after adjusted by Fama-French and Momentum factors.), the total returns in 
the whole year for these price strategies still remain significantly positive.  
4.4.3. Share Price Illusion and Stock Splits  
The evidence in this study suggests that low price stocks have higher returns than 
the high price stocks, and this outperformance is not explained by other well 
known firm characteristics or factors. How does this abnormal return arise? The 
abnormal return of penny stocks would be evidence of “Nominal Price Illusion” 
in noisy markets, which can be demonstrated in the following simple exercise and 
the figure below. Suppose that there are two stocks: A and B, which have the 
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same fundamental value except for their prices, and investors do not know 
whether or not they have the same values due to the difficulties in valuation; at 
time t, their prices are 20, =tAP  with 100 shares and 10, =tBP  with 200 shares. 
At time t+1 when 301, =+tAP , rational asset pricing theory suggests the price of 
stock B should be 15* 1, =+tBP  (the dotted line in the figure) since these two 
stocks’ fundamentals are not different, i.e., the returns would be the same for 
these two stocks 5.0* 1,1, == ++ tBtA rr . The same return for different price levels, 
however, will widen the price difference at time t + 1, and naïve investors, 
without knowing the real values of stocks A and B, may believe that stock A 
simply becomes too expensive compared with stock B. In other words, in noisy 
markets, we could observe price 151, >+tBP , i.e., 11,1, =< ++ tBtA rr  when 301, =+tAP  
in our example (the dashed line in the figure). 
When investors know that the fundamentals of the two firms are the same, the 
price illusion would not occur. However, because of noises in the market, 
fundamental values of firms are not known, and the simple price comparison 
would drive higher returns for lower price stocks. The upward bias in return 
would be higher for lower price stocks.  
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Our empirical evidence of the higher return of B over A generally supports 
the existence of this illusion.41 This may be directly tested by examining the 
performance of companies with publicly traded dual class shares in the US, 
because “financial theory suggest that two assets promising the same payoff in 
every state of nature must sell for the same price, therefore the voting rights 
would be worthless and we should expect the same market price for the two 
classes of stocks” (Levy, 1982). 
The typical dual class company offers one class of common stock with 
superior voting rights and one class of common stock with inferior voting rights. 
It is not uncommon to observe that the same company issues two classes shares 
(“A” and “B”) in the US. The two classes usually indicate different voting rights 
and dividend payment policies.42 A famous example is the A and B class shares 
of Berkshire and Hathaway. The difference between A and B class shares is 
well-known to investors: 1) a share of Class B common stocks have the rights of 
1/30th of a share of Class A common stock except that a Class B share has 1/200th 
of the voting rights of a Class A share (rather than 1/30
th
 of the vote); 2) Each 
share of a Class A is convertible at any time, at the holder’s option, into 30 shares 
of Class B, but not the opposite direction.43 The B class share can never sell for 
anything more than a tiny fraction above 1/30
th
 of the price of A share. When it 
rises above 1/30th, arbitrage takes place in which someone, perhaps an NYSE 
specialist can buy the A and converts into B. This will push the prices back into a 
1:30 ratio.44  
For our purposes, we focus on whether investors can generate a profit by 
investing on the price gap between a company’s two share classes. To do this, a 
search is conducted for the companies with dual class common stocks in the 
                                                
41 The tendency of think in terms of nominal rather than real monetary values is known as “Money Illusion” in 
economics. The recognition of the illusion has a long tradition, which can be traced back to 80 years ago. For 
example, Irving Fisher devoted an entire book to it (The Money Illusion, 1928). The existence of money 
illusion is well recognized in the economy (Shafir, Diamond and Tversky, 1997), therefore our proposal of 
share price illusion might simply be the special case of this money illusion. 
42 More details in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2004)  
43 Source: http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/compab.html 
44 Source: http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/compab.html 
                                                    Essays on Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing 
 - 97 - 
CRSP database at the end of December 2001, and it is found that a total of 46 
companies have both A- and B- class shares. In order to control the effect of 
voting power associated with the share class, the voting rights of these companies 
are manually discovered from their annual report. The final sample covers 20 
companies (40 stocks). 
The second column of Table 4.9 displays the voting rights ratio between the 
two share classes of a company.45 The fifth (labelled “B-A”) and sixth column 
show the average share price differences and the t-statistics from January 2002 to 
December 2007.
46
 It is clear that the nominal share prices between the two share 
classes are significantly different from each other. The returns for the two classes 
(the 9th column) are however not different from each other. More importantly, this 
return difference does not seem to be related to voting rights. For example, from 
the first company in Table 4.9, Kelly Services Inc, to the last company, Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc, the voting rights of A-share increase. However there is no return 
pattern associated with this increase.  
For our purpose, we construct two strategies based on share price: one is long 
only; and another is zero-financing long/short. The column “Payoff 1” in Table 
4.9 is the average monthly return for the long only price strategy. This strategy 
only buys the low price class stocks at the end of each month, and then they are 
held for the next month. It is found that 15 out of 20 companies have “payoff 1” 
higher than both of the two classes, and the remaining 5 companies have “Payoff 
1” higher than at least one share class. This implies that investors of companies 
with dual-class shares can have better payoff by investing on the low price class if 
their investment motivations are not to control the voting powers of the 
companies.  
The column “Payoff 2” is the average monthly return for the zero-cost price 
strategy, which long the low price class and short the high price class stock at the 
                                                
45 The notation, “A” and “B”, in this study does not necessarily coincide with the company’s “A” and “B” 
shares. In this study, we normalize “B” share as the class of share which has 1 voting right, and “A” as another 
share class which has all other voting rights.  
46 The price difference for Berkshire Hathaway is calculated as the difference between 30 times of B share 
price and A share price.  
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end of each month and are held for the next month. It is observed that all the 20 
companies have a positive payoff, among which half of them are statistically 
significant at 95% confidence level. 
Hence, higher returns are likely for low price stocks among the 20 companies 
with dual-class shares. These results are consistent with the “Nominal Price 
Illusion”. It might be this type of behavioural illusion which results in the high 
return of low price stocks. The proposal of this study is also consistent with Dyl 
and Elliott (2006) who claim that firms manage share price levels to increase the 
value of the firm, because firm managers would prefer to split stocks to maximize 
shareholders’ utility since they know that lower price will generate higher returns 
in future. 
4.4.4. The Impact of Minimum Price Increment (Tick Size) 
This study demonstrates that penny stocks outperform high price stocks. However, 
one of the concerns is that the minimum price increment might account for part of 
the abnormal high returns for penny stocks as this minimum price increment has 
larger impact on penny stocks than that on high price stocks. If this is the case, we 
would expect a lower than average return for price strategy P1-P5 after the 
decimalization. However, P1-P5 displays a monthly average return of 0.40% 
(t-statistics of 1.35) and 1.35% (t-statistics of 1.98) before and after 2001. 
Secondly, Ikenberry and Weston (2003) present empirical evidence that there is a 
widespread and persistent of price clustering at increments of five and ten cents 
(i.e., larger than the minimum tick size) even after the US equity market 
transitioned from the trading in multiples of one sixteenth and one eighth to one 
hundredth of a dollar in early 2001. In addition, Huang and Stoll (2001) 
investigate the impact of market characteristics, such as tick size, bid-ask spread 
and market depth on the market structure. After comparing the stocks traded on 
the London Stock Exchange (there is no minimum tick for quotes) and New York 
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Stock Exchanges (a dealer market and the existence of minimum tick size), they 
conclude that these characteristics are endogenous to the market structure, i.e., the 
minimum tick size regulation is not related to transaction prices. We, therefore, 
conclude that this minimum tick size is unlikely to have major impact to the 
conclusion in the current study. 
4.5. Conclusions 
In this study, empirical evidence is provided against the financial theory which 
suggests that share price is independent of returns; and we demonstrate that 
cross-sectional returns are significantly linked to their nominal share prices. Low 
price stocks have higher average returns than high price stocks; and this return 
difference is robust in the presence of other firm-specific effects such as size, 
liquidity, BE/ME, E/P and momentum. The well-known existing factors such as 
Fama-French and momentum factors cannot explain this cross-sectional return 
difference associated with share price. However, it is recognized that there is an 
evident seasonal pattern associated with the price strategy.  
In the US, publicly traded penny stocks have accounted for more than a 
quarter of total number of stocks in the three national exchanges. This study 
suggests that investors can acquire significant returns by investing in penny stocks. 
The fact that the exceptionally high returns for pennies in the first quarter of the 
year suggests investors can realize even larger returns by forming portfolios in the 
last quarter and liquidating in the second quarter of next year. This study also 
casts some light on the stock split phenomenon. Firm managers may lower their 
share prices to generate higher expected returns by splitting their stocks.  
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1.1
Monthly Average Amihud’s Illiquidity Level in the UK
The market liquidity is the average of individual stock's illiquidity, where the illiquidity measure is based on Amihud's (2002) measure.
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Figure 1.2
 Monthly Average Relative Illiquidity Level in the UK
The market liquidity is the average of individual stock's illiquidity, where the liquidity measure is based on the new relative measure proposed in this 
study.
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The UK SMB is calculated as follows: at the end of June in year t, two portfolios are formed on stocks’ ranked market value and held for the next 12 
months. The breakpoint is the 70th percentile of the ranked market equity.The return difference of these two portfolios is SMB. Portfolios are 
rebalanced every year. The US SMB is downloaded from Kenneth French Website.
Figure 1.3
Monthly SMB in the UK and US (Percentage)
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Figure 1.4
Monthly HML in the UK an US (Percentage)
The UK HML is calculated as follows. At the end of December in year t, two portfolios are formed on stocks’ ranked book-to-market value and held 
for the next 12 months.  The breakpoints are the 40th and 60th percentile of the ranked book-to-market equity. The return difference of these two 
portfolios is the HML. Portfolios are rebalanced every year. The US HML is downloaded from Kenneth French Website.
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-2.786 -2.901 -2.805 -3.064 -3.107 -3.037 -2.832 -3.158 -3.124 -3.181 -3.275 -3.444 -3.221 -3.313 -3.223 -3.065 -2.575 -2.446
No. of Stocks 96 179 183 184 576 577 712 826 832 798 974 1003 1060 1118 1325 1367 1382 1459
Liquidity Properties of the UK Stock Market over Time (Annual Average)
Table 1.1
The market liquidity is the average of individual stock's illiquidity. The first two rows are aggregate market liquidity based on Amihud's (2002) measure. The third row 
is the aggregate market liquidity based on the new relative liquidity measure proposed in this study.
mi ,γ
mi ,γ
mi ,ψ
Small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Big SMB
Average MV/Total MV (%) 0.060 0.160 0.300 0.490 0.810 1.320 2.240 4.050 9.290 81.290
Average Annual Return 1.310 0.890 0.500 0.810 2.600 2.500 2.340 2.790 4.000 7.050 -4.080
Average Monthly Return 0.110 0.070 0.040 0.070 0.210 0.210 0.190 0.230 0.330 0.570 -0.350
Monthly Return SD 3.320 3.520 3.510 3.810 4.070 3.890 4.000 3.910 4.040 3.900 2.720
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
t-test
0.002
SMB_US SMB_UK
0.002
-0.004
-0.004
-0.2480.656
0.0270.037
Table 1.2
Panel B: Statistical Properties for Monthly SMB in the UK and US
At the end of June in year t, 10 size decile portfolios are formed on stocks’ ranked market value and held for the next 12 months. Every portfolio represents 10 
percentile of the ranked ME. Portfolios are rebalanced every year. SMB is the mimicking factor for size. The breakpoint is the 70th percentile of the ranked market 
equity. The data for the US is from Kenneth French's Website.
Performance of Size-Sorted Portfolios
Panel A: Properties for 10 Decile Size Portfolios (in percentage) January 1988 to December 2004
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High HML
Average MV/Total MV (%) 17.280 14.560 17.300 16.530 9.960 7.740 5.530 4.070 3.130 3.900
Average Annual Return 2.080 1.340 6.080 7.490 4.220 6.930 6.120 8.020 9.620 12.270 3.870
Average Monthly Return 0.170 0.110 0.490 0.600 0.340 0.560 0.500 0.640 0.770 0.960 0.320
Monthly Return SD 3.830 4.480 3.930 4.210 4.360 4.680 5.460 5.030 4.830 4.940 2.500
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
t-test
HML_UK
0.003
HML_US
0.003
0.034 0.025
0.002
4.5254.424
0.003
Table 1.3
At the end of December in year t, 10 value decile portfolios are formed on stocks’ ranked book-to-market value and held for the next 12 months. Every portfolio 
represents 10 percentile of the ranked book-to-market stocks. Portfolios are rebalanced every year. HML is the mimicking factor for value. The breakpoints are the 
40th and 60th percentile of the ranked book-to-market equity. The data for the US is from Kenneth French's Website.
Panel B: Statistical Properties for Monthly HML in the UK and US
Performance of BE/ME-Sorted Portfolios
Panel A: Properties for 10 Decile Book-to-Market Portfolios (in percentage) January 1988 to December 2004
Illiquid 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Liquid LIQ
Average MV/Total MV (%) 0.740 0.780 1.070 1.360 1.730 2.340 3.170 5.150 11.190 72.470
Average Annual Return -13.740 -2.670 -3.440 1.760 1.750 -0.030 1.880 7.030 3.640 8.740 -7.850
Average Monthly Return -1.230 -0.230 -0.290 0.150 0.140 0.000 0.160 0.570 0.300 0.700 -0.680
Monthly Return SD 6.860 5.650 5.450 5.230 5.360 5.200 5.190 5.030 5.290 4.450 2.920
Illiquid 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Liquid LIQ
Average MV/Total MV (%) 9.010 6.570 9.260 10.790 13.480 15.800 13.080 10.870 8.590 2.560
Average Annual Return -6.550 -0.980 3.580 4.110 6.010 9.100 7.270 6.800 11.960 11.370 -7.527
Average Monthly Return -0.560 -0.080 0.290 0.340 0.490 0.730 0.590 0.550 0.940 0.900 -0.650
Monthly Return SD 6.090 4.980 4.690 5.160 4.850 4.630 4.370 5.070 5.180 7.030 2.020
Panel A: Properties for 10 Decile Liquidity Portfolios Sorted by             1988 to 2004 (in percentage)
Table 1.4
Performance of Liquidity-Sorted Portfolios
At the end of December in year t, 10 liquidity decile portfolios are formed on stocks’ ranked Amihud’s (or the relative) liquidity measure and held for the next 12 
months. Every portfolio represents 10 percentile of the ranked stocks. Portfolios are rebalanced every year. LIQ is the mimicking liquidity factor, which is the 
average return difference between the portfolios of the most illiquid 50 percent and the most liquid 50 percent of stocks.
Panel B: Properties for 10 Decile Liquidity Portfolios Sorted by            1988 to 2004 (in percentage)
mi,γ
mi ,ψ
LIQ
LIQ_AMIHUD
RM
HML
SMB
Monthly Mean
Monthly Std. Dev.
Historical Sharpe Ratio
-0.330
HML
1
0.020
1
RM SMBLIQ
1
0.010
LIQ_AMIHUD
1
0.010
0.003
0.034
0.042
0.008
-0.462
0.025
-0.007
0.029
1
-0.080
-0.240
-0.080 0.750
-0.120
0.030 0.200
Panel B: Statistical Properties for All Factors in the UK 
-0.007 -0.004
SMBLIQ LIQ_AMIHUD RM HML
-0.312
0.027
-0.651
0.020
Panel A: Correlation Matrix (204 Monthly Observations)
Table 1.5
Statistical Properties of the Factors
RM is the market return on the FTSE-all share index. SMB is the return difference between the 70th percentile of the ranked ME at the 
end of June each year t, and HML is the return spread between 40th and 60th percentiles of (BE/ME) at the end of December each year t. 
At the end of each year, Amihud's illiquidity measure and the relative liquidity mearsure are calculated for all stocks. The two portfolios 
are created based on these ranked measures. The breakpoint is the median of each liquidity measure. The return difference of these two 
portfolios in the next 12 months is the mimicking liquidity factor (LIQ and LIQ_AMIHUD).
S-B_D S-B_Q S-B_P H-L_D H-L_Q H-L_P ILLIQ-LIQ_D ILLIQ-LIQ_Q ILLIQ-LIQ_P
 Mean -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.008 0.008 0.005 -0.009 -0.012 -0.015
 Std. Dev. 0.038 0.034 0.031 0.044 0.033 0.027 0.032 0.041 0.064
t-test -0.922 -0.980 -1.046 2.431 3.001 2.641 -3.259 -4.349 -4.048
Panel B: CAPM of SMB, HML and ILLIQ-LIQ from 1991 to 2004
S-B_D S-B_Q S-B_P H-L_D H-L_Q H-L_P ILLIQ-LIQ_D ILLIQ-LIQ_Q ILLIQ-LIQ_P
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.008 0.008 0.005 -0.010 -0.010 -0.007
-0.346 -0.443 -0.508 2.028 2.402 1.956 -2.183 -3.405 -3.123
-0.546 -0.439 -0.395 0.047 0.004 0.068 -0.461 -0.330 -0.276
-7.988 -6.807 -6.659 0.382 0.036 0.862 -3.446 -3.567 -3.981
R-squared 0.348 0.282 0.273 0.002 0.000 0.011 0.114 0.126 0.135
S-B H-L
C
RM-Tbill
S-B H-L ILLIQ-LIQ
ILLIQ-LIQ
Table 1.6
Panel A: Monthly Statistical Properties of Different Hedge Portfolios
S-B (H-L) is the hedge portfolio for long the smallest (highest book-to-market) and short the biggest (lowest book-to-market). ILLIQ-LIQ is the hedge portfolio for long the 
most illiquid and short most liquid. _D, _Q and _P stand for decile, quintile and 30%/40%/30% breakpoints. RM is the market return on the FTSE-all share index. T-bill is 
the monthly rate for UK one month Treasury bill. S-B (H-L) is the hedge portfolio for long the smallest (highest book-to-market) and short the biggest (lowest book-to-
market). ILLIQ-LIQ is the hedge portfolio for long the most illiquid and short the most liquid. _D, _Q and _P stand for the decile, quintile and 30%/40%/30% breakpoints. 
The numbers in italic are t-statistics. Portfolios are rebalanced every year. The estimations are justified in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
unknown forms according to Newey and West (1987).
Size, Book-to-Market, Liquidity and Returns
S-B_D S-B_Q S-B_P H-L_D H-L_Q H-L_P
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.005 0.005 0.003
-1.146 -1.151 -1.307 1.503 1.609 1.083
-0.586 -0.474 -0.432 -0.006 -0.053 0.014
-8.315 -6.957 -7.170 -0.051 -0.498 0.184
-0.358 -0.321 -0.343 -0.489 -0.511 -0.488
-2.502 -2.061 -2.664 -2.859 -4.073 -4.994
Wald test of LIQ (F-stats) 6.261 4.246 7.095 8.176 16.591 24.937
R-squared 0.381 0.315 0.318 0.049 0.091 0.136
RM is the market return on the FTSE-all share index. T-bill is the monthly rate for the UK one month Treasury bill. S-B(H-
L) is the hedge portfolio for long the smallest (highest book-to-market) and short the biggest (lowest book-to-market). _D, 
_Q and _P stand for the decile, quintile and 30%/40%/30% breakpoints. LIQ is the liquidity mimicking factor based on the 
relative liquidity measure proposed in this study. The numbers in italic are t-statistics. Portfolios are rebalanced every year. 
The estimations are justified in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown forms according to 
Newey and West (1987).
S-B H-L
C
Table 1.7
Liquidity Effects over Size (SMB) and Book-to-Market Strategy (HML)
Rm-Tbill
LIQ
H-L
R-squared
H-L
Wald test of LIQ(F-stats)
R-squared
Panel B: Robustness of Liquidity effects over Book-to-Market Strategy
H-L_D H-L_Q H-L_P
C
0.006 0.005 0.003
1.369 1.563 1.193
Rm-Tbill
0.027 -0.056 -0.002
0.206 -0.524 -0.029
LIQ
-0.543 -0.520 -0.480
-3.150 -3.970 -4.791
22.952
0.059 0.094 0.143
Distress_Factor
-0.173
-0.914
0.064
0.477
0.117
1.109
9.922 15.761
Panel A: Financial Distress Factor  over Book-to-Market Strategy
H-L_D H-L_Q H-L_P
C
0.009 0.008 0.006
1.954 2.349 2.026
-0.468 0.871 1.451
Rm-Tbill
0.074 -0.012 0.039
0.566 -0.108 0.511
Table 1.8
Robustness of Liquidity Effects
RM is the market return on the FTSE-all share index. T-bill is the monthly rate for the UK one month 
Treasury bill. H-L is the hedge portfolio for long the highest book-to-market and short the lowest book-to-
market. _D, _Q and _P stand for the decile, quintile and 30%/40%/30% breakpoints. LIQ is the liquidity 
mimicking factor based on the relative liquidity measure proposed in this study. The distress factor is a 
mimicking factor for distress risk, obtained from Agarwal and Taffler (2005). The numbers in italic are t-
statistics. Portfolios are rebalanced every year. The estimations are justified in the presence of both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown forms according to Newey and West (1987).
0.005 0.007 0.028
Distress_Factor
-0.096 0.137 0.184
HML
Wald test of LIQ(F-stats)
R-squared
-0.296
0.116
0.412
0.400
0.444
2.147
0.440
0.271
0.590
1.113
-0.538
-0.612
0.260
0.743
0.582
0.495
3.514
0.645
-0.186
Industrial Production
Robustness of Liquidity Effects over Macroeconomic Variables
CPI
Term Spread
Corporate Spread
-0.191
-0.382
1.225
0.782
3.527 5.953 12.816
0.051 0.106 0.118
Momey Supply (M2)
-1.084 -1.206 -0.358
-1.344 -1.964 -0.613
-0.389
-1.878 -2.440 -3.580
-0.088
-0.131 -0.863 -0.784
0.005
1.664 2.753 1.051
7.261
C
0.013 0.015
Rm-Tbill
-0.027 -0.140
LIQ
-0.343 -0.332
Table 1.9
RM is the market return on the FTSE-all share index. T-bill is the monthly rate for the UK one month 
Treasury bill. H-L is the hedge portfolio for long the highest book-to-market and short the lowest book-to-
market. _D, _Q and _P stand for the decile, quintile and 30%/40%/30% breakpoints. LIQ is the liquidity 
mimicking factor based on the relative liquidity measure proposed in this study. The macroeconomic variables 
are all downloaded from Datastream. Among these macroeconomic variables, the industrial production is the 
increase in the rate of the seasonally adjusted UK industrial production volume index. CPI is the changes of 
the UK comsumer price index. Term spread is the yield difference between the 10-year government bond and 
one month T-bill. Corporate spread is the return difference between the Merrill Lynch UK BBB and AAA 
bond index. Money supply is the increase rate of the broad money supply.The numbers in italic are t-statistics. 
Portfolios are rebalanced every year. The estimations are justified in the presence of both heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation of unknown forms according to Newey and West (1987).
H-L_D H-L_Q H-L_P
-0.010 -0.012 -0.014 -0.01468 -0.016
-2.183 -2.543 -2.622 -2.702 -2.846
-0.461 -0.614 -0.552 -0.560 -0.504
-3.446 -4.845 -4.506 -3.844 -3.730
-0.478 -0.361 -0.435 -0.338
-3.776 -2.499 -2.933 -2.109
0.401 0.444 0.412 0.452
2.216 2.443 2.282 2.497
-0.227 -0.145
-0.973 -0.583
0.157 0.179
1.091 1.134
R-squared 0.114 0.190 0.198 0.197 0.207
RM is the market return on the FTSE-all share index. T-bill is the monthly rate for the UK one month 
Treasury bill. ILLIQ-lLIQ_d is the return difference between the most illiquid and liquid decile portfolios. 
SMB and HML are mimicking factors for size and value. The distress factor is a mimicking factor for 
distress risk, obtained from Agarwal and Taffler (2005).  WML is a 6 by 6 momentum factor as in 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The numbers in italic are t-statistics. Portfolios are rebalanced every year. 
The estimations are justified in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown 
forms according to Newey and West (1987).
Dependent variables: ILLIQ-LIQ_D
SMB
HML
C
RM-TBILL
Distress_Factor
WML
Table 1.10
Different Factor Models for Illiquid minus Liquid Portfolios
Postranking Postranking
Portfolio Betas  Returns (%) Illiquidity ln(Size) ln(Volume) Turnover Price
1 (Liquid) 0.88 9.82 -5.10 16.86 14.75 0.14 59.45
2 0.79 10.77 -4.19 15.46 13.91 0.21 46.07
3 0.77 11.07 -3.68 14.96 13.52 0.24 40.50
4 0.82 11.46 -3.24 14.60 13.25 0.28 37.33
5 0.80 12.10 -2.77 14.26 13.04 0.30 33.99
6 0.85 12.88 -2.39 13.98 12.79 0.32 32.80
7 0.88 11.80 -2.04 13.74 12.51 0.32 32.62
8 0.80 13.62 -1.73 13.48 12.24 0.33 30.24
9 0.86 12.89 -1.37 13.26 12.09 0.35 27.66
10 0.85 13.81 -1.08 13.07 11.86 0.34 26.52
11 0.88 14.90 -0.70 12.86 11.67 0.34 25.10
12 0.86 15.63 -0.40 12.67 11.46 0.35 23.73
13 0.86 14.80 -0.14 12.46 11.14 0.33 22.48
14 0.82 16.30 0.22 12.26 10.87 0.33 21.31
15 0.89 16.47 0.69 12.06 10.75 0.33 20.83
16 0.82 17.70 1.09 11.79 10.35 0.32 18.69
17 0.74 19.22 1.53 11.58 10.32 0.32 18.47
18 0.69 19.77 2.09 11.24 9.87 0.32 16.59
19 0.79 21.93 2.86 10.76 9.23 0.29 14.02
20 (Illiquid) 0.62 28.09 4.14 10.29 8.85 0.32 10.99
Betas, Average Returns, Liquidity and Other Characteristics on  20 Liquidity-ranked Portfolios Over the 
Period 1962 to 2005
Table 2.1
Panel A. Illiquidity Measure of Amihud
At the end of each year, from 1962 to 2004, all the available non-financial AMEX/NYSE stocks with price greater than 5 dollars from CRSP 
are ranked into 20 portfolios based on their liquidity level. Portfolio 1 (20) in each year consists of the most liquid (illiquid) 5 percent stocks. 
Portfolios are rebalanced every year. The post-ranking betas use the full sample of post-ranking returns for each portfolio. The market returns 
are equally-weighted. In order to minimise the effects of nonsynchronous trading on the estimate of beta (Scholes and Williams, 1977; 
Dimson, 1979), betas are estimated as the sum of the slopes in the regression of excess returns on the current and prior month’s excess market 
returns. An annual, equally-weighted buy-and-hold return on each portfolio in the next 12 months is calculated. 
A time-series of 44 postranking-year returns for each portfolio from year 1962 to 2005 is constructed. Two illiquidity measures are reported: 
Amihud's (2002) absolute illiquidity measure (Amihud) and the relative liquidity measure (reAmihud). Amihud measures liquidity as the ratio 
of absolute return to dollar trading volume. The relative illiquidity measure (reAmihud) is the natural logarithm of Amihud's measure scaled by 
market capitalization. By this construction, high value suggests low liquidity. Size is the average market value of equity in millions of dollars 
on June 30 of each year. Volume is measued as the total dollar trading volume in each year. Turnover is defined as the ratio of Volume to Size. 
Price is the annual year-end price level in dollars. Panel A (B) presents the results based on Amihud's (reAmihud) illiquidity measure. 
Postranking Postranking
Portfolio Betas  Returns (%) Illiquidity ln(Size) ln(Volume) Turnover Price
1 (Liquid) 1.04 10.63 8.60 14.55 13.72 0.64 34.10
2 0.99 11.66 8.83 14.72 13.46 0.46 32.96
3 0.88 12.61 8.94 14.83 13.40 0.40 33.05
4 0.92 13.41 9.05 14.81 13.25 0.36 32.92
5 0.88 14.78 9.14 14.91 13.26 0.32 32.08
6 0.96 12.62 9.20 14.84 13.22 0.32 30.23
7 0.84 13.93 9.29 14.97 13.12 0.30 31.22
8 0.84 14.60 9.36 14.94 13.22 0.30 30.50
9 0.87 14.65 9.44 14.94 13.03 0.29 29.59
10 0.86 14.71 9.51 14.94 13.03 0.28 29.37
11 0.84 15.13 9.61 14.90 12.87 0.28 28.66
12 0.75 15.19 9.71 14.97 12.78 0.28 26.23
13 0.85 15.57 9.83 14.23 12.14 0.27 26.78
14 0.76 16.18 9.95 14.33 12.14 0.26 26.49
15 0.72 16.26 10.08 13.48 11.36 0.24 24.35
16 0.78 16.78 10.19 13.20 11.11 0.24 24.06
17 0.72 16.25 10.36 12.90 10.68 0.22 24.03
18 0.65 17.78 10.56 12.98 10.41 0.20 23.95
19 0.68 18.70 10.84 12.93 10.16 0.18 23.67
20 (Illiquid) 0.70 19.40 11.38 12.79 10.03 0.15 23.93
Panel B. Relative Illiquidity Measure
Table 2.1----Continued
Portfolio Small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Big Small-Big s.e.
LIQ 0.80 1.11 0.81 1.11 1.07 0.99 0.94 0.85 0.92 0.90 -0.10 0.19
2 0.77 0.70 1.07 1.06 0.89 0.97 0.97 0.86 0.81 0.99 -0.23 0.20
3 0.85 0.79 0.78 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.85 0.81 0.67 0.82 0.03 0.22
4 0.96 1.03 0.98 0.90 0.96 0.82 0.97 0.75 0.76 0.82 0.13 0.16
5 0.68 0.75 0.99 1.03 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.74 0.76 0.76 -0.08 0.18
6 0.72 0.79 0.71 0.97 0.89 0.76 0.73 0.79 0.73 0.70 0.02 0.18
7 0.64 0.59 0.64 0.81 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.84 0.73 0.75 -0.11 0.19
8 0.73 0.55 0.75 0.90 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.75 -0.02 0.17
9 0.53 0.84 0.67 0.84 0.67 0.69 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.75 -0.22 0.21
ILLIQ 0.40 0.78 0.82 0.70 0.80 0.74 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.62 -0.22 0.20
ILLIQ-LIQ -0.40 -0.34 0.01 -0.40 -0.27 -0.25 -0.14 -0.06 -0.13 -0.28
s.e. 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.08
LIQ 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.03
2 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.03
3 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.04
4 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.03
5 0.25 0.22 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.16 0.03
6 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.03
7 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.03
8 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.03
9 0.32 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.22 0.04
ILLIQ 0.36 0.22 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.26 0.03
ILLIQ-LIQ 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01
s.e. 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Average Annual Returns
Holding Period Betas, Average Returns and Size on  100 Size/Liquidity-ranked 
Portfolios Over the Period 1962 to 2005
Postranking Betas
Table 2.2
Panel A. Illiquidity Measure of Amihud
At the end of each year, from 1962 to 2004, all the available non-financial AMEX/NYSE stocks with price 
greater than 5 dollars from CRSP are firstly ranked into 10 portfolios based on their market value. Then within 
each size-decile, stocks are subdivided into 10 liquidity portfolios. Portfolios are rebalanced every year. The 
post-ranking betas use the full sample of post-ranking returns for each portfolio. The market returns are equally-
weighted. In order to minimise the effects of nonsynchronous trading on the estimate of beta (Scholes and 
Williams, 1977; Dimson, 1979), betas are estimated as the sum of the slopes in the regression of excess returns 
on the current and prior month’s excess market returns. An annual, equally-weighted buy-and-hold return on 
each portfolio in the next 12 months is calculated. 
A time-series of 44 postranking-year returns for each portfolio from year 1962 to 2005 is constructed. Turnover 
is defined as the ratio of dollar trading volume to market capitalization. Two illiquidity measures are reported: 
Amihud's (2002) absolute illiquidity measure (Amihud) and the relative illiquidity measure (reAmihud). 
Amihud measures liquidity as the ratio of absolute return to dollar trading volume. The relative illiquidity 
measure (reAmihud) is the natural logarithm of Amihud's measure scaled by market capitalization. By this 
construction, high value suggests low liquidity.  Panel A (B) presents the results based on Amihud's (reAmihud) 
illiquidity measure. 
LIQ 10.44 11.23 11.78 12.21 12.71 13.13 13.63 14.20 14.94 17.70 -7.26 0.05
2 10.32 11.09 11.73 12.29 12.65 13.16 13.67 14.15 14.86 16.89 -6.57 0.07
3 10.22 11.15 11.78 12.23 12.68 13.12 13.59 14.15 14.84 16.52 -6.30 0.09
4 10.17 11.10 11.79 12.21 12.61 13.10 13.60 14.10 14.84 16.17 -6.00 0.08
5 10.14 11.11 11.68 12.22 12.65 13.15 13.54 14.08 14.77 15.95 -5.81 0.08
6 10.06 11.02 11.70 12.17 12.62 13.07 13.52 14.06 14.77 15.74 -5.68 0.07
7 10.00 11.04 11.66 12.19 12.57 13.05 13.50 14.08 14.74 15.70 -5.71 0.07
8 9.95 11.01 11.64 12.15 12.57 13.05 13.52 14.01 14.66 15.52 -5.57 0.07
9 9.84 11.04 11.65 12.11 12.62 13.01 13.50 14.00 14.59 15.43 -5.60 0.08
ILLIQ 9.61 10.99 11.69 12.15 12.61 13.00 13.52 13.99 14.58 15.37 -5.76 0.08
ILLIQ-LIQ -0.83 -0.24 -0.09 -0.06 -0.10 -0.14 -0.11 -0.21 -0.37 -2.33
s.e. 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
LIQ 0.58 0.76 0.79 0.87 0.74 0.75 0.61 0.47 0.33 0.09 0.49 0.04
2 0.47 0.56 0.51 0.56 0.47 0.51 0.39 0.36 0.28 0.11 0.36 0.03
3 0.42 0.48 0.43 0.46 0.41 0.37 0.36 0.30 0.23 0.12 0.29 0.03
4 0.38 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.39 0.31 0.30 0.26 0.22 0.15 0.23 0.04
5 0.31 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.04
6 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.27 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.03
7 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.18 0.04
8 0.32 0.30 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.03
9 0.32 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.03
ILLIQ 0.49 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.38 0.14
ILLIQ-LIQ -0.09 -0.53 -0.59 -0.70 -0.60 -0.62 -0.49 -0.37 -0.23 0.01
s.e. 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01
Panel A-Table 2.2----Continued
Average ln(Size)
Average Turnover
Portfolio Small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Big Small-Big s.e.
LIQ 0.79 1.02 0.81 1.15 0.99 1.09 0.98 1.01 1.03 0.91 -0.13 0.17
2 0.56 0.76 1.02 0.93 1.01 0.93 0.92 0.81 0.77 0.79 -0.23 0.18
3 0.89 0.85 0.80 1.08 0.80 0.98 0.83 0.80 0.68 0.79 0.11 0.16
4 0.81 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.80 0.93 0.77 0.75 0.82 -0.01 0.19
5 0.86 0.76 1.00 0.87 0.96 0.91 0.89 0.82 0.75 0.78 0.08 0.20
6 0.83 0.75 0.71 0.91 0.88 0.77 0.72 0.74 0.70 0.71 0.11 0.18
7 0.85 0.67 0.83 0.87 0.90 0.75 0.81 0.72 0.74 0.81 0.04 0.16
8 0.64 0.82 0.70 0.87 0.68 0.72 0.75 0.80 0.66 0.80 -0.16 0.23
9 0.55 0.65 0.58 0.83 0.78 0.69 0.78 0.72 0.81 0.71 -0.16 0.21
ILLIQ 0.46 0.78 0.84 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.73 -0.27 0.19
ILLIQ-LIQ -0.33 -0.23 0.04 -0.39 -0.23 -0.33 -0.22 -0.26 -0.25 -0.19
s.e. 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.11
LIQ 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.03
2 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.03
3 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.03
4 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.03
5 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.03
6 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.03
7 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.03
8 0.26 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.04
9 0.30 0.22 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.19 0.04
ILLIQ 0.29 0.22 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.03
ILLIQ-LIQ 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.02
s.e. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Postranking Betas
Average Annual Returns
Panel B. Relative Illiquidity Measure
Table 2.2----Continued
LIQ 10.20 11.13 11.76 12.18 12.68 13.11 13.60 14.12 14.76 15.88 -5.68 0.07
2 10.15 11.08 11.68 12.29 12.63 13.11 13.59 14.07 14.72 16.00 -5.85 0.08
3 10.02 11.04 11.72 12.19 12.64 13.08 13.57 14.12 14.75 15.96 -5.94 0.08
4 10.06 11.08 11.78 12.19 12.64 13.09 13.58 14.13 14.75 16.22 -6.16 0.08
5 10.07 11.12 11.74 12.20 12.61 13.12 13.57 14.07 14.82 16.22 -6.14 0.09
6 10.07 11.15 11.68 12.19 12.64 13.10 13.53 14.09 14.79 16.30 -6.23 0.09
7 10.12 11.02 11.65 12.16 12.62 13.04 13.52 14.06 14.73 16.48 -6.36 0.07
8 9.97 11.04 11.70 12.21 12.59 13.08 13.54 14.08 14.77 16.49 -6.52 0.08
9 10.10 11.06 11.66 12.13 12.64 13.05 13.56 14.03 14.81 16.86 -6.76 0.09
ILLIQ 10.24 11.08 11.74 12.18 12.65 13.03 13.55 14.03 14.73 17.08 -6.84 0.12
ILLIQ-LIQ 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03 1.20
s.e. 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10
LIQ 0.61 0.79 0.79 0.88 0.75 0.76 0.61 0.51 0.41 0.23 0.38 0.05
2 0.46 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.50 0.51 0.44 0.38 0.29 0.17 0.29 0.03
3 0.42 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.39 0.39 0.33 0.27 0.25 0.14 0.28 0.03
4 0.41 0.42 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.21 0.15 0.26 0.05
5 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.03
6 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.22 0.03
7 0.31 0.32 0.25 0.28 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.03
8 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.18 0.03
9 0.38 0.27 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.29 0.08
ILLIQ 0.32 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.24 0.03
ILLIQ-LIQ -0.30 -0.56 -0.58 -0.73 -0.61 -0.62 -0.50 -0.41 -0.31 -0.16
s.e. 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
Panel B-Table 2.2----Continued
Average ln(Size)
Average Turnover
Φ 1t Φ 2t Φ 3t
Portfolios t -statistics t -statistics t -statistics R
2
0.79 -0.04 0.54
980.43 -12.48
0.79 0.02 0.20
173.56 94.39
0.79 -0.04 0.00 0.54
88.26 -14.17 -2.02
0.87 0.00 0.00
4379.29 2.79
0.87 -0.03 0.18
530.19 -78.58
0.87 -0.04 -0.05 0.27
185.57 -15.07 -47.17
0.96 0.04 0.51
161.95 25.33
0.96 -0.05 0.47
165.31 -59.06
0.96 0.09 0.07 0.54
4.10 19.64 12.60
0.81 -0.01 0.06
327.39 -19.54
0.81 0.00 0.00
247.33 23.22
0.81 -0.09 -0.10 0.27
97.20 -43.13 -58.60
25, first size, then
liquidity ranked
100 liquidity ranked
100, first size, then
liquidity ranked
where βpt is the postranking beta for portfolio p from July 1 of year t to June 30 of year t+1. 
ILLIQpt-1 and Sizept-1 are the liquidity level and natural logarithm of the average market 
capitalization in millions of dollars for portfolio p at the end of year t. Both these two series 
are cross-sectionally demeaned every year. Φ1t, Φ2t, and Φ3t are regression parameters; and 
εpt is the regression error. Portfolios are formed in two different ways. (i) 20(100) portfolios 
by grouping on liquidity alone; (ii) ranking stocks first on size into 5(10) portfolios and then 
on liquidity within each size group into 5(10) portfolios.The post-ranking betas use the full 
sample of post-formation returns for each portfolio.
Two illiquidity measures are reported: Amihud's (2002) absolute illiquidity measure 
(Amihud) and the relative illiquidity measure (reAmihud). Amihud measures liquidity as the 
ratio of absolute return to dollar trading volume. The relative illiquidity measure (reAmihud) 
is the natural logarithm of Amihud's measure scaled by market capitalization. By this 
construction, high value suggests low liquidity.  Panel A (B) presents the results based on 
Amihud's (reAmihud) illiquidity measure. 
Panel A. Illiquidity Measure of Amihud
20 liquidity ranked
Table 2.3
 Cross-Sectional  Regression of Betas on Liquidity and Size Over the 
Period 1962 to 2005
Time-series averages of estimated coefficients from the following annual cross-sectional 
regressions from 1962 to 2005. Associated t -statistics and R-squares are reported (with and 
without Size/Liquidity being included in the regressions).
ptpttptttpt SizeLIQ εβ +Φ+Φ+Φ= −− 13121 ttptttpt izI LIQ +Φ+Φ= − 3121
0.80 -0.11 0.81
49.58 -35.31
0.80 0.02 0.56
2.84 1.62
0.80 -0.10 0.00 0.82
31.14 -33.39 -0.80
0.87 -0.08 0.26
20.17 -10.00
0.87 -0.04 0.28
444.68 -88.98
0.87 -0.13 -0.06 0.80
75.25 -52.65 -19.47
0.96 -0.04 0.12
61.98 -19.39
0.96 0.01 0.09
16.26 2.31
0.96 -0.03 0.01 0.14
15.69 -7.88 1.71
0.82 -0.08 0.25
42.71 -23.23
0.82 0.00 0.00
462.08 -8.40
0.82 -0.10 -0.02 0.33
108.14 -60.48 -7.11
100, first size, then
liquidity ranked
Panel B. Relative Illiquidity Measure
20 liquidity ranked
25, first size, then
liquidity ranked
100 liquidity ranked
Table 2.3----Continued
Φ 1t Φ 2t Φ 3t Φ 4t
Portfolios t -statistics t -statistics t -statistics t -statistics R
2
0.49 -0.43 0.21
9.70 -7.64
0.16 -0.01 0.02 0.38
4.11 -0.24 6.48
0.33 -0.22 -0.02 0.51
11.16 -5.40 -4.70
0.17 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.61
5.14 -0.57 3.62 -3.19
0.18 -0.05 0.25
5.24 -0.80
0.18 -0.05 0.01 0.40
5.33 -0.85 2.21
0.25 -0.13 -0.01 0.51
9.31 -2.98 -2.94
0.23 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 0.56
8.63 -2.55 2.35 -2.18
-0.11 0.27 0.17
-2.16 3.86
0.03 0.13 0.00 0.27
0.73 2.13 4.10
0.00 0.16 -0.01 0.28
-0.04 3.49 -2.41
0.10 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.37
2.96 1.44 4.68 -1.78
0.26 -0.13 0.08
11.37 -3.63
0.15 0.01 0.02 0.21
6.51 0.22 6.74
0.25 -0.12 -0.02 0.29
10.97 -3.10 -4.86
0.18 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.34
8.27 -1.12 4.86 -3.03
100 liquidity ranked
25, first size, then
liquidity ranked
100, first size, then
liquidity ranked
where rpt is the portfolio holding period return; βpt is the post-formation beta for portfolio p from July 1 of 
year t to June 30 of year t+1. ILLIQpt-1 and ln(Size)pt-1 are the liquidity level and natural logarithm of the 
average market capitalization in millions of dollars for portfolio p at the end of year t. Φ1t, Φ2t,  Φ3t and Φ4t 
are regression parameters; and εpt is the regression error. Portfolios are formed in two different ways. (i) 
20(100) portfolios by grouping on liquidity alone; (ii) ranking stocks first on size into 5(10) portfolios and 
then on liquidity within each size group into 5(10) portfolios.Postranking beta for each portfolio is the beta 
estimate in the one-year buy-and-hold period.
Two illiquidity measures are reported: Amihud's (2002) absolute illiquidity measure (Amihud) and the relative 
illiquidity measure (reAmihud). Amihud measures liquidity as the ratio of absolute return to dollar trading 
volume. The relative illiquidity measure (reAmihud) is the natural logarithm of Amihud's measure scaled by 
market capitalization. By this construction, high value suggests low liquidity.  Panel A (B) presents the results 
based on Amihud's (reAmihud) illiquidity measure. 
Panel A. Illiquidity Measure of Amihud
20 liquidity ranked
Table 2.4
 Cross-Sectional  Regression of Portfolio Returns on Betas, Liquidity and Size Over 
the Period 1962 to 2005
Time-series averages of estimated coefficients from the following annual cross-sectional regressions from 
1962 to 2005. Associated t -statistics and R-squares are reported (with and without Size/Liquidity being 
included in the regressions).
ptpttpttptttpt SizeILLIQr εβ +Φ+Φ+Φ+Φ= −− )ln( 141321
0.31 -0.20 0.31
8.25 -3.90
0.17 -0.03 0.02 0.39
5.72 -0.63 3.33
0.26 -0.13 -0.01 0.39
7.75 -2.98 -2.71
0.18 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.45
6.17 -1.03 2.57 -1.20
0.18 -0.05 0.29
4.66 -0.86
0.11 0.03 0.03 0.45
2.07 0.38 3.49
0.28 -0.16 -0.02 0.53
8.87 -3.51 -3.28
0.28 -0.16 0.00 -0.01 0.56
8.25 -3.67 0.09 -2.90
0.25 -0.10 0.06
7.37 -2.70
0.14 0.01 0.04 0.23
4.72 0.25 5.10
0.18 -0.03 -0.01 0.17
5.97 -0.83 -2.28
0.14 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.25
4.59 0.41 5.64 0.79
0.23 -0.10 0.08
9.53 -2.41
0.17 -0.02 0.02 0.15
6.74 -0.42 3.70
0.24 -0.10 -0.02 0.29
9.69 -2.64 -4.85
0.21 -0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.32
9.98 -2.22 1.98 -4.28
20 liquidity ranked
100 liquidity ranked
25, first size, then
liquidity ranked
100, first size, then
liquidity ranked
Panel B. Relative Illiquidity Measure
Table 2.4----Continued
Figure 3.1: One Month T-bill
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Figure 3.2: NBER Business Cycle
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Contraction: Peak to Trough Expansion: Previous Trough to This Peak
ERM COSK COKT DNSD LIQ SMB HML ASG ACRU LTRV MOM IDSN VO PCA1 PCA2 PCA3 PCA4 PCA5
Mean 0.487 0.157 0.176 0.025 -0.510 0.245 0.461 0.407 0.175 0.351 0.806 0.328 -0.036 0.082 0.055 -0.004 0.058 -0.042
(Std Err) (0.206) (0.117) (0.132) (0.227) (0.159) (0.151) (0.137) (0.152) (0.141) (0.116) (0.187) (0.284) (0.092) (0.163) (0.071) (0.078) (0.064) (0.053)
Skewness -0.496 0.239 0.180 0.494 -0.422 0.573 0.014 -0.183 -0.048 0.796 -0.630 0.046 -0.286 1.445 1.066 0.445 2.559 1.714
Kurtosis 4.947 6.248 5.201 7.451 5.019 8.539 5.385 6.367 4.665 6.086 8.273 8.873 6.613 10.267 12.353 11.589 23.012 17.291
Jarque-Bera 95.5 215.6 99.5 415.7 95.8 640.0 113.7 229.4 55.6 241.2 587.8 690.1 267.7 1223.2 1840.4 1491.4 8533.1 4319.5
ERM 1 0.431 0.270 0.407 0.143 0.163
COSK 0.293 1 0.242 0.033 0.184 0.151 0.012
COKT -0.323 -0.374 1 -0.246 -0.197 -0.140 -0.031 -0.049
DNSD -0.643 -0.361 0.478 1 -0.525 -0.167 -0.247 -0.093 -0.028
LIQ 0.082 0.080 -0.310 -0.100 1 -0.332 -0.009 0.164 -0.125 -0.056
SMB 0.306 0.033 0.058 -0.289 -0.786 1 0.574 0.073 0.055 0.151 0.077
HML -0.429 -0.104 0.380 0.665 -0.131 -0.289 1 -0.390 -0.147 -0.115 0.030 0.077
ASG -0.432 -0.187 0.395 0.627 -0.153 -0.231 0.680 1 -0.394 -0.176 -0.199 -0.042 0.060
ACRU -0.291 -0.238 0.329 0.460 -0.117 -0.161 0.570 0.625 1 -0.250 -0.152 -0.104 -0.065 0.068
LTRV -0.107 -0.168 0.225 0.311 -0.343 0.248 0.388 0.288 0.309 1 0.105 -0.017 0.001 -0.001 -0.021
MOM -0.075 -0.154 0.206 -0.037 -0.076 -0.004 -0.116 0.079 -0.062 -0.032 1 -0.047 -0.181 -0.158 -0.165 -0.089
IDSN -0.600 -0.246 0.286 0.734 0.285 -0.674 0.604 0.550 0.357 0.045 0.020 1 -0.664 -0.107 -0.226 -0.115 -0.065
VO -0.089 -0.065 0.090 0.123 -0.021 -0.010 0.126 0.057 0.071 0.017 -0.020 0.101 1 -0.119 -0.067 -0.089 -0.015 -0.058
Panel B: Correlation Matrix
We however form our downside-beta sorted portfolios consistent with other characteristic-sorted portfolios. That is, we use past 1-year daily data to compute downside-beta, and then use postformation return in the following month. VO,
IDSN, COSK, COKT, DNSD, are rebalanced every month. ASG, LIQ are rebalanced in June of each year. All the factor returns are value weighted. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics of Different Factors (Value-Weighted) from January 1967 to December 2006
We use all the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ nonfinancial firms which have traded at prices at least 5 dollars listed on the CRSP daily and monthly stock return files and the Compustat annual industrial files from 1963 to 2006. The data of
Fama and French (1993) factors, momentum factors (MOM) and long-term reversal (LTRV) are from Professor Kenneth French’s data library. Asset growth factor (ASG) is calculated as in Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2006). Accrual factor
(ACRU) is calculated as in Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005). Other firm characteristic factors are calculated as follows. We follow the method used by Fama and French (1993). A mimicking factor related to one specific
characteristic is computed as the out-of-sample return difference between the lowest 30% and the highest 30% characteristic-sorted portfolios using past information. Asset growth rate is calculated as in Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2006).
Specifically, the annual firm asset growth rate is calculated using year-on-year percentage change in total assets (Compustat Data Item 6). The firm asset growth rate for year y is defined as the percentage change in total assets from fiscal year
ending in calendar year y-2 to year ending in calendar y-1. 
We calculate our volume factor (VO) following the principal of Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001), where the past 50 days trading interval is used to classify the high- (low-) volume stock. This 50-day interval is split into a reference
period (first 49 days) and formation period (the last day of the interval). Using daily number of trade in this 50-day interval, a stock is classified as high- (low-) volume stock if its formation period volume is among the top (bottom) 10 percent
for that trading interval. Liquidity factor (LIQ) is calculated using the illiquidity measure of Amihud’s (2002). We calculate coskewness and cokurtosis following Harvey and Siddique (2000), where at least 24 out of past 60 monthly returns
are used. Then the 61st month return is recorded for the coskewness- (cokurtosis-) sorted portfolios. For the downside beta, Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) sort stocks into portfolios based on the realised downside beta at the beginning of the one-
year period t, and then they examine the relationship between downside beta and return from time t to t+12. 
A. Regression Analysis
Dependent Factors Constant ERM SMB HML MOM Adj R-Sqr Constant PCA1 PCA2 PCA3 PCA4 PCA5 Adj R-Sqr
0.002 0.170 -0.047 -0.008 -0.083 0.099 0.001 0.175 0.054 0.277 0.278 0.026 0.107
(1.327) (6.014) -(1.311) -(0.181) -(3.022) (1.136) (5.614) (0.766) (4.256) (3.493) (0.279)
-0.001 -0.136 0.205 0.370 0.166 0.271 0.002 -0.200 -0.365 -0.238 -0.066 -0.121 0.114
-(0.942) -(4.758) (5.645) (8.636) (5.940) (1.692) -(5.733) -(4.595) -(3.260) -(0.742) -(1.135)
-0.001 -0.481 -0.030 0.778 -0.018 0.597 0.001 -0.731 -0.532 -0.720 -0.333 -0.115 0.367
-(0.506) -(13.171) -(0.634) (14.203) -(0.514) (0.699) -(14.439) -(4.603) -(6.800) -(2.569) -(0.743)
-0.001 0.176 -1.002 -0.371 -0.085 0.812 -0.005 -0.325 -0.020 0.337 -0.314 -0.166 0.147
-(1.504) (10.052) -(44.783) -(14.087) -(4.980) -(3.183) -(7.861) -(0.213) (3.891) -(2.969) -(1.317)
0.000 -0.110 -0.003 0.701 0.114 0.502 0.005 -0.368 -0.376 -0.388 -0.101 0.174 0.223
(0.403) -(4.046) -(0.076) (17.157) (4.296) (3.497) -(9.784) -(4.375) -(4.928) -(1.051) (1.512)
-0.001 -0.042 0.015 0.565 -0.002 0.322 0.002 -0.218 -0.301 -0.189 -0.145 0.182 0.096
-(0.541) -(1.410) (0.400) (12.758) -(0.086) (1.671) -(5.770) -(3.497) -(2.402) -(1.501) (1.584)
0.001 -0.006 0.303 0.422 0.017 0.286 0.003 0.074 -0.027 0.002 -0.001 -0.045 0.001
(0.684) -(0.247) (9.600) (11.361) (0.692) (2.973) (2.289) -(0.364) (0.023) -(0.014) -(0.453)
0.004 -0.421 -0.911 0.702 0.052 0.711 0.005 -1.162 -0.431 -0.825 -0.519 -0.341 0.516
(2.403) -(10.844) -(18.423) (12.054) (1.383) (2.317) -(20.910) -(3.401) -(7.098) -(3.654) -(2.008)
-0.001 -0.024 0.024 0.077 -0.005 0.011 0.000 -0.068 -0.087 -0.105 -0.022 -0.101 0.020
-(0.635) -(1.018) (0.803) (2.187) -(0.225) -(0.322) -(2.636) -(1.478) -(1.957) -(0.335) -(1.287)
B. Regression Analysis
Dependent Factors Constant ERM COSK COKT DNSD LIQ ASG ACRU LTRV IDSN VO Adj R-Sqr
0.000 0.094 -0.058 -0.004 0.042 -0.636 -0.085 -0.073 0.089 -0.210 0.042 0.860
-(0.494) (5.418) -(2.359) -(0.167) (1.925) -29.796 -(3.236) -(3.029) (3.435) -(12.098) (1.488)
0.001 0.028 0.213 0.054 0.104 -0.085 0.191 0.190 0.219 0.175 0.072 0.655
(1.362) (1.134) (6.046) (1.547) (3.313) -2.803 (5.098) (5.524) (5.960) (7.054) (1.781)
0.007 -0.096 -0.252 0.346 -0.330 -0.056 0.280 -0.270 -0.038 0.070 -0.044 0.116
(3.938) -(1.762) -(3.263) (4.549) -(4.824) -0.842 (3.419) -(3.598) -(0.469) (1.296) -(0.503)
C. Principal Component Analysis
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 4 Comp 5 Comp 6 Comp 7 Comp 8 Comp 9 Comp 10 Comp 11 Comp 12 Comp 13
Eigenvalue 0.0083 0.0028 0.0018 0.0012 0.0008 0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001
Variance Prop. 0.467 0.155 0.102 0.066 0.042 0.037 0.028 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.017 0.013 0.005
Cumulative Prop. 0.467 0.622 0.724 0.790 0.832 0.869 0.897 0.921 0.944 0.966 0.982 0.995 1.000
IDSN
LIQ
VO
LTRV
ACRU
SMB
HML
MOM
Table 3.2
Regression and Principal Component Analysis of Different Factors from January 1967 to December 2006
The definitions of the factors are explained in Table 3.1. The numbers in the parentheses are White heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics. Bold numbers represent significance at 5% 
level. Principal component analysis is applied using covariance matrix.  
ASG
COSK
COKT
DNSD
Sample 
Preiod No of Stocks
T=60 N ERM COSK COKT DNSD LIQ SMB HML ASG ACRU MOM LTRV IDSN VO PCA1 PCA2 PCA3 PCA4 PCA5
Jan 1972 - 
Dec 1976
1741 1.096 0.640 0.432 0.428 0.614 0.525 0.699 0.699 0.533 0.459 1.232 1.088 0.755 0.404 0.638 0.435 0.463 0.417 0.406
Jan 1977 - 
Dec 1981
2752 1.084 1.348 0.868 1.248 1.107 1.451 1.349 1.372 1.252 1.255 0.682 1.336 0.908 1.396 0.757 1.289 1.150 0.998 1.965
Jan 1982 - 
Dec 1986
2809 1.084 1.634 2.152 2.349 3.018 2.137 2.173 3.916 3.239 2.524 2.001 2.021 3.532 2.034 1.791 1.689 2.196 2.133 2.140
Jan 1987 - 
Dec 1991
3365 1.080 1.088 0.984 1.005 0.810 0.857 1.264 0.862 1.355 0.977 0.804 1.055 1.661 0.985 1.015 0.926 1.027 1.106 1.010
Jan 1992 - 
Dec 1996
3682 1.076 1.152 1.907 1.932 2.066 1.835 1.945 1.948 2.004 1.977 1.503 1.647 2.317 2.038 2.029 1.518 1.911 1.589 1.991
Jan 1997 - 
Dec 2001
4300 1.074 0.742 0.864 0.816 0.956 0.878 0.859 1.027 0.879 0.867 0.972 1.051 1.091 0.870 0.879 0.873 0.746 0.896 0.856
Jan 2002 - 
Dec 2006
3990 1.075 1.676 1.887 2.245 2.345 1.865 1.511 1.930 2.017 1.942 2.270 1.706 1.889 2.030 2.652 2.038 1.413 2.064 2.189
Pre 1992 NOR 3 1 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Post 1992 NOR 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
Total NOR 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 4 4 4
Table 3.3
Average F-test of Factor Pricing Models with T=60 and K=1
K=15%
We use all the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ nonfinancial firms which have traded at prices at least $5 listed on the CRSP daily and monthly stock return files and the Compustat annual 
industrial files from 1972 to 2006. For explanations of the factors, see Table 3.1. For each subsample period, we apply the average F-test proposed by Hwang and Satchell (2007). The third 
column is the average F-test statistic for 5% significance level. The bold numbers indicate that they are significantly different from the 5% signfiicant level. 'NOR' means number of rejection 
period.
Models
Jan 72 - 
Dec 76
Jan 77 - 
Dec 81
Jan 82 - 
Dec 86
Jan 87 - 
Dec 91
Jan 92 - 
Dec 96
Jan 97 - 
Dec 01
Jan 02 - 
Dec 06
Total 
NOR
Pre-92 
NOR
Post-92 
NOR
Number of Stocks 1741 2752 2809 3365 3682 4300 3990
5% Average F-test 1.097 1.084 1.083 1.080 1.078 1.075 1.076
1 PCA1, PCA2 0.651 0.818 1.125 0.865 1.598 0.904 2.628 3 1 2
2 PCA1, PCA3 0.685 0.771 1.842 1.013 2.023 0.793 1.784 3 1 2
3 PCA1, PCA4 0.598 0.729 1.802 0.950 1.672 0.943 2.633 3 1 2
4 PCA1, PCA5 0.595 1.093 1.808 1.031 2.099 0.902 2.833 4 2 2
5 PCA2, PCA3 0.469 1.272 1.753 0.961 1.496 0.775 1.382 4 2 2
6 PCA2, PCA4 0.422 1.100 1.701 1.043 1.203 0.946 2.027 4 2 2
7 PCA2, PCA5 0.411 2.202 1.708 0.934 1.575 0.903 2.150 4 2 2
8 PCA3, PCA4 0.456 1.002 2.208 1.139 1.574 0.796 1.388 4 2 2
9 PCA3, PCA5 0.438 1.912 2.216 1.034 1.976 0.756 1.488 4 2 2
10 PCA4, PCA5 0.396 1.659 2.150 1.114 1.642 0.922 2.175 5 3 2
1 ERM, COSK 0.676 1.527 1.608 1.102 1.138 0.728 1.689 5 3 2
2 ERM, COKT 0.618 1.192 1.426 1.094 1.153 0.747 1.467 5 3 2
3 ERM, DNSD 0.715 1.405 1.391 1.032 1.106 0.744 1.528 4 2 2
4 ERM, LIQ 0.751 1.315 1.713 1.014 1.065 0.757 1.088 3 2 1
1 ERM, SMB 0.823 1.163 1.698 1.013 1.193 0.776 1.477 4 2 2
2 ERM, HML 1.066 1.371 1.590 1.056 0.977 0.808 1.074 2 2 0
3 ERM, ASG 0.629 1.307 1.348 1.102 1.070 0.743 1.391 4 3 1
4 ERM, ACRU 0.610 1.346 1.444 1.103 1.148 0.739 1.686 5 3 2
5 ERM, LTRV 1.068 1.378 1.646 1.064 1.018 0.817 1.491 3 2 1
6 ERM, MOM 0.917 1.348 1.215 0.922 1.038 0.806 1.382 3 2 1
7 ERM, IDSN 0.753 1.231 1.341 1.060 1.354 0.849 1.680 4 2 2
8 ERM, VO 0.649 1.390 1.618 1.058 1.191 0.773 1.656 4 2 2
Number of Rejections: Average F-test of Factor Pricing Models with T=60 and K=2
Table 3.4
Panel B: Risk-Related Factors
Panel C: Firm Characteristics Based Factors
Panel A: PCA Factors
We use all the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ nonfinancial firms which have traded at prices at least $5 listed on the CRSP daily and 
monthly stock return files and the Compustat annual industrial files from 1972 to 2006. For explanation of the factors, see Table 3.1. 
For each subsample period, we apply the average F-test proposed by Hwang and Satchell (2007). The third row is the average F-test 
statistic for the 5% significance level. The bold numbers indicate that they are significantly different from 5% signfiicant level. 'NOR' 
means number of rejection period.
Models
Jan 72 - 
Dec 76
Jan 77 - 
Dec 81
Jan 82 - 
Dec 86
Jan 87 - 
Dec 91
Jan 92 - 
Dec 96
Jan 97 - 
Dec 01
Jan 02 - 
Dec 06
Total 
NOR
Pre-92 
NOR
Post-92 
NOR
Number of Stocks 1741 2752 2809 3365 3682 4300 3990
5% Average F-test 1.097 1.085 1.083 1.079 1.079 1.075 1.076
1 PCA1, PCA2, PCA3 0.703 0.831 1.160 0.872 1.583 0.807 1.761 3 1 2
2 PCA1, PCA2, PCA4 0.611 0.768 1.136 0.796 1.263 0.980 2.611 3 1 2
3 PCA1, PCA2, PCA5 0.609 1.231 1.140 0.878 1.663 0.935 2.813 4 2 2
4 PCA1, PCA3, PCA4 0.651 0.761 1.855 0.954 1.666 0.844 1.749 3 1 2
5 PCA1, PCA3, PCA5 0.640 1.063 1.863 1.030 2.097 0.804 1.915 3 1 2
6 PCA1, PCA4, PCA5 0.559 0.893 1.819 0.966 1.732 0.972 2.814 3 1 2
7 PCA2, PCA3, PCA4 0.463 1.100 1.769 1.086 1.185 0.836 1.360 5 3 2
8 PCA2, PCA3, PCA5 0.444 2.147 1.776 0.969 1.555 0.793 1.456 4 2 2
9 PCA2, PCA4, PCA5 0.401 1.869 1.721 1.053 1.249 0.981 2.138 4 2 2
10 PCA3, PCA4, PCA5 0.434 1.615 2.230 1.149 1.629 0.810 1.460 5 3 2
1 ERM, COSK, COKT 0.661 1.231 1.436 1.092 1.138 0.765 1.420 5 3 2
2 ERM, COSK, DNSD 0.751 1.529 1.371 1.029 1.137 0.740 1.489 4 2 2
3 ERM, COSK, LIQ 0.797 1.082 1.668 1.030 1.111 0.751 1.075 2 1 1
4 ERM, COKT, DNSD 0.717 1.156 1.262 1.006 1.102 0.796 1.486 4 2 2
5 ERM, COKT, LIQ 0.750 1.324 1.459 1.020 1.069 0.788 1.020 2 2 0
6 ERM, DNSD, LIQ 0.831 1.105 1.452 1.062 0.960 0.732 0.996 2 2 0
1 ERM, SMB, HML 0.938 1.142 1.493 0.981 0.947 0.792 1.032 2 2 0
2 ERM, SMB, ASG 0.722 1.214 1.396 1.072 1.016 0.758 1.327 3 2 1
3 ERM, SMB, ACRU 0.760 1.154 1.495 1.012 1.137 0.767 1.484 4 2 2
4 ERM, SMB, LTRV 0.905 1.131 1.710 1.020 1.048 0.846 1.416 3 2 1
5 ERM, SMB, MOM 0.851 0.919 1.263 0.931 1.091 0.856 1.330 3 1 2
6 ERM, SMB, IDSN 0.857 1.127 1.045 1.130 1.086 0.789 1.420 4 2 2
7 ERM, SMB, VO 0.820 1.145 1.679 0.994 1.236 0.811 1.481 4 2 2
8 ERM, HML, ASG 1.061 1.334 1.428 0.989 1.006 0.827 1.062 2 2 0
9 ERM, HML, ACRU 1.074 1.373 1.535 1.060 0.941 0.818 1.083 3 2 1
10 ERM, HML, LTRV 1.084 1.404 1.554 1.041 0.959 0.815 1.074 2 2 0
11 ERM, HML, MOM 0.839 1.188 1.247 0.929 0.942 0.826 1.043 2 2 0
12 ERM, HML, IDSN 1.073 1.188 1.519 0.973 1.104 0.862 1.073 3 2 1
13 ERM, HML, VO 1.083 1.401 1.527 1.047 0.972 0.838 1.082 3 2 1
14 ERM, ASG, ACRU 0.635 1.310 1.313 1.036 1.013 0.746 1.408 3 2 1
15 ERM, ASG, LTRV 1.016 1.343 1.262 1.092 0.996 0.802 1.351 4 3 1
16 ERM, ASG, MOM 0.672 1.269 1.121 0.991 1.025 0.786 1.274 3 2 1
17 ERM, ASG, IDSN 0.696 1.187 1.240 1.099 1.215 0.875 1.417 5 3 2
18 ERM, ASG, VO 0.646 1.340 1.357 1.062 1.099 0.767 1.385 4 2 2
19 ERM, ACRU, LTRV 1.055 1.381 1.370 1.081 1.026 0.827 1.514 4 3 1
20 ERM, ACRU, MOM 0.786 1.348 1.184 0.930 1.055 0.799 1.326 3 2 1
21 ERM, ACRU, IDSN 0.751 1.202 1.288 1.020 1.458 0.862 1.693 4 2 2
22 ERM, ACRU, VO 0.626 1.392 1.431 1.073 1.190 0.765 1.668 4 2 2
23 ERM, MOM, LTRV 0.822 1.181 1.233 0.923 0.907 0.837 1.263 3 2 1
24 ERM, LTRV, IDSN 1.127 1.154 1.331 1.085 1.114 0.841 1.508 6 4 2
25 ERM, LTRV, VO 1.090 1.411 1.637 1.026 1.011 0.853 1.480 3 2 1
26 ERM, MOM, IDSN 0.963 1.354 1.156 0.984 1.294 0.884 1.400 4 2 2
27 ERM, MOM, VO 0.928 1.372 1.215 0.914 1.076 0.838 1.350 3 2 1
28 ERM, IDSN, VO 0.777 1.291 1.287 1.008 1.408 0.876 1.647 4 2 2
Panel C: Firm Characteristics Based Factors
Panel A: PCA Factors
Table 3.5
Number of Rejections: Average F-test of Factor Pricing Models with T=60 and K=3
We use all the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ nonfinancial firms which have traded at prices at least $5 listed on the CRSP daily 
and monthly stock return files and the Compustat annual industrial files from 1972 to 2006. For explanation of the factors, see 
Table 3.1. For each subsample period, we apply the average F-test proposed by Hwang and Satchell (2007). The third row is the 
average F-test statistic for the 5% significance level. The bold numbers indicate that they are significantly different from 5% 
signfiicant level. 'NOR' means number of rejection period.
Panel B: Risk-Related Factors
Models
Jan 72 - 
Dec 76
Jan 77 - 
Dec 81
Jan 82 - 
Dec 86
Jan 87 - 
Dec 91
Jan 92 - 
Dec 96
Jan 97 - 
Dec 01
Jan 02 - 
Dec 06
Total 
NOR
Pre-92 
NOR
Post-92 
NOR
Number of Stocks 1741 2752 2809 3365 3682 4300 3990
5% Average F-test 1.097 1.084 1.083 1.080 1.078 1.075 1.076
1 PCA1, PCA2, PCA3, PCA4 0.670 0.799 1.174 0.808 1.248 0.870 1.729 3 1 2
2 PCA1, PCA2, PCA3, PCA5 0.658 1.200 1.179 0.885 1.651 0.825 1.896 4 2 2
3 PCA1, PCA2, PCA4, PCA5 0.574 1.002 1.152 0.809 1.315 1.016 2.798 3 1 2
4 PCA1, PCA3, PCA4, PCA5 0.610 0.872 1.877 0.971 1.728 0.861 1.879 3 1 2
5 PCA2, PCA3, PCA4, PCA5 0.442 1.822 1.793 1.098 1.232 0.859 1.431 5 3 2
1 ERM, COSK, COKT, DNSD 0.759 1.239 1.281 1.014 1.143 0.816 1.418 4 2 2
2 ERM, COSK, COKT, LIQ 0.803 1.086 1.467 1.030 1.113 0.810 1.041 3 2 1
3 ERM, COKT, DNSD, LIQ 0.825 1.100 1.300 1.044 0.962 0.783 1.021 2 2 0
4 ERM, COSK, DNSD, LIQ 0.876 1.082 1.411 1.060 1.017 0.738 1.002 1 1 0
1 ERM, SMB, HML, ASG 0.895 1.110 1.401 0.987 0.958 0.806 1.033 2 2 0
2 ERM, SMB, HML, ACRU 0.950 1.145 1.463 0.993 0.945 0.799 1.040 2 2 0
3 ERM, SMB, HML, MOM 0.895 0.944 1.141 0.934 0.917 0.785 1.032 1 1 0
4 ERM, SMB, HML, LTRV 0.954 1.136 1.359 0.994 0.964 0.855 1.038 2 2 0
5 ERM, SMB, HML, IDSN 0.926 1.131 1.135 1.034 1.010 0.818 1.074 2 2 0
6 ERM, SMB, HML, VO 0.970 1.128 1.431 0.980 0.924 0.813 1.025 2 2 0
7 ERM, SMB, ASG, ACRU 0.729 1.184 1.354 0.991 1.013 0.761 1.341 3 2 1
8 ERM, SMB, ASG, MOM 0.756 0.951 1.163 1.001 0.998 0.826 1.260 2 1 1
9 ERM, SMB, ASG, LTRV 0.870 1.172 1.303 1.079 1.009 0.883 1.317 3 2 1
10 ERM, SMB, ASG, IDSN 0.769 1.169 1.025 1.169 1.057 0.790 1.346 3 2 1
11 ERM, SMB, ASG, VO 0.730 1.194 1.404 1.041 1.009 0.780 1.331 3 2 1
12 ERM, SMB, ACRU, MOM 0.761 0.919 1.230 0.929 1.063 0.851 1.287 2 1 1
13 ERM, SMB, ACRU, LTRV 0.918 1.136 1.413 1.023 1.058 0.892 1.438 3 2 1
14 ERM, SMB, ACRU, IDSN 0.836 1.131 0.999 1.087 1.153 0.789 1.427 4 2 2
15 ERM, SMB, ACRU, VO 0.775 1.120 1.483 1.000 1.149 0.794 1.489 4 2 2
16 ERM, SMB, MOM, LTRV 0.862 0.934 1.282 0.943 0.953 0.874 1.267 2 1 1
17 ERM, SMB, MOM, IDSN 0.882 0.946 0.970 1.048 1.074 0.778 1.325 1 0 1
18 ERM, SMB, MOM, VO 0.836 0.937 1.262 0.924 1.133 0.889 1.324 3 1 2
19 ERM, SMB, LTRV, IDSN 0.913 1.120 1.009 1.151 1.024 0.852 1.394 3 2 1
20 ERM, SMB, LTRV, VO 0.933 1.107 1.698 0.996 1.040 0.874 1.420 3 2 1
Panel C: Firm Characteristics Based Factors
Panel A: PCA Factors
Table 3.6
Number of Rejections: Average F-test of Factor Pricing Models with T=60 and K=4
We use all the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ nonfinancial firms which have traded at prices at least $5 listed on the CRSP daily and 
monthly stock return files and the Compustat annual industrial files from 1972 to 2006. For explanation of the factors, see Table 3.1. For 
each subsample period, we apply the average F-test proposed by Hwang and Satchell (2007). The third row is the average F-test statistic 
for the 5% significance level. The bold numbers indicate that they are significantly different from 5% signfiicant level. 'NOR' means 
number of rejection period.
Panel B: Risk-Related Factors
21 ERM, SMB, IDSN, VO 0.866 1.100 1.002 1.093 1.119 0.798 1.421 4 2 2
22 ERM, HML, ASG, ACRU 1.073 1.338 1.410 0.964 0.937 0.830 1.074 2 2 0
23 ERM, HML, ASG, MOM 0.820 1.201 1.185 0.975 0.954 0.840 1.043 2 2 0
24 ERM, HML, ASG, LTRV 1.059 1.356 1.368 0.995 0.980 0.838 1.066 2 2 0
25 ERM, HML, ASG, IDSN 1.025 1.197 1.349 0.991 1.107 0.891 1.052 3 2 1
26 ERM, HML, ASG, VO 1.075 1.371 1.418 0.984 1.025 0.857 1.070 2 2 0
27 ERM, HML, ACRU, MOM 0.837 1.151 1.248 0.936 0.899 0.839 1.030 2 2 0
28 ERM, HML, ACRU, LTRV 1.092 1.410 1.485 1.044 0.948 0.835 1.093 3 2 1
29 ERM, HML, ACRU, IDSN 1.074 1.190 1.452 0.972 1.143 0.875 1.086 4 2 2
30 ERM, HML, ACRU, VO 1.096 1.408 1.491 1.051 0.943 0.848 1.091 3 2 1
31 ERM, HML, MOM, LTRV 0.881 1.133 1.285 0.932 0.906 0.815 1.044 2 2 0
32 ERM, HML, MOM, IDSN 0.874 1.186 1.270 0.952 1.100 0.885 1.037 3 2 1
33 ERM, HML, MOM, VO 0.860 1.204 1.254 0.925 0.944 0.851 1.053 2 2 0
34 ERM, HML, LTRV, IDSN 1.133 1.167 1.525 1.005 1.100 0.849 1.076 4 3 1
35 ERM, HML, LTRV, VO 1.112 1.431 1.509 1.022 0.936 0.836 1.083 4 3 1
36 ERM, HML, IDSN, VO 1.096 1.224 1.459 0.964 1.090 0.889 1.072 3 2 1
37 ERM, ASG, ACRU, MOM 0.686 1.301 1.125 0.970 0.988 0.792 1.253 3 2 1
38 ERM, ASG, ACRU, LTRV 1.025 1.343 1.204 1.041 0.983 0.809 1.374 3 2 1
39 ERM, ASG, ACRU, IDSN 0.719 1.191 1.232 1.012 1.288 0.877 1.437 4 2 2
40 ERM, ASG, ACRU, VO 0.650 1.358 1.319 1.012 1.034 0.769 1.403 3 2 1
41 ERM, ASG, MOM, LTRV 0.806 1.155 1.099 0.995 0.926 0.817 1.229 3 2 1
42 ERM, ASG, MOM, IDSN 0.755 1.271 1.111 1.027 1.231 0.917 1.296 4 2 2
43 ERM, ASG, MOM, VO 0.683 1.298 1.116 0.975 1.063 0.809 1.258 3 2 1
44 ERM, ASG, LTRV, IDSN 1.048 1.145 1.191 1.122 1.121 0.862 1.380 5 3 2
45 ERM, ASG, LTRV, VO 1.033 1.373 1.269 1.043 0.985 0.825 1.348 3 2 1
46 ERM, ASG, IDSN, VO 0.726 1.239 1.228 1.039 1.209 0.900 1.412 4 2 2
47 ERM, ACRU, MOM, LTRV 0.815 1.206 1.175 0.933 0.921 0.848 1.265 3 2 1
48 ERM, ACRU, MOM, IDSN 0.905 1.354 1.159 0.949 1.401 0.909 1.349 4 2 2
49 ERM, ACRU, MOM, VO 0.813 1.379 1.186 0.924 1.103 0.825 1.295 4 2 2
50 ERM, ACRU, LTRV, IDSN 1.122 1.155 1.255 1.050 1.179 0.860 1.532 5 3 2
51 ERM, ACRU, LTRV, VO 1.086 1.419 1.369 1.041 1.009 0.856 1.503 3 2 1
52 ERM, ACRU, IDSN, VO 0.777 1.266 1.246 0.976 1.461 0.887 1.662 4 2 2
53 ERM, LTRV, IDSN, VO 1.164 1.192 1.287 1.029 1.106 0.857 1.489 5 3 2
54 ERM, MOM, LTRV, IDSN 0.899 1.159 1.158 1.012 1.068 0.853 1.284 3 2 1
55 ERM, MOM, LTRV, VO 0.841 1.186 1.235 0.909 0.905 0.874 1.242 3 2 1
56 ERM, MOM, IDSN, VO 0.986 1.372 1.156 0.971 1.344 0.910 1.362 4 2 2
Panel C: Firm Characteristics Based Factors
Table 3.6-----------Continued
Jan 72 - 
Dec 76
Jan 77 - 
Dec 81
Jan 82 - 
Dec 86
Jan 87 - 
Dec 91
Jan 92 - 
Dec 96
Jan 97 - 
Dec 01
Jan 02 - 
Dec 06
Number of Stocks 1817 3468 3436 4212 4574 4889 4805
5% Average F-test 1.098 1.080 1.079 1.076 1.075 1.073 1.074
ERM, COSK, DNSD, LIQ 1.085 1.027 2.030 1.021 1.044 1.038 1.078
ERM, SMB, HML, MOM 1.005 1.031 1.654 1.088 1.027 1.120 1.041
ERM, COSK, DNSD, LIQ 0.013 0.050 0.102 0.047 0.030 0.010 0.031
ERM, SMB, HML, MOM 0.020 0.026 0.071 0.039 0.021 0.014 0.046
Conventional F-test 
(Rejection Rates)
Panel A: Average F-test
Panel B: Conventional F-test
Table 3.7
Average and Conventional F-test of Factor Pricing Models with T=60 and K=4
We use all the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ nonfinancial firms which have traded at prices at least $5 listed on the 
CRSP daily and monthly stock return files and the Compustat annual industrial files from 1972 to 2006. For 
explanation of the factors, see Table 3.1. For each subsample period, we apply the average F-test proposed by Hwang 
and Satchell (2007). The Conventional F-test reports the porportions of reject at the 5% significance level when N=10 
with 10,000 times iterations.
Average F-test
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ Share Distribution
At the end of each Month from December 1925 to December 2006, we count the number of stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ based on 
firm's price level. 
Figure 4.1
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P1<=$5 $5<P2<=$10 $10<P3<=$15 $15<P4<=$20 P5>$20
P1-P5 S1P1-S5P5 L5P1-L1P5
JAN 0.086 0.093 0.097 0.110 0.120 0.132
FEB 0.015 0.022 0.019 0.023 0.033 0.035
MAR 0.008 0.011 0.006 0.008 0.013 0.012
APR -0.001 0.007 -0.001 -0.004 0.004 -0.002
MAY 0.008 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.007
JUNE -0.009 -0.006 -0.009 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001
JULY 0.002 0.007 0.007 -0.003 0.003 0.005
AUG -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 -0.011 -0.008 -0.008
SEP -0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.010
OCT -0.005 -0.003 -0.007 -0.022 -0.023 -0.029
NOV -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 -0.015 -0.016 -0.017
DEC -0.022 -0.024 -0.024 -0.022 -0.023 -0.020
Annual Return 0.052 0.095 0.069 0.061 0.116 0.121
After adjusted by FF+MOM
Figure 4.2
Seasonality of the Price Strategies
At the end of each June from 1963 to 2006, we form 5 price range portfolios and 25 portfolios based on firm's price level and size or liquidity. Stocks are firstly 
sorted into 5 either size or liquidity quintile, then are sub-grouped into 5 price range portfolios. To be included in the 25 Price and Size portfolios, a stock must 
have shares outstanding and a price level. To be included in the 25 Price and Liquidity portfolios, a stock must have the illiquidity proxy of Amihud (2002). P1 
(P5) stands for Penny (share price higher than $5) stock portfolio. S1 (S5) stands for the small (big) portfolio. L1 (L5) stands for the most liquid (illiquid) portfolio. 
This chart plots the average monthly returns for price strategies of buying penny- and selling high- price stocks (P1-P5), buying small penny- and selling big high- 
price stocks (S1P1-S5P5), and buying illiquid penny- and selling liquid high- price stocks (L5P1-L1P5). 
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Figure 4.3
Seasonality of The Price Strategies After Adjustment by Fama-French's factors and Momentum
At the end of each June from 1963 to 2006, we form 5 price range portfolios and 25 portfolios based on firm's price level and size or liquidity. Stocks are firstly 
sorted into 5 either size or liquidity quintile, then are sub-grouped into 5 price range portfolios. To be included in the 25 Price and Size portfolios, a stock must 
have shares outstanding and a price level. To be included in the 25 Price and Liquidity portfolios, a stock must have the illiquidity proxy of Amihud (2002). P1 
(P5) stands for Penny (share price higher than $5) stock portfolio. S1 (S5) stands for the small (big) portfolio. L1 (L5) stands for the most liquid (illiquid) portfolio. 
This chart plots the average monthly returns after adjustment by Fama-French and Momentum factors for price strategies of buying penny- and selling high- price 
stocks (P1-P5), buying small penny- and selling big high- price stocks (S1P1-S5P5), and buying illiquid penny- and selling liquid high- price stocks (L5P1-L1P5). 
ERM, SMB, HML and Momentum factor are Fama and French factors from Kenneth French's data library.
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Ret t-stats Price ln(Size) No of Stocks P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Total
1.836% 5.238 2.803 19.692 206 69.700% 19.300% 2.910% 0.680% 0.320% 92.910%
1.318% 5.020 7.488 20.187 258 18.440% 51.420% 19.180% 4.900% 2.780% 96.720%
1.140% 5.081 12.443 20.653 258 3.580% 21.300% 40.610% 20.920% 10.680% 97.090%
1.136% 5.424 17.288 21.292 219 1.520% 6.890% 21.200% 33.310% 34.290% 97.210%
1.004% 5.661 48.086 23.324 795 0.290% 1.180% 3.120% 7.370% 85.560% 97.520%
0.831% 3.203
Ret t-stats Price ln(Size) No of Stocks P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Total
2.190% 3.542 2.863 17.558 41 70.360% 23.240% 4.020% 0.990% 0.370% 98.980%
1.381% 2.935 7.295 17.820 69 19.250% 50.970% 20.020% 5.650% 3.770% 99.660%
1.091% 2.699 12.178 18.363 76 4.350% 23.390% 37.690% 22.220% 12.300% 99.950%
1.119% 2.968 16.927 18.942 78 2.230% 7.460% 21.500% 31.650% 36.610% 99.450%
0.880% 2.896 51.546 21.098 410 0.410% 1.250% 2.850% 6.450% 88.810% 99.770%
1.311% 2.919
Ret t-stats Price ln(Size) No of Stocks P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Total
1.530% 4.065 2.752 20.257 348 68.830% 16.090% 2.010% 0.440% 0.300% 87.670%
1.263% 4.624 7.655 20.765 421 17.740% 51.640% 18.570% 4.330% 1.970% 94.250%
1.182% 5.124 12.671 21.227 415 2.980% 19.570% 42.950% 19.780% 9.390% 94.670%
1.151% 5.330 17.599 21.868 341 0.950% 6.500% 20.900% 34.680% 32.310% 95.340%
1.111% 5.518 45.105 23.895 1127 0.180% 1.140% 3.390% 8.220% 82.660% 95.590%
0.418% 1.449
Ret t-stats Price ln(Size) No of Stocks P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Total
1.592% 3.978 2.038 20.032 1269 70.600% 11.120% 1.600% 0.360% 0.250% 83.930%
1.160% 3.743 7.383 20.603 751 23.720% 44.370% 16.940% 4.630% 2.190% 91.850%
1.268% 4.621 12.537 22.173 507 4.910% 21.810% 34.770% 19.350% 10.630% 91.470%
1.304% 5.026 17.539 22.769 360 1.980% 7.460% 19.750% 30.060% 31.760% 91.010%
1.201% 4.618 37.387 24.036 696 0.750% 2.470% 5.600% 11.110% 69.720% 89.650%
0.391% 1.444
$15<P4<=$20
P5>$20
P1-P5
Price Range
P1<=$5
$5<P2<=$10
$10<P3<=$15
P1-P5
Price Range
P1<=$5
$5<P2<=$10
$10<P3<=$15
$15<P4<=$20
P5>$20
P1-P5
Panel D: NASDAQ Stocks; July 1973 to December 2006 Transition Vectors
Price Range
P1<=$5
$5<P2<=$10
$10<P3<=$15
$15<P4<=$20
P5>$20
P1-P5
Panel B: NYSE and AMEX Stocks; July 1926 to June 1963
Table 4.1
Transition Vectors
Panel C: NYSE and AMEX Stocks; July 1963 to December 2006 Transition Vectors
Price Range
P1<=$5
$5<P2<=$10
$10<P3<=$15
$15<P4<=$20
P5>$20
Panel A: NYSE and AMEX Stocks; July 1926 to Dec 2006 Transition Vectors
At the end of each June from 1926 to 2006, we form 5 portfolios based on a firm's price level. Each row on the right-hand side of each table shows the average 
transition vector for a particular portfolio. ln(Size) is the natural logarithm of the product of the number of shares outstanding and share price. No. of stocks is the 
time-series average of number of stocks within each portfolio.
12 Month Holding Period Returns and Characteristics of 5 Share Price Portfolios
Ret t-stats Price ln(Size) No of Stocks P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Total
1.616% 4.414 2.371 20.040 1325 69.390% 13.900% 1.900% 0.440% 0.300% 85.930%
1.216% 4.368 7.532 20.646 999 21.620% 47.460% 18.000% 4.730% 2.300% 94.110%
1.194% 5.043 12.639 21.543 805 4.180% 21.480% 38.610% 19.570% 10.520% 94.360%
1.166% 5.269 17.603 22.201 618 1.500% 7.730% 20.750% 32.340% 32.440% 94.760%
1.088% 5.290 44.460 23.907 1663 0.380% 1.710% 4.370% 9.340% 79.050% 94.850%
0.528% 1.940
Ret t-stats Jan Ret t-stats Non-Jan Ret t-stats Ret t-stats Jan Ret t-stats Non-Jan Ret t-stats
1.616% 4.414 13.386% 8.517 0.559% 1.676 1.655% 4.668 12.863% 8.407 0.649% 2.001
1.216% 4.368 7.962% 6.757 0.610% 2.278 1.278% 4.574 8.303% 6.857 0.647% 2.428
1.194% 5.043 5.547% 5.609 0.803% 3.425 1.204% 5.052 5.831% 5.615 0.789% 3.376
1.166% 5.269 4.218% 4.486 0.892% 4.018 1.188% 5.323 4.620% 4.675 0.879% 3.973
1.088% 5.290 2.425% 2.994 0.968% 4.578 1.071% 5.180 2.645% 3.156 0.930% 4.396
0.528% 1.940 10.961% 9.276 -0.409% -1.750 0.584% 2.283 10.218% 9.219 -0.281% -1.270
Ret t-stats Jan Ret t-stats Non-Jan Ret t-stats Ret t-stats Jan Ret t-stats Non-Jan Ret t-stats
1.645% 4.734 12.426% 8.107 0.677% 2.129 1.636% 4.804 12.024% 7.886 0.703% 2.254
1.310% 4.668 8.469% 6.775 0.667% 2.509 1.340% 4.769 8.535% 6.760 0.694% 2.612
1.228% 5.099 6.105% 5.518 0.791% 3.389 1.253% 5.183 6.239% 5.461 0.806% 3.465
1.210% 5.407 4.876% 4.695 0.881% 4.012 1.217% 5.431 5.002% 4.712 0.877% 4.011
1.100% 5.327 2.872% 3.318 0.941% 4.481 1.119% 5.441 3.037% 3.426 0.947% 4.550
0.545% 2.229 9.554% 9.024 -0.264% -1.240 0.517% 2.207 8.987% 8.805 -0.244% -1.187
Ret t-stats Jan Ret t-stats Non-Jan Ret t-stats
1.633% 4.886 11.691% 7.855 0.730% 2.374
1.352% 4.829 8.567% 6.708 0.704% 2.670
1.278% 5.290 6.355% 5.515 0.822% 3.552
1.235% 5.520 5.081% 4.779 0.889% 4.082
1.134% 5.533 3.132% 3.514 0.955% 4.614
0.499% 2.205 8.560% 8.868 -0.225% -1.124
$15<P4<=$20
P5>$20
P1-P5
Price Range
P1<=$5
$5<P2<=$10
Price Range
P1<=$5
$5<P2<=$10
$10<P3<=$15
Table 4.2
Performance of Price Portfolios in Longer Holding Period
$15<P4<=$20
P5>$20
Panel B: NYSE, AMEX  and NASDAQ Stocks; July 1963 to Dec 2006
Price Range
P1<=$5
$5<P2<=$10
$10<P3<=$15
Holding Period is 1 Year
Holding Period is 5 Years
$10<P3<=$15
$15<P4<=$20
P5>$20
P1-P5
P1-P5
$10<P3<=$15
$15<P4<=$20
P5>$20
P1-P5
At the end of each June from 1963 to 2006, we form 5 portfolios based on a firm's price level. ln(Size) is the natural logarithm of the product of the number of shares outstanding and share price. No. of 
stocks is the time-series average of number of stocks within each portfolio.
Holding Period is 2 Years
Holding Period is 3 Years Holding Period is 4 Years
Price Range
P1<=$5
$5<P2<=$10
Transition VectorsPanel A: NYSE, AMEX  and NASDAQ Stocks; July 1963 to Dec 2006
Price Range Small (S1) S2 S3 S4 Big (S5) Small (S1) S2 S3 S4 Big (S5) Small (S1) S2 S3 S4 Big (S5)
P1<=$5 1.979% 1.155% 0.897% 0.285% 0.884% 13.908% 12.702% 11.227% 8.930% 8.914% 0.908% 0.119% -0.030% -0.491% 0.165%
$5<P2<=$10 1.513% 1.253% 1.029% 0.908% 0.951% 7.586% 8.129% 7.634% 6.769% 5.948% 0.968% 0.636% 0.436% 0.382% 0.503%
$10<P3<=$15 1.533% 1.371% 1.110% 1.091% 1.173% 4.136% 5.293% 5.659% 5.216% 4.182% 1.299% 1.019% 0.701% 0.720% 0.903%
$15<P4<=$20 1.206% 1.279% 1.245% 1.053% 1.093% 3.505% 4.226% 4.666% 3.767% 3.139% 0.999% 1.015% 0.937% 0.810% 0.909%
P5>$20 1.065% 1.230% 1.240% 1.139% 1.022% 2.301% 3.332% 3.206% 2.654% 1.939% 0.954% 1.042% 1.064% 1.003% 0.939%
P1-P5 0.914% -0.075% -0.343% -0.830% -0.280% 11.607% 9.370% 8.021% 6.358% 6.647% -0.046% -0.923% -1.094% -1.474% -0.899%
t-stats 2.815 -0.252 -1.171 -2.554 -0.729 8.313 6.456 5.491 3.832 3.391 -0.157 -3.472 -4.116 -4.856 -2.471
Degree of Freedom 521 521 521 473 413 42 42 42 38 33 478 478 478 434 379
Price Range Small (S1) S2 S3 S4 Big (S5) Small (S1) S2 S3 S4 Big (S5) Small (S1) S2 S3 S4 Big (S5)
P1<=$5 9.152 10.251 11.177 12.244 14.199 1.600 2.293 2.855 2.731 2.561 739 403 142 33 8
$5<P2<=$10 9.309 10.335 11.250 12.311 14.538 6.800 7.079 7.454 7.747 7.658 167 346 306 144 37
$10<P3<=$15 9.349 10.363 11.295 12.349 15.135 12.006 12.208 12.415 12.595 12.232 62 168 275 222 77
$15<P4<=$20 9.357 10.369 11.333 12.394 15.568 16.712 17.056 17.197 17.443 17.798 29 86 167 220 116
P5>$20 9.329 10.384 11.360 12.487 17.044 28.912 26.798 27.371 29.571 45.960 27 82 204 478 869
Returns in January Returns in Non-January MonthsReturns in All Months
Number of Stocks
Panel B: Characteristics of 25 Price and Size Portfolios; NYSE, AMEX  and NASDAQ Stocks; 1963 to 2006
Ln(Size) Price
Panel A: 25 Price and Size Portfolios; NYSE, AMEX  and NASDAQ Stocks; July 1963 to Dec 2006
At the end of each June from 1963 to 2006, we form 25 portfolios based on a firm's price level and size or liquidity. Stocks are firstly sorted into 5 either size or liquidity quintile, then are sub-grouped into 5 price 
range portfolios. To be included in the 25 Price and Size portfolios, a stock must have shares outstanding and a price level. To be included in the 25 Price and Liquidity portfolios, a stock must have the illiquidity 
proxy of Amihud (2002).
Performance of 25 Price and Size or Liquidity Portfolios
Table 4.3
Price Range Liquid (L1) L2 L3 L4 Illiquid (L5) Liquid (L1) L2 L3 L4 Illiquid (L5) Liquid (L1) L2 L3 L4 Illiquid (L5)
P1<=$5 0.396% 0.873% 1.134% 1.123% 2.008% 18.484% 13.375% 14.779% 14.168% 15.088% -1.219% -0.246% -0.090% -0.048% 0.834%
$5<P2<=$10 0.891% 0.781% 1.039% 1.335% 1.653% 8.187% 8.932% 7.926% 8.650% 8.321% 0.236% 0.049% 0.420% 0.679% 1.054%
$10<P3<=$15 1.004% 1.005% 1.223% 1.450% 1.478% 5.366% 5.534% 5.924% 5.513% 4.554% 0.613% 0.598% 0.801% 1.085% 1.202%
$15<P4<=$20 1.056% 1.120% 1.207% 1.436% 1.537% 3.515% 3.667% 4.441% 4.599% 3.752% 0.835% 0.891% 0.916% 1.152% 1.338%
P5>$20 1.003% 1.146% 1.279% 1.338% 1.688% 1.894% 2.490% 3.123% 3.402% 3.098% 0.923% 1.025% 1.113% 1.153% 1.562%
P1-P5 -0.699% -0.427% -0.288% -0.215% 0.276% 16.162% 10.816% 11.338% 10.766% 10.378% -2.205% -1.434% -1.331% -1.201% -0.630%
t-stats -0.922 -1.024 -0.798 -0.708 0.785 3.245 4.412 6.880 7.390 8.946 -3.453 -3.999 -4.125 -4.606 -1.872
Degree of Freedom 365 437 497 521 473 29 35 40 42 38 335 401 456 478 434
Price Range Liquid (L1) L2 L3 L4 Illiquid (L5) Liquid (L1) L2 L3 L4 Illiquid (L5) Liquid (L1) L2 L3 L4 Illiquid (L5)
P1<=$5 13.842 12.356 11.323 10.920 10.232 -3.709 -1.835 -0.412 0.982 3.615 8 46 108 165 375
$5<P2<=$10 14.422 12.519 11.741 11.264 10.894 -3.307 -1.795 -0.485 0.912 2.475 25 90 145 176 157
$10<P3<=$15 15.245 12.911 12.028 11.582 10.957 -3.368 -1.872 -0.529 0.829 2.170 47 108 124 128 60
$15<P4<=$20 15.662 13.132 12.344 11.896 11.336 -3.473 -1.918 -0.539 0.740 2.203 68 110 102 88 27
P5>$20 17.060 13.432 12.767 12.278 11.784 -3.768 -1.996 -0.632 0.655 1.895 556 334 202 111 23
Table 4.3-----------Continued
Panel D: Characteristics of 25 Price and BE/ME Portfolios; NYSE, AMEX  and NASDAQ Stocks; 1963 to 2006
Ln(Size) ln(Amihud) Number of Stocks
Panel C: 25 Price and Liquidity Portfolios; NYSE, AMEX  and NASDAQ Stocks; July 1963 to Dec 2006
Returns in All Months Returns in January Returns in Non-January Months
Price Range Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
P1<=$5 1.270% 1.592% 1.769% 1.847% 1.789% 15.133% 12.451% 12.467% 12.199% 12.825% 0.025% 0.617% 0.809% 0.918% 0.798%
$5<P2<=$10 0.703% 1.334% 1.362% 1.389% 1.347% 9.033% 8.109% 7.151% 7.393% 7.776% -0.045% 0.726% 0.842% 0.850% 0.770%
$10<P3<=$15 0.707% 1.176% 1.233% 1.361% 1.384% 5.816% 5.345% 5.501% 5.327% 5.936% 0.248% 0.801% 0.850% 1.005% 0.976%
$15<P4<=$20 0.733% 1.117% 1.175% 1.310% 1.433% 4.630% 3.838% 4.082% 4.171% 4.730% 0.383% 0.873% 0.914% 1.053% 1.137%
P5>$20 0.631% 0.993% 1.081% 1.215% 1.365% 2.616% 2.429% 2.255% 2.471% 3.068% 0.453% 0.864% 0.975% 1.103% 1.212%
P1-P5 0.639% 0.599% 0.689% 0.632% 0.425% 12.517% 10.022% 10.212% 9.728% 9.757% -0.428% -0.247% -0.166% -0.185% -0.413%
t-stats 2.112 2.309 2.447 2.466 1.580 9.121 8.707 9.532 9.072 7.583 -1.679 -1.089 -0.644 -0.810 -1.764
Degree of Freedom 521 521 521 521 521 42 42 42 42 42 478 478 478 478 478
Price Range Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
P1<=$5 12.819 12.608 13.293 13.152 12.828 -6.105% -0.552% 1.625% 3.983% 12.269% 436 223 164 181 300
$5<P2<=$10 13.975 13.622 13.468 12.963 12.941 -4.797% -0.470% 1.628% 3.933% 10.576% 214 210 185 176 192
$10<P3<=$15 14.674 14.269 14.503 14.368 13.753 -4.268% -0.410% 1.610% 3.921% 10.100% 122 189 180 158 137
$15<P4<=$20 15.104 15.122 15.331 14.728 14.359 -3.982% -0.414% 1.611% 3.914% 9.705% 78 141 148 134 106
P5>$20 16.751 16.974 16.892 17.007 16.315 -3.603% -0.356% 1.652% 3.911% 9.166% 147 335 422 440 301
Panel A: 25 Price and Liquidity Portfolios; NYSE, AMEX  and NASDAQ Stocks; July 1963 to Dec 2006
At the end of June each year from 1963 to 2006, we form 25 portfolios based on a firm's price level and the average past 6 months return. Stocks are firstly sorted into 5 return-based quintile, then are sub-
grouped into 5 price range portfolios. Loser (Winner) is the portfolio with the lowest (highest) past return stocks. To be included in the portfolio, a stock must have both price and at least past 3 months returns. 
Performance of 25 Price and Past Return Portfolios
Table 4.4
Returns in January Returns in Non-January MonthsReturns in All Months
Number of Stocks
Panel B: Characteristics of 25 Price and BE/ME Portfolios; NYSE, AMEX  and NASDAQ Stocks; 1963 to 2006
Ln(Size) Average Past 6-month Return
Price Range Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
P1<=$5 1.091% 1.343% 1.874% 2.030% 2.287% 12.927% 12.141% 14.231% 13.858% 12.131% 0.029% 0.373% 0.765% 0.968% 1.404%
$5<P2<=$10 0.653% 1.310% 1.385% 1.460% 1.540% 7.687% 9.234% 8.215% 8.254% 7.831% 0.022% 0.598% 0.772% 0.850% 0.976%
$10<P3<=$15 0.654% 0.936% 1.305% 1.502% 1.410% 5.346% 5.623% 5.469% 5.694% 5.601% 0.233% 0.515% 0.931% 1.126% 1.034%
$15<P4<=$20 0.673% 1.096% 1.294% 1.294% 1.360% 3.207% 4.171% 4.192% 3.933% 4.398% 0.446% 0.819% 1.034% 1.058% 1.087%
P5>$20 0.915% 1.010% 1.209% 1.269% 1.291% 1.831% 2.072% 2.421% 2.807% 3.154% 0.833% 0.915% 1.100% 1.131% 1.124%
P1-P5 0.176% 0.333% 0.665% 0.732% 0.996% 11.096% 10.070% 11.809% 10.980% 8.977% -0.804% -0.541% -0.335% -0.187% 0.280%
t-stats 0.448 1.038 2.027 2.532 4.064 6.300 7.970 8.222 9.122 7.457 -2.191 -1.804 -1.141 -0.730 1.293
Degree of Freedom 521 521 521 509 521 42 42 42 41 42 478 478 478 467 478
Price Range Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
P1<=$5 11.949 13.000 13.423 12.131 11.850 0.128 0.368 0.626 0.981 35.485 135 146 154 206 339
$5<P2<=$10 13.759 13.216 13.342 13.547 13.677 0.136 0.372 0.626 0.960 12.018 84 119 148 179 167
$10<P3<=$15 15.020 14.800 13.897 14.167 14.479 0.142 0.369 0.622 0.951 13.018 60 109 121 120 89
$15<P4<=$20 14.894 15.756 14.815 14.734 15.100 0.145 0.368 0.619 0.945 25.379 54 98 101 89 60
P5>$20 17.297 17.034 16.569 16.288 15.853 0.148 0.364 0.613 0.935 37.305 229 342 289 221 134
At the end of each June from 1963 to 2006, we form 25 portfolios based on a firm's price level and BE/ME. Stocks are firstly sorted into 5 BE/ME quintile, then are sub-grouped into 5 price range 
portfolios.To be included in the portfolio, a stock must have both price and non-negative BE/ME ratio.
Performance of 25 Price and BE/ME Portfolios
Table 4.5
Panel A: 25 Price and BE/ME Portfolios; NYSE, AMEX  and NASDAQ Stocks; July 1963 to Dec 2006
Ln(Size) BE/ME Number of Stocks
Returns in All Months Returns in January Returns in Non-January Months
Panel B: Characteristics of 25 Price and BE/ME Portfolios; NYSE, AMEX  and NASDAQ Stocks; 1963 to 2006
Price Range Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
P1<=$5 1.875% 1.741% 1.859% 1.999% 2.072% 16.020% 12.074% 11.312% 11.508% 11.348% 0.606% 0.813% 1.010% 1.147% 1.239%
$5<P2<=$10 1.031% 1.166% 1.352% 1.615% 1.586% 10.047% 8.152% 7.369% 7.897% 8.231% 0.221% 0.540% 0.812% 1.051% 0.990%
$10<P3<=$15 0.801% 1.087% 1.276% 1.479% 1.582% 6.840% 6.172% 4.889% 5.364% 5.830% 0.259% 0.630% 0.952% 1.131% 1.201%
$15<P4<=$20 0.945% 0.896% 1.100% 1.348% 1.539% 5.309% 4.558% 3.652% 3.926% 4.634% 0.553% 0.567% 0.871% 1.117% 1.261%
P5>$20 0.890% 0.828% 1.048% 1.197% 1.381% 3.493% 2.173% 2.256% 2.548% 2.964% 0.657% 0.708% 0.939% 1.076% 1.238%
P1-P5 0.987% 0.908% 0.803% 0.659% 0.637% 12.520% 9.895% 9.026% 8.643% 8.269% -0.048% 0.102% 0.065% -0.057% -0.048%
t-stats 3.031 3.168 3.162 2.608 2.662 8.995 8.663 8.496 7.034 7.842 -0.168 0.384 0.280 -0.254 -0.220
Degree of Freedom 509 509 509 485 497 41 41 41 39 40 467 467 467 445 456
Price Range Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
P1<=$5 12.803 13.371 11.614 12.151 12.908 -0.779 0.009 0.062 0.094 0.302 516 234 101 82 177
$5<P2<=$10 12.965 13.781 13.349 14.139 12.872 -0.242 0.013 0.062 0.093 0.182 154 179 125 127 178
$10<P3<=$15 13.494 14.723 15.014 13.617 14.042 -0.182 0.017 0.063 0.093 0.159 62 118 125 135 134
$15<P4<=$20 14.635 14.567 15.809 14.423 14.549 -0.150 0.020 0.063 0.092 0.156 30 88 118 131 111
P5>$20 15.763 16.684 17.107 17.055 16.473 -0.117 0.023 0.063 0.091 0.234 71 258 410 408 285
Panel A: 25 Price and Liquidity Portfolios; NYSE, AMEX  and NASDAQ Stocks; July 1963 to Dec 2006
At the end of each June from 1963 to 2006, we form 25 portfolios based on a firm's price and E/P ratio. Stocks are firstly sorted into 5 E/P quintile, then are sub-grouped into 5 price range portfolios. To 
be included in the portfolio, a stock must have both E/P and price level data. 
Performance of 25 Price and E/P Portfolios
Table 4.6
Returns in January Returns in Non-January MonthsReturns in All Months
Number of Stocks
Panel B: Characteristics of 25 Price and BE/ME Portfolios; NYSE, AMEX  and NASDAQ Stocks; 1963 to 2006
Ln(Size) E/P
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Individual Stocks in All Months
Model Intercept ln(Price) ln(Size) MOM BE/ME E/P ln(LIQ) R-Square
1 Coefficient 0.018 -0.003 0.030
t-stat (4.232) -(3.739)
2 Coefficient 0.027 -0.003 -0.001 0.038
t-stat (4.764) -(2.728) -(2.439)
3 Coefficient 0.018 -0.004 0.060 0.042
t-stat (4.561) -(4.394) (6.220)
4 Coefficient 0.009 -0.002 0.000 0.012
t-stat (3.760) -(3.101) -(0.825)
5 Coefficient 0.009 -0.002 0.006 0.013
t-stat (3.675) -(3.421) (3.036)
6 Coefficient 0.014 -0.002 0.001 0.042
t-stat (3.117) -(1.750) (2.911)
7 Coefficient 0.011 -0.002 0.000 0.037 0.001 0.000 0.028
t-stat (2.099) -(2.810) -(0.888) (5.788) (4.685) -(0.586)
Panel B: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Individual Stocks in January
Model Intercept ln(Price) ln(Size) MOM BE/ME E/P ln(LIQ) R-Square
1 Coefficient 0.049 -0.007 0.031
t-stat (2.276) -(1.854)
2 Coefficient 0.043 -0.008 0.001 0.038
t-stat (1.942) -(1.461) (0.535)
3 Coefficient 0.047 -0.008 -0.019 0.044
t-stat (2.665) -(2.176) -(0.326)
4 Coefficient 0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.007
t-stat (0.575) -(0.045) -(1.008)
5 Coefficient 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.007
t-stat (0.491) (0.110) -(0.042)
6 Coefficient 0.054 -0.009 -0.002 0.041
t-stat (2.025) -(1.573) -(0.931)
7 Coefficient -0.008 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.013
t-stat -(0.831) -(0.041) (1.509) (0.318) -(0.102) (1.393)
Panel C: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Individual Stocks in Other Months
Model Intercept ln(Price) ln(Size) MOM BE/ME E/P ln(LIQ) R-Square
1 Coefficient 0.022 -0.004 0.041
t-stat (3.190) -(3.128)
2 Coefficient 0.025 -0.003 -0.001 0.047
t-stat (2.956) -(1.922) -(2.490)
3 Coefficient 0.022 -0.005 0.089 0.058
t-stat (3.369) -(3.493) (5.462)
4 Coefficient 0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.006
t-stat (3.158) -(3.053) -(0.108)
5 Coefficient 0.006 -0.001 0.010 0.007
t-stat (2.879) -(3.153) (2.402)
6 Coefficient 0.018 -0.003 0.001 0.050
t-stat (2.498) -(2.107) (2.835)
7 Coefficient 0.011 -0.001 -0.001 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.014
t-stat (2.562) -(3.267) -(1.799) (2.802) (0.537) -(1.698)
Table 4.7
Cross-Sectional Regressions for Individual Stocks
For each month t over July 1963 to December 2006, all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks are regressed on lagged 
accounting and return based variables. 'MOM' is the average return in the previous 6 months. BE/ME is defined as in 
Davis, Fama and French (2000).  E/P is the ratio of earning per share to share price. LIQ is liquidity measure of Amihud 
(2002). 
P1-P5 S1P1-S5P5 L5P1-L1P5
JANDM 0.086 0.093 0.097
(12.626) (12.496) (12.343)
FEBDM 0.015 0.022 0.019
(2.398) (3.103) (2.597)
MARDM 0.008 0.011 0.006
(1.199) (1.585) (0.874)
APRDM -0.001 0.007 -0.001
-(0.089) (1.049) -(0.178)
MAYDM 0.008 0.010 0.007
(1.336) (1.373) (0.964)
JUNEDM -0.009 -0.006 -0.009
-(1.333) -(0.901) -(1.152)
JULYDM 0.002 0.007 0.007
(0.324) (0.944) (0.930)
AUGDM -0.009 -0.006 -0.008
-(1.386) -(0.873) -(1.055)
SEPDM -0.005 0.000 0.001
-(0.783) -(0.003) (0.169)
OCTDM -0.005 -0.003 -0.007
-(0.820) -(0.470) -(0.918)
NOVDM -0.014 -0.015 -0.017
-(2.251) -(2.137) -(2.367)
DECDM -0.022 -0.024 -0.024
-(3.492) -(3.420) -(3.259)
ERM -0.150 -0.291 -0.194
-(3.146) -(5.530) -(3.524)
SMB 1.073 1.229 1.429
(17.054) (17.681) (19.661)
HML 0.004 0.104 0.314
(0.059) (1.281) (3.707)
MOM -0.141 -0.052 0.010
-(2.995) -(1.004) (0.182)
Adjusted R-squared 0.552 0.549 0.585
Wald F-statistic 
(JANDM =FEBDM =…=DECDM =0) 15.819 15.653 15.005
Table 4.8
Explaining the Price Strategy: Time-Series Regression
At the end of each June from 1963 to 2006, we form 5 price range portfolios and 25 portfolios based on 
a firm's price level and size or liquidity. Stocks are firstly sorted into 5 either size or liquidity quintile, 
then are sub-grouped into 5 price range portfolios. To be included in the 25 Price and Size portfolios, a 
stock must have shares outstanding and a price level. To be included in the 25 Price and Liquidity 
portfolios, a stock must have the illiquidity proxy of Amihud (2002). P1 (P5) stands for Penny (share 
price higher than $5) stock portfolio. S1 (S5) stands for the small (big) portfolio. L1 (L5) stands for the 
most liquid (illiquid) portfolio. The dependent variables are payoffs of three price strategies: buying 
penny- and selling high- price stocks (P1-P5), buying small penny- and selling big high- price stocks 
(S1P1-S5P5), and buying illiquid penny- and selling liquid high- price stocks (L5P1-L1P5). Fama and 
French factors: ERM, SMB, HML, and Momentum factor are  from Kenneth French's data library. 
JANDM, FEBDM,...DECDM are 12 dummy variables which indicate the months of the year.
Voting Rights
NAME B:A B A B-A t-stats B A B-A t-stats Payoff 1 t-stats Payoff 2 t-stats
KELLY SERVICES INC 1:0 27.656 26.558 1.098 6.698 0.437% 0.174% 0.263% 0.467 0.508% 0.639 0.355% 0.646
CITADEL HOLDING CORP 1:0 6.734 6.817 -0.083 -3.806 2.869% 2.880% -0.011% -0.024 3.446% 3.820 1.271% 2.788
GREIF BROTHERS CORP 1:0 49.394 51.203 -1.809 -4.185 2.491% 2.737% -0.246% -0.496 2.664% 2.630 0.454% 0.958
BEL FUSE INC 1:0 27.046 30.162 -3.116 -9.543 1.194% 0.810% 0.383% 0.725 0.854% 0.729 0.053% 0.100
ADVANTA CORP 1:0 21.205 22.608 -1.403 -8.570 1.256% 1.618% -0.361% -1.381 1.619% 1.084 0.641% 2.525
PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES INC 1:0 11.233 12.167 -0.934 -11.444 0.090% -0.178% 0.268% 0.944 -0.004% -0.003 0.523% 1.851
BALDWIN & LYONS INC 1:0 24.676 25.048 -0.372 -2.517 1.112% 1.122% -0.010% -0.014 2.161% 2.791 2.041% 3.140
VIACOM INC 1:0 35.814 35.693 0.121 4.888 -0.033% -0.004% -0.029% -0.622 0.025% 0.034 0.119% 2.666
BROWN FORMAN CORP 1:0 67.920 66.228 1.692 12.668 1.506% 1.540% -0.034% -0.200 1.576% 2.670 0.159% 0.931
MOOG INC 1:10 36.143 36.901 -0.758 -4.154 2.534% 1.968% 0.565% 0.932 2.951% 3.257 1.375% 2.347
BIO RAD LABORATORIES INC 1:10 59.504 59.733 -0.229 -3.023 2.033% 2.013% 0.020% 0.108 2.360% 2.267 0.622% 3.608
FOREST CITY ENTERPRISES INC 1:10 47.922 48.079 -0.158 -2.673 1.531% 1.515% 0.016% 0.132 1.570% 2.357 0.415% 3.596
CONSTELLATION BRANDS INC 1:10 31.366 31.458 -0.092 0.892 1.519% 1.484% 0.035% 0.347 1.529% 1.854 0.356% 2.367
WILEY JOHN & SONS INC 1:10 32.730 32.777 -0.047 -1.865 1.071% 1.075% -0.003% -0.031 1.297% 1.967 0.414% 4.487
DONEGAL GROUP INC 1:10 17.389 16.608 0.781 4.470 1.745% 2.114% -0.370% -0.376 2.835% 3.156 1.693% 1.823
GRAY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS INC 1:10 10.974 11.348 -0.375 -2.416 0.417% 0.154% 0.263% 0.521 0.497% 0.419 0.595% 1.199
K V PHARMACEUTICAL CO 1:20 23.265 23.863 -0.598 -4.651 1.293% 1.187% 0.106% 0.355 1.240% 0.968 0.386% 1.289
SENECA FOODS CORP NEW 1:20 19.663 20.035 -0.372 -5.487 0.929% 1.065% -0.136% -0.310 1.564% 2.674 1.317% 3.182
HUBBELL INC 1:20 43.591 41.593 1.998 9.221 1.362% 1.490% -0.128% -0.821 1.365% 1.821 0.067% 0.425
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC 1:200 2950 88699 -208 -3.537 1.053% 1.047% 0.005% 0.076 1.055% 2.294 0.206% 3.047
Price Strategies
At end of December 2001, we identify 20 stocks with dual class shares (A and B) in the CRSP database. Then we manually look up the voting rights ratios from companys' annual reports. This 
table reports the average monthly prices and returns for these 20 stocks from January 2002 to December 2007. There are two price strategies for each firm in the table. Payoff 1 is calculated as 
follows. At the end of each month, we only invest in the low-price class stock and hold for the next month. Payoff 2 is the average monthly return for a zero cost invesment: at the end of each 
month, long the low-price class and short the high price class. Portfolios are held for the following month and then rebalanced. For Berkshire Hathaway, the price strategy is based on the 
difference between A share and 30 times B share. In this table, we normalize "B" share as the share class which has 1 voting right, and "A" as another share class which has all other voting rights. 
Table 4.9
Price Strategy for Dual Class Stocks
Average Monthly Price Average Monthly Return
